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ABSTRACT
Intersections of food, energy, and water systems (the FEW nexus) pose many
sustainability and governance challenges, including risks to ecosystems, inequitable
distribution of benefits and harms across populations, and reliance on distant sources for
food, energy, and water. Nexus-based approaches can offer more holistic pathways for
societal transitions to FEW systems that are just and sustainable, but tend to focus
narrowly on inputs (e.g. water ‘for’ energy) in ways that do little to address the historical
roots and structural underpinnings of current system inadequacies, thus risking their
perpetuation.
This dissertation widens the FEW nexus in two contexts in which the nexus extends well
beyond inputs, and uses network analysis to characterize the rapidly-shifting global
energy system at the core of extractive activities in both cases. Chapter 2 provides an
integrated assessment of the trans-boundary FEW nexus in the Denver region,
considering impacts of extensive hydraulic fracturing of the Niobrara shale on both
agricultural activity and water resources.
Chapter 3 extends the FEW nexus to incorporate materials and directly address embodied
injustices and transboundary sustainability, and illustrates this expanded framing by
linking the northward expansion of the ‘forest frontier’ to the James Bay hydroelectric
megaproject in Eeyou Istchee/ Jamesie, Quebec. We estimate the region's interlinked
forest disturbances from hydropower, mining, clearcutting, fire, and roads since 1975 to
be about 106,000 km2, an area four times the size of Vermont, which receives about onethird of its electricity from Hydro-Quebec.
Finally, Chapter 4 employs network analysis to examine global oil and gas extraction
from 2014 to 2018, highlighting cooperation (‘collusion’) among global investor-owned,
hybrid, and national oil and gas companies in the face of existential threats to the industry
that crystallized around the US election of 2016. At a system level, the interdependence,
global reach, and combined power of the major extractors point to the necessity of a
supply-side approach to the reduction of global carbon emissions.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Nexus-based approaches to the study of food, energy, and water systems (FEWS) are
centered on the premise that these systems are fundamentally interdependent and
therefore need to be examined in relation to one another in order to ensure resilience and
sustainability. A key corollary is that FEW systems, framed as the basic underpinnings of
modern life, are also profoundly inequitable. It has been estimated that 800 million
people are hungry and 2 billion experience moderate or severe food insecurity (FAO et
al., 2019), 1.2 billion live in water-scarce regions (Bigas et al., 2013), 1.2 billion do not
have access to electricity, more than 2.7 billion rely on traditional biomass for cooking
(WEO, 2016), and 700 million live on less than $1.90 per day (World Bank, 2015).
Recent calls for research on the interdependencies between food, energy, and water
systems (Belmont Forum, Urban Europe, and European Commission, 2016; National
Science Foundation, 2016) highlight the critical and often-overlooked linkages among
these systems, emphasizing that solutions focused on one often have unintended
consequences for the other two.
The food-energy-water (FEW) nexus approach offers new ways to identify
regional vulnerabilities and opportunities to transition to more just and sustainable uses of
FEWS. For example, large, unmonitored surface water withdrawals for thermoelectric
power plant cooling across the United States (Averyt et al., 2011; Bazilian et al., 2011)
are of particular concern in the arid southwestern US. Such research has prompted the
design of more water efficient electricity generation and provided additional impetus for
the shift in arid regions to wind and solar power, renewable energy alternatives which

1

require very little water input. The FEW approach can also be used to identify the
dependencies of mega-cities on other regions for both real and ‘embodied’ water required
for food and energy production (Anu Ramaswami et al., 2017), also referred to as virtual
water (Hoeckstra et al). The closely related ‘resource nexus,’ identifies five interrelated
nodes, encompassing materials and land as well as food, energy, and water (AndrewsSpeed et al., 2012; Bleischwitz, Hoff, et al., 2018; Bleischwitz, Spataru, et al., 2018).
FEW / resource nexus approaches are especially relevant as the global energy
system is undergoing a disjointed and politically contested sociotechnical transition away
from fossil fuels to alternative forms of energy and as global grassroots efforts intensify
to transition to more sustainable systems. In this context, interdependencies can be
quantified in terms of embodied energy and water inputs to FEWS (e.g. water for
thermoelectric power generation or energy for food transport). The impacts among these
essential and entangled systems (e.g energy extraction on water and food systems) and
who disproportionately bears the burden of these impacts, along with the historical
conditions, political factors, and systemic inequities that have led to current unsustainable
and inequitable transboundary patterns of extraction, production, and consumption, are
less often the focus of inquiry (although a small subset of FEWS research does address
these topics (e.g. Allouche et al., 2014; Foran, 2015; Middleton et al., 2015)). Such a
focus is needed to more firmly link FEW nexus inquiry to research and action that
supports both a just and sustainable transition.
In this dissertation I widen the aspects of the nexus to examine not just FEW
inputs, but also impacts on FEW systems and the surrounding environment, as well as
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access to and control over FEW systems and material resources. I ask, what are the
embodied FEW injustices and transboundary unsustainabilities that are intertwined with
present FEW systems? I use two case studies and a network analysis to illustrate these
conceptual framings: 1) the Denver Region in the United States, a key producer of both
food and energy, 2) the contested territory of Eeyou Istchee/Jamesie, Quebec, the site of
the largest hydropower complex in the Western Hemisphere, and 3) a multiplex analysis
of the global oil and gas production network from 2014-2018. In this brief introduction, I
will review a number of recent critiques of the nexus approach, providing context and
justification for these proposed extensions to the FEW /resource nexus, before
elaborating briefly on these extensions as they are implemented through the three
chapters comprising this dissertation.
1.1 FEW Nexus Critiques
A number of authors point out that the FEW nexus is not a new idea: it builds on other
earlier integrative approaches, most notably the Integrated Water Resource Management
(IWRM) (Wichelns 2017; Cairns and Krzywoszynska 2016). Cai et al. (2018) argue that
in contrast to IWRM, the FEW nexus approach has a clearer scope, explicitly setting the
sectoral bounds (i.e., food, energy, and water resources) of integration, whereas IWRM
attempts to integrate all resources and objectives related to water, and is often subject to
institutional barriers (Cai et al 2018: 260). The fluidity of the FEW nexus concept has
been well articulated; nexus investigations take on different manifestations depending on
context, scale and geography (Matthews & Motta, 2015). It has also been noted that the
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FEW nexus approach may miss trade-offs and conflicts with other excluded sectors (Leck
et al 2015, Pittock et al. 2013).
The nexus has also been characterized as a “buzzword:” a powerful term that
combines “ambiguity of meaning and strong normative resonance,” delineating power
struggles over competing narratives and “nodes around which ideological battles are
fought” (Cairns and Krzywoszynska 2016: 4, Stubbs, 2001: 188 cited in Mautner, 2005)).
As a corollary to the integrative imaginary, the nexus is seen as a multidisciplinary
problem requiring multi-disciplinary approaches (Leck et al; Albrecht et al 2018), and
can be “understood as a problem that is impossible to grasp, or respond to adequately,
from within the partial framings of individual academic disciplines” (Cairns and
Krzywoszynska 2016: 8).
Stakeholders use the term nexus in multiple and heterogeneous ways, and there is
not yet a singular ‘nexus discourse’ (Cairns & Krzywoszynska, 2016: 2). Endo et al.
observe that there is no clear definition of the nexus, but in the international context it has
been interpreted as a process to link different stakeholders under different sectors and
spatial scales to achieve sustainable development” (2017: 21). Leck et al. characterize the
FEW nexus as an “intellectually appealing” concept that faces significant conceptual and
practical challenges, including “lack of clarity about what a ‘successful’ nexus approach
looks like in practice and how it can be achieved” (2015: 446,454).
Another key critique of the FEW nexus approach is that, like other integrative
practices that have failed to deliver in practice, the nexus concept inadequately addresses
political economy, defined as “the role of power and vested interests in resource
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allocation, linkages to markets and equitable approaches for negotiating inter-temporal
trade-offs” (Leck 2015: 453; Peronne and Hornberger 2014; Rees 2013). This
shortcoming is seen as significant: Allouche et al contend that “if the nexus is to be a
useful framework for exploring alternative pathways rather than a narrative that
legitimizes existing dominant pathways, the political economy of the nexus must be more
explicitly addressed” through bottom-up rather than “top-down ways of knowing the
relationship between water, food and energy” (2014: 23). Cairns and Krzywoszynska
argue that attending to such questions of power is a “crucial but often underplayed aspect
of proposed integration” (2016: 11). Williams et al note that “by its very conception, ‘the
nexus’ betokens political terrain,” stating that the “contested relationships, processes and
technologies through which energy and water become enrolled in nexus interactions – the
political production of the nexus – are drastically overlooked in existing scholarship” and
that there is “a striking absence of theoretically informed spatial and political analysis of
the nexus” (2014: 4).
At the core of the nexus are control ‘over’ and access ‘to’ food, energy, water, but
the deep linkages between access and the key societal structures enabling, permitting, and
denying such access are often overlooked. As Leck et al (2015: 53) write:
Access to and utilization of water, energy and food are closely linked with
structural issues such as political processes, poverty and entitlements; the
prevailing development and political-economic environment will therefore
strongly influence both the way in which nexus approaches are implemented and
their outcomes (Allouche et al. 2014; Dupar and Oates 2012; Pittock et al. 2013;
Rees 2013). However, political economic considerations are largely underrepresented in nexus research with analyses often completely neglecting political
contexts or overlooking underlying existing unsustainable activities… Identifying
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winners and losers in WEF nexus decision-making and giving explicit attention to
justice and equity concerns are central for nexus agendas to be socially
progressive (Dupar and Oates 2012; Stringer et al. 2014).”
In addition to these critiques, a number of suggestions have been offered for
future nexus research. Many researchers call for more critical, theoretically informed
perspectives. Leck et al. propose the use of analytical eclecticism, defined by Sil and
Katzenstein as “an intellectual stance that supports efforts to complement, engage and
selectively utilize theoretical constructs embedded in contending research traditions to
build complex arguments that bear on substantive problems” (Sil and Katzenstein 2010:
411). This potentially effective lens could guide nexus research in navigating the
boundaries among disciplines and is unique in specifying how “elements of different
causal factors might coexist as part of a more complex argument that bears on problems
of interest to both scholars and practitioners.” This lens also facilitates dialogue across
disciplines through utilizing rather than “replacing critical research efforts by adherents
of specific traditions” (Leck et al 2015: 451-452).
In following chapters, I consciously apply the lens of ‘analytical eclecticism’ and
explore the embodied inequities that are associated with the FEW / resource nexus. In
Chapter 2, I undertake an integrated assessment of the food-energy-water nexus in the
ten-county Denver region, finding that the impacts of energy production ‘on’ regional
water systems are as critical to assessing the FEW nexus as quantifying the inputs of
water ‘to’ those systems. In Chapter 3, I extend the FEW nexus to include Materials,
Embodied iNjustices and Transboundary Sustainability (FEW+M+EN+TS), addressing
issues of impacts ‘on’ as well as access ‘to’ and control ‘over’ FEW+M systems. In so
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doing, these chapters directly address major challenges for the nexus concept and trace
different causal factors that coexist as part of a more complex argument. In Chapter 3
specifically, the integration of historical and political economic considerations, and the
need to give explicit attention to justice and equity concerns, is addressed through the
concept of embodied injustices and illustrated by a case study of intensifying resource
extraction and infrastructure development by outside entities in a contested landscape for
the benefit of distant consumers over a 40-year period. Chapter 4 focuses on the fossil
energy system, examining the spatial dimensions of global oil and gas production
network in the critical 5-year period before, during, and after the 2016 US presidential
election (2014-2018). Like Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 focuses on the political economy
in which the energy system operates. Across the three chapters, transdisciplinary
approaches are utilized, spanning the fields of remote sensing, geographic information
systems, network analysis, critical geography, forestry, history, policy studies, and
ecology. Additionally, I seek to offer a framing that is flexible enough to accommodate
local contexts and still be generalizable.
The following three subsections provide additional background on each of these
extensions: ‘materials,’ with an emphasis on mining, embodied FEW injustices and
transboundary sustainability.
1.2 The Resource Nexus: FEW + Materials
A number of nexus approaches include “materials” as part of a broader “resource
nexus” (e.g. Bleischwitz et al. 2017; Bleischwitz et al. 2018; Andrews-Speed et al. 2012),
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and while some studies use the food-energy-water and “resource nexus” interchangeably
(Foran 2015) others do not. Liu et al. 2017 distinguish between “the water, energy and
food security nexus, and the concept of resource nexus [which] can also be found in the
literature – water, energy, land and minerals” (Liu et al., 2017: 1716). A 2012 report on
the “Global Resource Nexus” written from the perspective of “transatlantic actors and
interests” (that is, the EU, the United States, and Canada) includes a security perspective,
identifying three realms of the resource nexus: markets, state interests and interstate
relations, and local human security (Andrews-Speed et al 2012: 5). The Routledge
handbook on the resource nexus defines it “as a set of context-specific critical
interlinkages between two or more natural resources used as inputs into systems
providing essential services to humans, such as water, energy, and food,” and outlines “a
clearly defined five-node nexus for the systems of water, energy, food, land, and
materials that seeks to provide consistency, focus, and adaptability to the respective scope
and context of analysis and application” (Bleischwitz et al 2017:4; italics added).
Bleischwitz et al further subdivide materials (defined as “non-energy abiotic
resources”) into metals and critical minerals, construction minerals, industrial minerals,
and mineral fertilizers. Materials are essential for housing and shelter and account for up
to 50% of natural resource use. Moreover, base metals, critical minerals, and construction
minerals have important implications for energy production, storage, and distribution,
water provision and re-use, and urbanization. Mineral fertilizers are also key inputs for
food production: mining is the source of potassium and phosphates, two key plant
nutrients in mineral fertilizers. Moreover, the environmental impacts, including land and
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water resource degradation and GHG emissions of base metals and nutrients are
considerable (paragraph, Bleischwitz et al 2018: 8; Hertwich et al., 2010). Mining
additionally provides the materials needed to build the machinery and information and
computing technologies critical to current FEW systems.
Humphreys (in Bleischwitz et al 2017: 266) points out the linkages between
mining and the resource nexus, including land, water, energy, and food production.
Mining requires land for the exploitation of ores as well as for the disposal of the
substantial waste generated; an estimated 60 billion tons of material are removed from
the earth each year (Humphreys 2017; Ericsson, 2016). Mining also requires
considerable amounts of water to wash and process minerals: “It is estimated on average
to take around 172 tons (thousand litres) of water to produce one ton of copper and 107
tons to produce one ton of nickel. Some 600–700 tons of water are required to produce 1
kilogram of gold” (Humphreys 2017: 270). Moreover, “mining has enormous impacts on
the quality, quantity, and flow patterns of water, but as it flows, seeps, and drains, water
also remakes mining landscapes physically and politically” (Marston 2017). Similarly,
large quantities of energy are needed to recover, smelt, and refine minerals: Energy
represents a approximately “one quarter of the total cost of producing the major metals.
Associated with this use of energy, the industry is responsible for significant emissions of
greenhouses gases to the atmosphere” (Humphreys 2017: 271). Moreover, linkages
between other resource systems and mining have become more important as the pressure
on these other resource systems increases, and may turn out to be more critical in
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constraining mining development than the physical availability of mineral ores
(Humphreys 2017: 266).
1.3 ‘Embodiment’ and embodied injustices at the resource nexus
The FEW / resource nexus literature generally envisions the interdependencies among
these systems in terms of the inputs to one system from by another (e.g. water inputs for
food ). The concepts of embodied (‘virtual’) water and energy are widely used in FEW
nexus studies to quantify the water and energy needed for food and energy production
and for obtaining water supply; e.g the water inputs for electricity generation and
agricultural crops (Ramaswami et al 2017; Konar et al 2011; Hoekstra and Mekonnen
2011), the energy impacts of high-volume hydraulic fracturing (HVHF) and horizontal
drilling on water resources and farming systems (Ahamed et al. 2017); and the
environmental and social impacts of hydropower (Rosenberg et al 1995; Nilsson and
Berggren 2000).
Although the water inputs to high-volume hydraulic fracturing (HVFH, or
‘fracking’) are relatively small compared to water withdrawals for thermoelectric power
and crop irrigation, the water footprint of fracking continues to intensify in the United
States alongside its escalating oil and gas extraction, and fracking in combination with
horizontal drilling have potentially far-reaching impacts on water, food systems, and
helth. Hydropower, by contrast, can be viewed as a quintessentially ‘entangled’ water and
energy system, wherein all the water of a dammed river serves as input to energy
generation and is embodied in the resulting electricity. The embodied impacts of the
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energy system reverberate through the hydrological (water) system, which in turn impact
the wider social-ecological systems that it supports. Considering hydropower projects to
be global assemblages (Ogden et al. 2013), Gutteriez et al (2019) draw attention to the
multiple scales, locations, and contingent relationships entangled with hydropower
development. Dam mega-projects are seen as a vital tool for state building, with three
political elements characterizing global hydropower assemblages: 1) large hydropower as
a symbol for national development; 2) hydropower as a “locus of resistance” for
transnational political activism; and 3) the “ongoing alteration of river systems organized
according to the purported logic of renewable energy transitions” (Gutteriez et al 2019:
102).
Drawing on ideas of embodiment as well as the fields of environmental and
energy justice, Healy et al. introduce the concept of “embodied energy injustice,” which
“explicitly integrates previously unrecognized social-environmental harms and
injustices,” exposing the “disproportionate distribution of such harms on vulnerable
peoples situated along energy supply chains” (2019: 219, 221) focusing primarily on
fossil fuels. They observe that conceptualizations of embodied energy injustices can: 1)
help situate chains of energy injustices and place-based energy struggles within wider
national and regional energy politics and 2) address regulatory gaps in energy governance
by expanding the scope of energy decisions and processes, providing a framework to
situate and understand place-based injustices as part of an unjust global order (Healy et
al. 2019).
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In the same way, and with equal urgency, conceptualizing embodied food, energy,
water, and material (FEWM) injustices can situate chains of interacting FEWM injustices
and place-based struggles within wider politics, decisions, and processes across multiple
interacting lifecycles and supply chains. As with embodied energy injustice, this multisystem perspective reveals deep inequities within and among nations and generations. In
conceptualizing embodied FEWM injustices on vulnerable and disenfranchised local
populations along the transboundary supply chain, control ‘over,’ access ‘to,’ and
impacts ‘on’ food, water, energy, materials, and land should also be understood as critical
dimensions of the FEW/resource nexus. In this context, embodied FEW injustices at the
nexus occur when: 1) control over land, water, and energy resources systematically
disenfranchises vulnerable populations; 2) the environmental and health impacts of
interdependent FEWM systems disproportionately affect these groups; 3) access to food,
energy, water, land and material well-being of generally local vulnerable communities
are systematically hampered, jeopardized or denied to benefit generally distant
consumers.
In the first chapter, I describe the FEW nexus in the Denver Region, where
possible quantifying inputs from each system to the other two, and examining the types
of ecosystem risks associated with FEW system intersections. I also examine the
distribution of these risks across the Denver Region, how they are changing over time,
and consider what type of indicators are needed to address these questions, as well as the
limitations of such metrics. In the second chapter, I extend the FEW / resource nexus to
include embodied injustices and transboundary sustainability (FEW+M+EN+TS) and
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apply this extended lens to a northern “resource frontier” first opened to development 45
years ago by the James Bay hydropower megaproject, where extractive efforts, given
concrete expression in Quebec’s 2011 Plan Nord, are now accelerating at the same time
that hydropower is being re-branded as clean energy. In each of these cases, flows of
food, energy, and water across political and administrative boundaries from sites of
production (sources) to sites of consumption (sinks) are central to questions of both
equity and sustainability.
1.4 Transboundary sustainability: Linking Production and Consumption Through
Infrastructure
The notion of transboundary sustainability (TS) is vital to integrated, coherent efforts to
increase sustainability at local, regional, national and international levels. Urban areas are
responsible for much of the global demand for food, energy, water, and materials, and
cities seeking to improve their overall sustainability and health are increasingly adopting
a FEW nexus perspective (Ramaswami et al., 2016; Ramaswami et al., 2017; Zhang et
al., 2011). Transportation, energy, and water infrastructure are key support sectors for
and components of FEW systems, serving as connective tissue linking many components
of FEW supply and demand across large distances. While food distribution systems and
mining depend on road networks, energy and water systems have their own dedicated
complex infrastructures of grids and pipes for transport across long distances. These
infrastructures are highly interdependent; transportation enables the building of energy
and water distribution networks and is necessary for material extraction and removal, as
well as food distribution.
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Embodied FEW+M injustices are also closely interlinked with teleconnected,
multiscalar supply chains that span multiple regions, administrative units, and provincial,
state and national boundaries. Environmental impacts and embodied injustices affect
vulnerable communities along supply chains of varying complexity. Fossil fuel supply
chains, for example, typically include hundreds of small and large-scale public and
private corporations in numerous locations around the world, while hydropower
megaprojects such as the James Bay Project may involve a single utility company,
making it ostensibly easier to expose social and environmental impacts and injustices. As
the James Bay case demonstrates, however, even when the actors are known, successfully
opposing and defeating such projects is fraught with difficulty.
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CHAPTER 2: THE FOOD-ENERGY-WATER NEXUS, REGIONAL
SUSTAINABILITY, AND HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: AN INTEGRATED
ASSESSMENT OF THE DENVER REGION
Abstract
Intersections of food, energy, and water systems (also termed the FEW nexus) pose many
sustainability and governance challenges for urban areas, including risks to ecosystems,
inequitable distribution of benefits and harms across populations, and reliance on distant
sources for food, energy, and water. This case study provides an integrated assessment of
the FEW nexus at the city and regional scale in ten contiguous counties encompassing the
rapidly growing Denver region in the United States. Spatial patterns in FEW
consumption, production, trans-boundary flows, embodied FEW inputs, and impacts on
FEW systems were assessed using an urban systems framework for the trans-boundary
food-energy-water nexus. The Denver region is an instructive case study of the FEW
nexus for multiple reasons: it is rapidly growing, is semi-arid, faces a large projected
water shortfall, and is a major fossil fuel and agricultural producer. The rapid uptake of
high-volume hydraulic fracturing (HVHF) combined with horizontal drilling in populated
areas poses ongoing risks to regional water quality. Through this case study, fracking is
identified as a major topic for FEW nexus inquiry, with intensifying impacts on water
quantity and quality that reflect nationwide trends. Key data gaps are also
identified, including energy for water use and food preparation. This case study is
relevant to water and sustainability planners, energy regulators, communities impacted by
hydraulic fracturing, and consumers of energy and food produced in the Denver region. It
is applicable beyond Denver to dry areas with growing populations, agricultural activity,
and the potential for shale development.
Key Message
Readers of this case study will be able to define the food-energy-water nexus and
describe emerging conceptual frameworks for examining the FEW nexus at local and
regional scales. Readers will become familiar with both challenges in applying such
frameworks and insights the FEW nexus approach can offer into complex issues
surrounding sustainability.
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Key substantive content: An integrated spatial assessment of the food-energywater (FEW) nexus, focusing on: a) production, b) consumption, c) trans-boundary flows,
d) embodied water and energy inputs, e) and embodied impacts (e.g. the impact of energy
systems on regional water supplies).
Key message: As the water footprint of hydraulic fracturing continues to
intensify in the United States alongside the country’s escalating oil and gas extraction,
fracking poses particular risks to water and food systems in regions where energy and
food production are co-located. Given its role in expanding fossil fuel production and
potential impacts on water and food systems, hydraulic fracturing is an important subject
for emerging trans-disciplinary FEW nexus inquiry.
2.1 Introduction
Global food, energy and water (FEW) systems are profoundly interconnected: 70% of
global freshwater withdrawals are for agricultural production (1); 8% of total global
energy is used for water pumping, treatment, and distribution (2); and in the U.S. the
amount of water withdrawn for electricity generation rivals that used by the agricultural
sector (3). Solutions focused on just one of these systems, or on one geographic region,
often have unintended consequences for other systems and regions. Interconnected FEW
systems also have profound impacts on the overall environment, reshaping and
profoundly altering land and ecosystems at large scales.
The FEW nexus has been broadly defined as the intersections among food,
energy, and water systems that have major impacts on: a) natural resources, particularly
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water, energy, nutrients b) pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, and c) “the security
of FEW supplies essential to the well-being of the world’s population” (4). The FEW
nexus approach is seen as a promising way to identify and quantify the potential
synergies in food, energy, and water security, while also reducing trade-offs, increasing
efficiency, improving governance, and working to protect ecosystems (5). Integrated
nexus assessments often focus on understanding the linkages between domains, such as
water to generate thermoelectric power (6,7). Central to these assessments are attempted
quantifications of the embodied, or virtual, water and energy required across different
segments of FEW life cycles, but there are major gaps in the data and methodological
approaches needed for such efforts (4).
High-volume hydraulic fracturing (HVHF) – “fracking” – combined with
horizontal drilling is a timely, important, and contentious example of the interconnection
between water and energy systems: it is a water-intensive process that uses high-pressure
water to create cracks in underground shale formations to extract previously inaccessible
gas and petroleum (8). It has been described as a “wicked” problem: one involving
complex and opaque science and policymaking, overlapping areas of policy jurisdiction,
requiring coordinated action among divided stakeholders, and resulting in limited
solutions with complex consequences (9,10).
Fracking and drilling have potentially far-reaching impacts on water systems (11–
13); recent research also maps the linkages between fracking and food systems (14).
These impacts are unevenly distributed both in space (15,16) and across populations (17–
19), with the potential to compromise water quality if not carefully managed (20,21). In
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the United States vast shale reserves extend from the Appalachian Mountains to the
Northern Plains to the Gulf Coast (22). These processes have become widely used in the
span of less than a decade (22), and have propelled the United States to become the top
global producer of petroleum and gas in the world, surpassing Russia in natural gas in
2009 and Saudi Arabia in petroleum in 2013 (23), with output set to increase even further
in the coming years.
It has been widely noted that the water inputs for high volume hydraulic
fracturing are small compared to the requirements of agriculture and other industry
(24,25) and the growing FEW nexus literature generally has not considered fracking to be
a subject of inquiry. In this case study, however, the FEW nexus approach led to the
identification of hydraulic fracturing as a key issue at the intersection of regional food,
energy and water systems. Systematic consideration of both inputs to as well as impacts
on FEW systems are vital to a full picture of the challenges posed by hydraulic fracturing
for regional communities, that is, both the quantity of water inputs needed for fracking
and the observed and potential impact of fracking on regional water quality.
However, as with FEW nexus data in general, water quality data related to
hydraulic fracturing are limited, diverse, and often difficult to access (9). In 2014 one
review called the physical science literature on fracking “remarkably inconclusive” (26),
and much is unknown about current and potential impacts of HVHF and drilling on water
quality. At the same, understanding how frequently these operations impact groundwater
quality is essential to assessing drinking water safety and risk in regions around the
country where these practices are common (27), particularly as nationwide oil and gas
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production continues to increase.
2.2 Case Examination

The Denver region has several characteristics that make it an instructive case study of the
trans-boundary FEW nexus: it is rapidly growing, semi-arid, has diminishing
groundwater reserves, and is a principal fossil fuel exporter and major agricultural
producer. The ten counties included in this study had an estimated total population of
3,375,000 in 2015, grew by 20% in the preceding ten years, and are projected to gain an
additional 1.2 million residents by 2035 (28,29). Eight of the ten counties in the region sit
at least partially atop the Niobrara, a major shale formation that has among the highest oil
and gas outputs in the country (30).
The Denver region receives between 6 and 16 inches of precipitation annually
and sits atop the Denver Basin Aquifer, a largely non-renewable and extensively drilled
groundwater reserve (Figure 2-1). Regional agriculture and Denver area municipalities
already rely on major diversions of water from the Western slope of the Rocky
Mountains over the Continental Divide to the Eastern Slope. As human settlements
encroach on land previously used for agriculture, growing municipalities are permanently
buying water rights from farmers, a policy known as ‘buy and dry.’ The state is facing an
anticipated 163 billion gallon (500,000 acre-feet) water shortfall by 2050, twice the
amount currently used by Denver Water’s 1.3 million residents (29,31).
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Figure 2-1. The ten-county study area. Cultivated land, the Denver Basin aquifer
system, and the Niobrara Shale Formation are overlaid with municipal extents. The inset
depicts the location of the Denver region within the southwestern United States. Data
sources: USDA Cropland Data Layer, Denver Region Council of Governments, US
Geological Survey, US Energy Information Administration.

Similar to rapidly-growing counties located above the rich gas reserves of the
Barnett shale in Texas, Weld, Boulder, Broomfield and Adams Counties in the Denver
region are in the midst of a “perfect storm” where expanding surface development meets
mineral extraction (32). In Colorado this ‘split-estate’ system creates conflict between
surface owners and those who own the mineral rights located below the surface (21).
Responsibility for well and land reclamation in the case of abandoned wells is also a major
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concern under this system (34).
The following research questions, relevant to identifying more sustainable system
interconnections at multiple spatial scales, are addressed:
1. To what extent can the FEW nexus in the region be described and quantified?
2. What types of ecosystem risks are associated with these activities?
3. How are risks distributed across the landscape and how are they changing over
time?
4. What available and emerging indicators are needed to address these questions? In
what ways are such metrics limited?

2.2.1 Methods
Extending an existing urban system framework: One way to assess FEW system
intersections is through the concept of embodied water and energy. Embodied energy
refers to the energy needed for food and water-related activities across the life cycle,
including energy for pumping, distribution, and wastewater treatment. Similarly,
embodied water refers to the water needed for energy and food related activities across
the life cycle (Figure 2-2Error! Reference source not found.a). This case study builds o
n the urban systems framework to assess the trans-boundary FEW nexus first proposed in
2017 by Ramaswami et al. that they used to quantify direct and embodied flows of food,
energy, and water for the city of Delhi, India (4). Not considered in that case were intracity differences, changes over time, and in-boundary FEW production.
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Figure 2-2a and b. Illustration of the pairwise relations in the FEW Nexus framework for
developing spatially explicit indicators at the urban-regional scale, considering (a) inputs
to and (b) impacts on food, energy and water systems.
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The current study extends that framework by including data from ten counties
and more than forty municipalities. Also included is an assessment of in-boundary
energy and food production for export, as well as changes to FEW systems over the past
decade. Embodied impacts on FEW systems situated within broader ecosystems as well
as embodied inputs to FEW systems are also systematically considered (Table 2-1 and
Figure 2-2b).
Table 2-1. FEW relations, focusing on impacts, including examples specific to hydraulic
fracturing and a category for impacts on overall ecosystems.
Pairwise Relation
Examples (*specific to hydraulic fracturing)
Wimpact àE Impact of water
*Use of recycled water for oil and gas
quality across the
extraction.
energy life cycle
Wimpact àF Impact of water
Recycled water for agriculture; access to clean
quality across the
water for food preparation; *Impacts from
food life cycle
decline in water quality on soil, land, and
ecosystem productivity (crops/animal health);
Eimpact àW Energy-related risks
*Aquifer contamination through gas leakage
to/impacts on water
from improper construction or failing wells;
systems
water resource contamination through spills,
leaks, and waste management; accumulation of
metals and radioactive elements in aquatic
sediments at disposal and spill sites (13,20)
Eimpact àF Energy-related
*[Second order] impacts from decline in water
impacts on food
quality on soil, land, and ecosystem
systems
productivity (crops/animal health); effects of
fracking-related air pollution on pollinators;
effects on development of local, alternative
food systems; fracking-related boom-bust
dynamics (14).
Extent of interactions among frac fluid and
wastewater constituents is not well-understood
(61).
Eimpactà
Energy-related
*Total environmental study paradigm for the
Ecosystems impacts on socialimpacts of fracking, including the
ecological system as a anthroposphere , atmosphere, hydrosphere,
whole
lithosphere, and biosphere (62)
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Fimpact àW

Food-related impacts
on water systems

Nutrient pollution of lakes, rivers and streams
from agricultural runoff (4)

This characterization focuses on: a) FEW production, b) FEW consumption, c)
trans-boundary flows of food, energy, and water d) embodied FEW inputs e) and embodied
FEW impacts. Where such data was not already available in GIS format, geo-referenced
maps based on state, county, and regional boundary files were created. Additional detail
about data sources, processing steps, and calculations are included in Supplementary
Materials.
Co-production of supply and demand metrics with regional FEW experts was
also undertaken. Analysts from regional utilities, regional data providers, infrastructure
consultants, and city sustainability coordinators were consulted to gain additional
perspectives on regionally important FEW nexus topics. During June-August 2016, semistructured interviews were conducted with representatives from several organizations
involved in FEW nexus governance, service provision, and research. These organizations
included the Denver Region Council of Governments (DRCOG), Xcel Energy, Denver
Water, the National Center for Atmospheric Research, and the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory. The goal of these interviews was to obtain feedback on our initial
research questions, identify relevant data sources, and build working relationships.
2.3 Food, energy, and water demand in the Denver region
Per day, the Denver region consumes an estimated 68.9 GWh of electricity; 378,000 MCF
of natural gas for residential and industrial heating; and 1403 M gallons of water (35,36).
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Approximately 114,000 tons of coal, crude petroleum, transport fuels, and natural gas; and
46,000 tons of food and agricultural products are imported into the region per day. Energy
imports totaled $9.67 billion and food-related imports totaled $17.6 billion in 2015,
including food and energy products that are produced within the region (37).
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Figure 2-3. Region-wide and per household water, electricity and natural gas
consumption. Data sources: USGS and Xcel Energy.

City-wide and per capita FEW consumption within the region varies widely
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(Figure 2-3). Aggregate energy demand is greater within more densely populated cities
and towns, but per household demand in these areas tends to be lower. Denver and
Boulder, for example, consume the most electricity and natural gas in aggregate but have
the lowest energy consumption per household (Figure 2-4; see Supplementary Materials
for additional details and calculations.]
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Figure 2-4. FEW Multi-Metric Visual Tools. (Top): The three axes display regional
production and consumption of food (green), water (blue), and energy (orange).
(Bottom): City-level FEW sustainability metrics for selected muncipalities in the region.

2.4 Food, energy, and water supply in the Denver region
Per day, approximately 186,000 tons of coal, crude petroleum, transport fuels, and natural
gas and 39,000 tons of food and agricultural products are exported from the region. Fossil
fuel extraction and food production are major activities: 44,000 oil and gas wells yielded
120 million barrels of oil and 686 million MCF in 2017 (38). Twenty-four percent of the
land area was categorized as cultivated in 2015 (39). Energy exports totaled $19.7 billion,
while food-related exports totaled $13.8 billion in 2015, including goods consumed
within the region (37). Notably, much of this fossil fuel extraction and food production is
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occurring in the same place: 68% of the region’s 44,000 oil and gas wells are located on
farmland (Error! Reference source not found.), directly impacting land and water r
esources used for regional food production.
Intraregional differences in food and energy production are significant. Energy
and agricultural activities are concentrated in Weld County, which has 81% of the
region’s oil and gas wells (38). Agriculture sales (80% livestock and 20% crops) are
consistently in the top ten nationwide; in 2012 sales amounted to $1.86 billion, a 21%
increase from 2007 (40). Annual oil output in Weld County rose nine-fold to 118 million
barrels and natural gas output more than tripled to 678 million MCF between 2006 and
2016. In neighboring Boulder County, by contrast, annual oil output fell from 27% to
97,000 barrels and natural gas output fell from 38% to 1.5 MCF during the same period
(38), due to a county-wide moratorium on fracking from 2012-2017, renewed for another
two years in 2018 (41). [See Supplementary Materials for additional details and
calculations.]
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Figure 2-5. Energy and food production in the Denver Region. (a) Surface locations of
oil and gas wells: As of Jan 2018, the region has a total of approximately 44,000 oil and
gas wells. Data sources: COGCC and EIA. (b) Extent of the Denver region’s crop and
pastureland. Human settlement is encroaching onto land previously used for irrigated
agriculture. Data sources: USDA and DRCOG.
2.5 Transboundary Flows
According to freight data, in 2015 the region exported 14 megatons of food and
agricultural products, generating $13.8 billion in revenue, and 67 megatons of energyrelated products, generating $19.7 billion (Figure 6). Per megaton, the value of food
produced in the region was about $1 billion, while per megaton of fossil fuels the value is
$295,000 (37).
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Food: The region is a net food importer. In 2015, 10 megatons of food-related
commodities were imported into the Denver region. By contrast, 7.6 megatons were
exported to destinations around the country. An additional 6.5 megatons produced in the
region were also consumed in the region.
Energy: The region is a net energy exporter. In 2015, 37 megatons of energyrelated commodities were imported into the Denver region. By contrast, 63 megatons
were exported to destinations around the country. An additional 4.7 megatons produced
in the region were consumed in the region.
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Figure 2-6 (panel; 4 maps). Food and energy imports and exports from the Denver
Region. Food and agricultural imports and exports from the Denver Region in 2015.
Energy imports and exports from the Denver Region in 2015. Data source: Center for
Transportation Analysis.
Water: Seventy to 80% of Colorado’s precipitation falls west of the Continental
Divide and 80-90% of the state’s population lives east of the Divide. The Colorado-Big
Thompson Project (C-BT), built between 1938 and 1956, supplies water to more than 2.6
Gm2 of irrigated farmland and approximately 880,000 people in northeastern Colorado in
eight counties, including Boulder, Broomfield and Weld (8).
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2.6 Embodied food, energy, and water: Inputs
Embodied water: inputs
Export-based agriculture and energy production consume a significant portion of the
region’s limited water resources. While much of the water used for agriculture percolates
through the soil (to become recycled groundwater), the water used for hydraulic
fracturing cannot be re-used for other purposes because of the toxic chemical additives
needed for the fracking process.
Winputsà F: Water inputs to food systems
Irrigation in the Denver Region is the major water use. In 2010 almost one billion gallons
per day were used for irrigation/agriculture (35).
WinputsàE: Water inputs to energy systems
Water input for hydraulic fracturing: Water input for hydraulic fracturing poses risks to
the regional quantity of water supplies. As identified in a technical report issued by the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory, these risks include: a) the number of wells
drilled, b) the amount of water used per well, c) the amount of recycling of fluids used to
offset freshwater requirements, and d) local water availability (20).
a) Number of wells drilled: There are approximately 44,000 oil and gas wells in the
region. Since 2010, 9060 were reported to have used hydraulic fracturing (38,42;
Figure 7).
b) Amount of water used per well: Reflecting national trends, the reported average
water use per well has steadily increased over time, from 2.43 MG in 2013 to 8.8
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MG in 2017 (Table 2).
c) Amount of recycling of fluids used to offset freshwater requirements: In Colorado
the amount of produced water reused is not tracked and the reuse of produced
water is not mandatory (8,20,43) .
d) Local water availability: Reflecting national trends, the total base water volume
for hydraulic fracturing has steadily increased over time, doubling from one-half
billion gallons in 2016 to almost one trillion in 2017 (42). (Water source not
included in the dataset.)
Table 2-2. Industry-reported water use for hydraulic fracturing on the Niobrara Shale.
Data derived from the FracFocusRegistry database (fracfocus.org).
Year

Total Base Water
Volume (Mgal)

2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

3160
5750
5450
4920
9770
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#Frack
Jobs
Started
1300
1450
1120
721
1111

Average
Water Use
(Mgal)
2.44
3.97
4.88
6.32
8.80
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Figure 2-7a and 7b. Water inputs for hydraulic fracturing. (a) The locations of
conventional oil and gas wells and hydraulic fracturing wells along with total base water
use for each well, if reported; b) Locations of water wells overlaid with oil and gas wells.
Data sources: COGCC, fracfocus.org, USGS, and DRCOG.

2.7 Shale development impacts on regional water and food systems
2.7.1 Impacts on water across the life cycle
Water quality risks posed by unconventional shale oil and gas development arise from: a)
seismic exploration and discovery, b) onsite road and well pad construction techniques, c)
drilling and onsite chemical management practices, d) wastewater management practices
and e) interim and final reclamation (20,44). Publicly available data on impacts to water
quality resulting from oil and gas development are confined to violations issued by state
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regulators, reported spills, accidental releases, groundwater impacts, and uncontained
berms (Table 2-3).
Table 2-3. Energy impacts on water, food, and ecosystems in the Denver region.
Pairwise
Relation
Eimpact àW:
Energy-related
impacts on water
systems
(Figures 9,10)
Data sources:
COGCC Daily
Activity
Dashboard
(DAD);
Fracfocus.org

Eimpact àF:
Energy-related
impacts on food
systems
(Figures 11, 12)
Data sources:
COGCC DAD;
USDA 2016
Wimpact àE:
Impact of water
quality across
the energy life
cycle
Eimpactà Socialecological
system as a
whole
(Figure 10)

Systems Analysis: Type of Impact and Relevant Indicators
Aquifer contamination through gas leakage from improper
construction or failing wells. Violations Issued: In 2017: 18 (50%
decrease from 2016)
Water resource contamination through spills, leaks, and waste
management. Spills/Accidental releases: Between 2014-2017: 1537.
In 2017 in Weld County: 399 (36% increase from 2016)
Accumulation of metals and radioactive elements in aquatic sediments
at disposal and spill sites: Between 2014-2017:
•
•

Reported groundwater impacts at 314 sites and surface water
impacts at 10 sites
160 uncontained berms holding produced and frac flowback
water

Consumption of valuable freshwater in arid regions/ overexploitation
of diminished water resources:
Water use in 2017 to 1 trillion gallons (100% increase from 2016);
8.8 million gallons per well
Second order impacts from decline in water quality on soil, land, and
ecosystem productivity, including crops/animal health (Pothukuchi et
al. 2017).
30,000 wells on farmland in the region: 12,000 wells on pastures/
grassland; 12,000 on active cropland; 6,000 on fallow/idle
cropland
Use of recycled water for oil and gas extraction. Data on the amount
of water recycled not available; re-use by industry is not
mandatory in Colorado.
Disposal of waste (produced) water: About 50% is disposed by
underground injection.
Most produced water not injected is disposed in evaporation and
percolation pits or discharged under the Colorado Discharge Permit
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Data sources:
COGCC DAD;
COGCC Annual
Report, 2017;
Fractracker.org

System. Data on how much water is discharged and where these
releases occur are not available.
Seismic activity caused by injection wells for wastewater
34 Class II injection wells
Public complaints: Nearly six-fold increase from 190 in 2016 to
1124 in 2017
Home explosion in the town of Firestone caused by abandoned gasline
from existing well

Onsite practices: One indicator of risk to water quality is the number of spills
associated with the drilling process. There were 451 spills in the Denver Region from
operations in 2014 (Figure 8). This number dropped to 366 in 2015 and 293 in 2016, but
rose again in 2017. Another indicator of the risk to water quality from unsafe onsite
chemical management practices is the number of violations issued by regulators to well
operators. In 2017, 18 violations were issued, a 50% decrease from 2016, while public
complaints increased almost six-fold during the same period, from 190 in 2016 to 1124 in
2017 (38; Figure 9).
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Figure 2-8. Spills and unauthorized releases. The oil and gas extraction industry
reported 1537 occurrences from 2014 to January 2018. The white spot in the middle of
Weld County is the town of Greeley. Data Source: COGCC.
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Figure 2-9. Spills and releases, public complaints, and alleged violations in Weld
County from 2011 to 2017. Data sources: COGCC Daily Activity Dashboard and the
Colorado Oil and Gas Information System
Wastewater management: Wastewater (also referred to as produced water)
found in hydrocarbon formations, is a major by-product of the fracking and drilling
process. High in salt and naturally-occurring groundwater contaminants, it returns to the
surface along with chemical-laced frac-flowback water. In Colorado, a majority of
wastewater is injected into the ground or taken to evaporation ponds (8). Metals and
radioactive elements accumulate in aquatic sediments at disposal and spill sites (13;
Figure 2-10). The Denver region’s oil and gas drilling activities generated more than 35
million barrels of wastewater in 2016, compared to 8.4 million barrels in 2006
quadrupling in ten years (38).
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Figure 2-10a and 10b. Class II injection wells, uncontained berms, groundwater and
surface water impacts. (a) Locations where ground and surface water impacts, and
uncontained berms were reported between Jan 2014 to Jan. 2018 and (b) overlaid with
human settlement, cropland and pastureland Data sources: COGCC Daily Activity
Dashboard, fractracker.org.

2.7.2 Impacts on food across the life cycle
Eimpact → Fsystem Second order impacts of hydraulic fracturing on food systems result
from declining water quality on soil, land, and ecosystem productivity, including
crops/animal health (14). The surface locations of 30,000 of the region’s 44,000 oil and
gas wells are on farmland: about 12,000 on pastures/ grassland, another 12,000 on active
cropland, and 6,000 on fallow/ idle cropland (39).
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2.8 Discussion
2.8.1 Framework Implementation
Building on an urban systems framework developed by Ramaswami et al. for FEW nexus
analysis (4), the regional-level results above are synthesized within an expanded regional
framework (Figure 2-11). Where data is available, quantifiable flows of food, energy, and
water into and out of the region are depicted. The embodied water and energy associated
with these activities are also shown (e.g. the water used for irrigation, electricity
generation, and fracking). This approach highlights the additional vulnerabilities of
water-intensive production of food and energy in the populated, semi-arid Denver region.
The original framework is also extended in an initial attempt to incorporate the risk posed
to the region’s scarce water supplies and arable land from hydraulic fracturing to meet
fossil fuel demand from outside the region.

Figure 2-11. Implementation of the trans-boundary urban systems framework for the
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FEW nexus. Flows of food, energy and water to, from, and within the Denver region are
depicted. Data gaps, data sources, and time periods for numerical estimates are
included. This representation focuses on inputs, with some attempt to incorporate
impacts.
2.8.2 Data Availability and Gaps: Informed by Diverse Institutions, Agendas and
Contexts
The implementation of this urban systems framework for the Denver region also
illustrates the many gaps in data availability surrounding the interdependency of regional
food, energy, and water systems (dashed lines and red boxes, Figure 2-11). The total
amount of water pumped from the Denver Basin aquifer is not monitored (46) and gaps
and discrepancies in federal data on water usage by thermoelectric power plants are wellknown (6). Other key data gaps include energy for water use and food preparation. We
also include sources and dates for available data, adding an additional layer of
transparency to reflect the constructed nature of publicly available information for
city/regional indicators (45) as they pertain to the FEW nexus. For example, according to
self-reported industry data 28 Mgal/day of water were used in fracking jobs on the
Niobrara shale that had a start date in 2017 (42), while 18 Mgal/day were used for
electricity generation in 2010, according to the USGS (35).
2.8.2.1 Fracking Data
Because oil and gas industry data is proprietary, with rights to privacy protected by law,
such data is not accessible to citizens and researchers working in the public interest.
Local political activity has prompted public access to information on drilling operations
in the state of Colorado since 2012, including disclosure of the chemicals used in the
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fracking process and the amount of water used per frack job (47). In the wake of a house
explosion in the town of Firestone in 2017 caused by a stray gas line, Denver-area
communities have demanded public maps of the state’s 120,000 flow-lines (48).
Data on the impacts of hydraulic fracturing on water quality in particular are sparse and
contested. Underground injection of oil and gas wastewater, for example, has not yet
been researched as a source of systemic groundwater contamination on the state or
national level (49) and there are no regulations requiring detailed data disclosure that
could allow scientists in academia and industry to develop best practices (9). Citizens
groups have stepped in to fill knowledge gaps through surface and groundwater
monitoring projects (50–52). Distrust of the ability of industry and government regulators
to produce valid, unbiased water quality data is common among these groups (9).
2.8.3 Hydraulic fracturing and the FEW nexus
This case study illustrates that hydraulic fracturing can be viewed as a defining issue at
the intersection of food, energy and water systems. It has been emphasized in the
literature that water use and produced water intensity for fracking is lower than other
energy extraction methods, and represents only a fraction of total industrial water use
nationwide (24). While this may be true at a large scale, this narrative misses several
crucial points that are clearly illustrated in the Denver case:
With respect to water quantity:
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1) Fracking poses unique risks in semi-arid, agricultural, and rapidly growing areas. In
the Denver region fracking water use not only competes with municipal demand and
agriculture, it is occurring within municipal boundaries and on the region’s farmland.
2) Water use for hydraulic fracturing has intensified in the region over the past five
years, as it has in rest of the United States; the water footprint of both inputs and
wastewater are increasing.
With respect to water quality:
1) The Niobrara shale and Denver Basin Aquifer are co-located (Figure 2-1), with both
drilling and wastewater injection posing risks to groundwater, a concern even in nonwater scarce areas. Globally, 59% of world’s shale deposits are in the footprint of
major freshwater aquifers (25).
2) In Colorado, the majority of Class II injection wells and aquifer exemptions are
located in regions with higher quality water, including the Denver Region, potentially
jeopardizing those resources (49).
With respect to regulation and governance:
1) Water quality impact depends on construction, drilling, onsite chemical management
practices, and wastewater handling, and is thus greatly impacted by regulation,
monitoring, and enforcement.
2) Federal power to regulate shale gas development is limited due to fracking
exemptions from the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean Water Act, as well as
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drilling exemptions from the National Emission Standards, Hazardous Air Pollutants
and other federal environmental statutes (32,53).
3) Colorado’s air emissions and water-testing regulations have been called the most
rigorous in the country by state officials (54); however the COGCC employs
approximately 23 inspectors to monitor the 52,000 wells around the state (55),
leading some stakeholders to question their effectiveness (33).
4) Regional intensification of the water footprint of hydraulic fracturing shows signs of
increasing even further since Jan 2017, the start of a new presidential administration,
which favors less federal regulation of the energy industry and less environmental
regulation in general.
5) At the same time, inadequate enforcement may be intensifying: 2017 also saw a 36%
increase in spills/releases; a 600% increase in public complaints in Weld County, and
a 50% drop in Notice of Alleged Violations compared to 2016 (38).
With respect to justice, equity, and the right to ban
A nuanced grasp of ‘how energy, water, and food have been produced, historically, under
particular social formations’ (56) is vital to developing a full picture of the complex
social, political and environmental dimensions of FEW nexus issues in general, and
hydraulic fracturing in particular. Such perspectives address the power relations that
underpin a given resource nexus, termed the ‘critical social science’ of the FEW nexus
(56), and are especially relevant to the governance of fracking, distributional and
environmental justice, and greater regional and global sustainability.
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The lack of centralized authority over oil and gas drilling in the U.S. has left
decision-making in the hands of states and local authorities. While the U.S. mandates
environmental impact assessment of development projects, there is no required
equivalent assessment of the social impacts of these projects on affected communities.
Municipalities and communities are therefore burdened with the responsibility of
addressing the costs and benefits of energy development. This can further reinforce
existing inequities, as wealthier and less marginalized communities are better able to
marshal the resources necessary to do this effectively.
Within this context, the potential for multiple, unknown, or contested risks
related to oil and natural gas extraction has led to increased community activism across
Colorado (55). The Colorado Supreme Court has struck down several local bans on
hydraulic fracturing (City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil and Gas Association; City of Fort
Collins v. Colo. Oil and Gas Association), based on lawsuits filed by the oil and gas
industry against Denver-area cities Broomfield and Longmont, as well as nearby Fort
Collins. In November 2018, Proposition 112, which would have required the setback
distance for fracking from schools, homes and water sources be increased from 500 to
2500 feet, was defeated in statewide elections. The oil and gas industry spent $41 million
in a campaign to reject the proposition (57); 57% voted ultimately against it.
This makes state enforcement of existing environmental, health, and safety
regulations the only immediate recourse for local residents seeking to limit tracking
impacts on their communities. The fracking moratorium in Boulder County has not yet
been contested by industry, emphasizing the lack of consistency in de facto protection for
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residents across the region. Additionally municipal land area comprises a mere 11% of
the Denver region; even if local bans were upheld, large areas would remain open to
shale development.
2.8.3.1 Sustainability transitions: Teleconnections, nexus tradeoffs, and energy
alternatives
The Denver region exports 93% of the energy and 54% of the food it produces to cities
and states around the country, particularly the mid- and south-western U.S. The transboundary FEW nexus approach allows ecosystem and health risks to the Denver region’s
3.2 million inhabitants to be linked indirectly to fossil fuel consumption across the
country. More directly, these risks can be linked to a patchwork of local, state, and
federal regulation and court rulings on hydraulic fracturing. While the region’s waterintensive agricultural sector nearly rivals the energy sector in economic value, it involves
fewer material flows and less groundwater risk. Co-location of renewable energy
infrastructure with farming is another model for regional energy-food production that
poses reduced risk to water supplies (58).
2.9 Conclusion
This case study illustrates the potential for the FEW nexus approach to identify
interconnections between demand and supply networks, incorporating embodied FEW as
well as ecosystem impacts and risks at multiple spatial scales. Consideration of impacts
on as well as inputs to FEW systems in the Denver region places hydraulic fracturing
firmly within the FEW nexus scope. This is important because FEW nexus research is the
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target of major funding efforts (59,60) and directly relevant to the intensifying water
footprint of fracking in the United States (24), particularly when it is co-located with
agriculture. FEW nexus research is also well-poised to articulate the need for more and
better data on system and trans-boundary interconnections that are vital to assessing the
impact of fracking on regional water quality and soil fertility that so far have not been
systematically undertaken (9,61). In addition, this emerging trans-disciplinary effort has
the potential to offer key insights into so-called ‘wicked problems’ that fracking
exemplifies.
2.10 Case Study Questions
On describing and quantifying the FEW nexus
• What is the ‘data gap’ in FEW nexus based research?
• What other types of knowledge might be needed to assess nexus interconnections and
identify sustainable solutions at multiple spatial scales and across food, energy and
water systems?
• What historical factors have contributed to the current FEW systems in place in the
Denver region? Why is this important?
On hydraulic fracturing
• What is the role of public policy in improving scientific understanding of the impacts
of hydraulic fracturing on water quality?
• What monitoring systems, industry regulations, and environmental protections are
needed to ensure that regional water supplies are not impacted by hydraulic
fracturing?
• Should municipalities be allowed to ban hydraulic fracturing within their boundaries?
Why or why not?
On local sustainability, regional interdependence, and distributional equity
• What are the links between local solutions to meet the food, energy, and water needs
of a community, and sustainable solutions? In what cases might local production of
food or energy be unsustainable?
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•

Why is it important that sustainable solutions also be equitable ones? Provide some
examples to support your reasoning.

Investigating the FEW nexus
• Consider your hometown or other geographic area of interest. What indictors would
you need to describe the interconnections between energy, water and food systems in
this region? From what sources would you obtain this data?
• What important issues related to food, energy and water sustainability might such
indicators overlook?
• What historical factors have contributed to the current FEW systems in place in your
area of interest? Why is this important?
Envisioning sustainable, interconnected systems
• What might sustainable and equitable food, water and energy systems look like for
your area of interest? How would these systems depend on each other?
• In what ways would your region depend on other regions? How would its FEWrelated activities impact other regions?

2.11 References
1.

Sarkar AN. Global Climate Change and Confronting the Challenges of Food
Security. Productivity. 2016;57(2).

2.

UN-Water. Water, Food and Energy [Internet]. UN-Water. [cited 2018 Sep 14].
Available from: http://www.unwater.org/water-facts/water-food-and-energy/

3.

Barber NL. Summary of Estimated Water Use in the United States in 2010. U.S.
Geological Survey; 2014.

4.

Ramaswami A, Boyer D, Nagpure AS, Fang A, Bogra S, Bakshi B, et al. An
urban systems framework to assess the trans-boundary food-energy-water nexus:
implementation in Delhi, India. Environ Res Lett. 2017 Feb 1;12(2):25008.

5.

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Reconciling resource uses in
transboundary basins: assessment of the water-food-energy-ecosystems nexus.
United Nations; 2015.

53

6.

Averyt K, Macknick J, Rogers J, Madden N, Fisher J, Meldrum J, et al. Water use
for electricity in the United States: an analysis of reported and calculated water
use information for 2008. Environ Res Lett. 2013 Mar 1;8(1):15001.

7.

Macknick J, Sattler S, Averyt K, Clemmer S, Rogers J. The water implications of
generating electricity: water use across the United States based on different
electricity pathways through 2050. Environ Res Lett. 2012 Dec 1;7(4):45803.

8.

Walker EL, Anderson AM, Read LK, Hogue TS. Water Use for Hydraulic
Fracturing of Oil and Gas in the South Platte River Basin, Colorado. JAWRA J
Am Water Resour Assoc. 2017 Aug;53(4):839–53.

9.

Brantley SL, Vidic RD, Brasier K, Yoxtheimer D, Pollak J, Wilderman C, et al.
Engaging over data on fracking and water quality. Science. 2018;359(6374):395–
397.
Weber E, Khademian AM. Wicked Problems, Knowledge Challenges, and
Collaborative Capacity Builders in Network Settings. Public Adm Rev.
2008;68(2):34–349.

10.

11.

Vidic RD, Brantley SL, Vandenbossche JM, Yoxtheimer D, Abad JD. Impact of
Shale Gas Development on Regional Water Quality. Science. 2013 May
17;340(6134):1235009–1235009.

12.

Werner AK, Vink S, Watt K, Jagals P. Environmental health impacts of
unconventional natural gas development: A review of the current strength of
evidence. Sci Total Environ. 2015 Feb;505:1127–41.

13.

Vengosh A, Jackson RB, Warner N, Darrah TH, Kondash A. A Critical Review of
the Risks to Water Resources from Unconventional Shale Gas Development and
Hydraulic Fracturing in the United States. Environ Sci Technol. 2014 Aug
5;48(15):8334–48.

14.

Pothukuchi K, Arrowsmith M, Lyon N. Hydraulic Fracturing: A Review of
Implications for Food Systems Planning. J Plan Lit. 2018 May;33(2):155–70.

15.

Ogneva-Himmelberger Y, Huang L. Spatial distribution of unconventional gas
wells and human populations in the Marcellus Shale in the United States:
Vulnerability analysis. Appl Geogr. 2015 Jun;60:165–74.

16.

Meng Q, Ashby S. Distance: A critical aspect for environmental impact
assessment of hydraulic fracking. Extr Ind Soc. 2014 Nov;1(2):124–6.

54

17.

Carre NC. Environmental justice and hydraulic fracturing: the ascendancy of
grassroots populism in policy determination. J Soc Change. 2012;4(1):4.

18.

Malin SA, DeMaster KT. A devil’s bargain: Rural environmental injustices and
hydraulic fracturing on Pennsylvania’s farms. J Rural Stud. 2016 Oct;47:278–90.

19.

Clough E, Bell D. Just fracking: a distributive environmental justice analysis of
unconventional gas development in Pennsylvania, USA. Environ Res Lett. 2016
Feb 1;11(2):25001.

20.

Logan J, Heath G, Macknick J, Paranhos E, Boyd W, Carlson K. Natural gas and
the transformation of the US energy sector: electricity. Joint Institute for Strategic
Energy Analysis Golden, CO; 2012.

21.

Sovacool BK. Cornucopia or curse? Reviewing the costs and benefits of shale gas
hydraulic fracturing (fracking). Renew Sustain Energy Rev. 2014 Sep;37:249–64.

22.

Meko T, Karklis L. The United States of oil and gas. The Washington Post
[Internet]. 2017 Feb 14 [cited 2018 Sep 15]; Available from:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/united-states-of-oil/

23.

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). United States remains the world’s
top producer of petroleum and natural gas hydrocarbons - Today in Energy
[Internet]. [cited 2018 Sep 14]. Available from:
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36292

24.

Kondash A, Vengosh A. Water Footprint of Hydraulic Fracturing. Environ Sci
Technol Lett. 2015 Oct 13;2(10):276–80.

25.

Rosa L, Rulli MC, Davis KF, D’Odorico P. The Water-Energy Nexus of
Hydraulic Fracturing: A Global Hydrologic Analysis for Shale Oil and Gas
Extraction. Earths Future. 2018 May;6(5):745–56.

26.

Lave R, Lutz B. Hydraulic Fracturing: A Critical Physical Geography Review:
Hydraulic Fracturing. Geogr Compass. 2014 Oct;8(10):739–54.

27.

Jasechko S, Perrone D. Hydraulic fracturing near domestic groundwater wells.
Proc Natl Acad Sci. 2017 Dec 12;114(50):13138–43.

28.

U.S. Census Bureau USC. American FactFinder - Results [Internet]. [cited 2018
Sep 15]. Available from:
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=
bkmk

55

29.

Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB). Colorado’s Water Plan [Internet].
2015. Available from: https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cowaterplan/plan

30.

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Drilling Productivity Report
[Internet]. 2018 [cited 2018 Sep 15]. Available from:
https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/#tabs-summary-2

31.

Finley B. Hickenlooper: Water usage, not storage, will solve Colorado’s shortfall.
The Denver Post [Internet]. 2015 Jan 29; Available from:
www.denverpost.com/2015/01/29/hickenlooper-water-usage-not-storage-willsolve-colorados-shortfall/

32.

Fry M, Briggle A, Kincaid J. Fracking and environmental (in)justice in a Texas
city. Ecol Econ. 2015 Sep;117:97–107.

33.

Opsal T, O’Connor Shelley T. Energy Crime, Harm, and Problematic State
Response in Colorado: A Case of the Fox Guarding the Hen House? Crit
Criminol. 2014 Nov;22(4):561–77.

34.

Walsh KB. Split Estate and Wyoming’s Orphaned Well Crisis: The Case of
Coalbed Methane Reclamation in the Powder River Basin, Wyoming. Case Stud
Environ [Internet]. 2017 Jan 1; Available from:
http://cse.ucpress.edu/content/early/2017/11/16/cse.2017.000455.abstract

35.

U.S. Geological Survey. Water Use Data for the Nation [Internet]. 2016 [cited
2018 Sep 15]. Available from: https://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis/wu

36.

Xcel Energy. Community Energy Reports | [Internet]. 2016 [cited 2018 Sep 15].
Available from:
https://www.xcelenergy.com/working_with_us/municipalities/community_energy
_reports

37.

Center for Transportation Analysis. Freight Analysis Framework (FAF4)
[Internet]. 2016 [cited 2018 Sep 15]. Available from:
https://faf.ornl.gov/faf4/Extraction1.aspx

38.

Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. Colorado Oil & Gas Daily
Activity Dashboard [Internet]. [cited 2018 Sep 14]. Available from:
https://cogcc.state.co.us/dashboard.html#/dashboard

56

39.

USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service. CropScape - NASS CDL
Program: Cropland Data Layer [Internet]. 2016 [cited 2018 Sep 15]. Available
from: https://nassgeodata.gmu.edu/CropScape/

40.

USDA. Market Value of Agricultural Products Sold Including Direct Sales: 2012
and 2007 [Internet]. 2014 [cited 2018 Sep 15]. (Geographic Area Series, Part 6,
AC-12-A-6). Available from:
https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapt
er_2_County_Level/Colorado/st08_2_002_002.pdf

41.

Castle S. Boulder City Council extends fracking moratorium by 2 years via
emergency vote. The Daily Camera [Internet]. 2018 May 15 [cited 2018 Sep 14];
Available from:
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/boulder/ci_31880916/boulder-city-councilextends-fracking-ban

42.

Groundwater Protection Council and Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Comission.
FracFocus Chemical Disclosure Registry [Internet]. Groundwater Protection
Council and Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Comission; 2018 [cited 2018 Sep
15]. Available from: http://fracfocus.org/data-download

43.

CDR Associates. Produced Water Beneficial Use Dialogue: Opportunities and
Challenges for Re-Use of Produced Water on Colorado’s Western Slope.
Colorado Energy Office & Colorado Mesa University Water Center;

44.

Samelson M, Sura M. Protecting Source Water in Colorado During Oil and Gas
Development. Intermountain Oil and Gas BMP Project, the Colorado Rural Water
Association, AirWaterGas and Western Resource Advocates; 2016.

45.

Kitchin R, Lauriault TP, McArdle G. Knowing and governing cities through
urban indicators, city benchmarking and real-time dashboards. Reg Stud Reg Sci.
2015 Jan;2(1):6–28.

46.

Paschke SS, editor. Groundwater availability of the Denver Basin aquifer system,
Colorado. Reston, Va: U.S. Geological Survey; 2011. 274 p. (Professional paper).

47.

Gallaher S. A Summary Report of Colorado’s Local-level Oil and Gas Political
Activity, 1973-2015. School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado Denver;
2015.

48.

KUSA Staff. Mapping Colorado’s invisible pipeline network [Internet]. KUSA.
2017 [cited 2018 Sep 15]. Available from:

57

https://www.9news.com/article/news/investigations/mapping-colorados-invisiblepipeline-network/73-453118002
49.

Ferrar K. Groundwater risks in Colorado due to Safe Drinking Water Act
exemptions [Internet]. 2017 [cited 2018 Sep 15]. Available from:
https://www.fractracker.org/2017/10/groundwater-risks-in-colorado/

50.

Stedman R, Lee B, Brasier K, Weigle JL, Higdon F. Cleaning up water? Or
building rural community? Community watershed organizations in Pennsylvania.
Rural Sociol. 2009;74(2):178–200.

51.

Kinchy A, Jalbert K, Perry S, Parks S. Watershed Knowledge Mapping Project:
list of participating monitoring organizations [Internet]. 2013 [cited 2018 Sep 15]
p. 1–2. Available from: http://www.watershed-mapping.rpi.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/Monitoring_Organizations_2_2013.pdf

52.

Penningroth SM, Yarrow MM, Figueroa AX, Bowen RJ, Delgado S. CommunityBased Risk Assessment of Water Contamination from High-Volume Horizontal
Hydraulic Fracturing. NEW Solut J Environ Occup Health Policy. 2013
May;23(1):137–66.

53.

Kosnik RL. The Oil and Gas Industry’s Exclusions and Exemptions to Major
Environmental Statutes. 2007;

54.

Finley B. Colorado adopts tougher air rules for oil, gas industry – The Denver
Post [Internet]. [cited 2018 Sep 15]. Available from:
https://www.denverpost.com/2014/02/23/colorado-adopts-tougher-air-rules-foroil-gas-industry/

55.

Maddaford B. Inspections of oil and gas development. Colorado Legislation Staff
Council Issue Brief, 13-09. [Internet]. 2013 [cited 2018 Sep 15] p. 1–7. Available
from: https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/1309_inspections_of_oil_and_gas_dev_ib.pdf

56.

Foran T. Node and regime: Interdisciplinary analysis of water-energy-food nexus
in the Mekong region. Water Altern. 2015;8(1).

57.

Irfan U. A major anti-fracking ballot measure in Colorado has failed [Internet].
Vox. 2018 [cited 2018 Nov 13]. Available from:
https://www.vox.com/2018/11/5/18064604/colorado-election-results-frackingproposition-112

58

58.

Xiarchos I, Sandborn A. Wind Energy Land Distribution In The United States of
America [Internet]. United States Department of Agriculture; 2017. Available
from: https://www.usda.gov/oce/energy/files/FINALWind_Energy_Land_Distribution_in_the_United_States_of_America_7282017.p
df

59.

National Science Foundation. Innovations at the Nexus of Food, Energy, and
Water Systems (INFEWS). 2016.

60.

Sustainable Urbanisation Global Initiative: Food-Water-Energy Nexus [Internet].
Belmont Forum, Urban Europe, European Commission; 2017. Available from:
www.sugi-nexus.org

61.

McLaughlin MC, Borch T, Blotevogel J. Spills of Hydraulic Fracturing
Chemicals on Agricultural Topsoil: Biodegradation, Sorption, and Cocontaminant Interactions. Environ Sci Technol. 2016 Jun 7;50(11):6071–8.

62.

Meng Q. The impacts of fracking on the environment: A total environmental
study paradigm. Sci Total Environ. 2017 Feb;580:953–7

59

CHAPTER 3: THE FOOD-ENERGY-WATER-MATERIAL NEXUS AND
EMBODIED INJUSTICES: THE ROLE OF HYDROPOWER IN
DEFORESTATION IN EEYOU ISTCHEE/NORTHERN QUEBEC
Abstract
Injustices within political and economic systems profoundly influence Food, Energy, and
Water (FEW) systems, yet the interdependent inequities stemming from these systems are
rarely considered in nexus analyses. In this study we widen the FEW nexus to include
Materials (FEWM) and examine Embodied iNjustices and Transboundary
unSustainability (FEWM+ENTS) resulting from FEWM systems. We introduce a fourpart monitoring framework, including 1) FEWM inputs; 2) the social-ecological impacts
of these systems; 3) access to FEWM and 4) control over FEW systems and material
extraction. We apply this approach to the contested region of Eeyou Istchee/Jamésie,
Quebec, where the 40-year construction of the largest hydropower complex in the
Western Hemisphere has enabled large-scale extraction of timber, minerals, and
electricity from a relatively intact boreal ecosystem. Using remote sensing analysis and
supplementary datasets, we document ecosystem disturbances by year and type since
1975, when the Cree Nations of Eeyou Istchee, the Inuit, and the Quebec and Canadian
governments signed the first modern Aboriginal land claims agreement. We identify
cumulative impacts and interdependencies among hydropower, roads, logging, wildfire
and mining, finding that roughly 106,000 km2 have been deforested due to these
disturbances since 1975, comprising 29% of the region, an area equivalent to more than
four times the state of Vermont, which receives about one-third of its electricity from
Hydro-Quebec. These extensive environmental degradations undermine claims that
electricity and material exports from the region are ‘clean’ and ‘sustainable.’ Instead,
these disturbances illustrate the unsustainability of current interlinked transboundary
FEWM supply chains and demonstrate steadily intensifying non-Native control over and
extraction of the region’s resources, reflecting larger patterns of embodied injustices that
have recently culminated in sweeping new development initiatives and stand to further
reinforce these historical trajectories.

3.1 Introduction
Nexus-based approaches to the study of food, energy, and water systems (FEWS) are
centered around the premise that these systems are both fundamentally interconnected
and increasingly unsustainable. Incorporating materials into food-energy-water (FEW)
nexus framings is not new: a number of approaches include materials as part of a broader
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“resource nexus,” envisioned as “a clearly defined five-node nexus for the systems of
water, energy, food, land, and materials,” whereby the “nexus” refers specifically to a set
of “context-specific interlinkages between two or more natural resources used as inputs
into systems providing essential services to humans” (Bleischwitz, Hoff, et al., 2018: 4,
italics added; Andrews-Speed et al., 2012; Bleischwitz, Spataru, et al., 2018). Materials,
which Bleischwitz et al. define as “non-energy abiotic resources,” include base metals,
critical minerals, and construction minerals, and account for up to 50% of natural
resource use, making their overall environmental impacts and GHG emissions
considerable (2018: 8). As pressure on FEW systems increase, linkages among FEW
systems and water- and energy-intensive mining practices have become more important
(Humphreys, 2017).
The FEW/resource nexus has the potential to offer new insights in the midst of
increasing global water scarcity and the deepening climate crisis, as the need to move
away from fossil fuels gains urgency, bottom-up efforts to transition to sustainable FEWS
intensify, and entrenched energy interests exert widespread influence on global political
processes. Nexus-based approaches are useful in elucidating regional vulnerabilities, such
as the dependence of mega-cities on other areas for direct water supply and for
‘embodied’ water inputs to food and energy production (Ramaswami et al., 2017;
Hoekstra & Mekonnen, 2012). Nexus interdependencies are often quantified in terms of
embodied inputs; for example, the amount of water needed for agricultural crop
irrigation, or the energy required for groundwater pumping. Nexus analysis that focuses
on embodied inputs, while important in clarifying patterns of FEW supply and demand,
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generally does not provide an understanding of the socio-political factors, historical
conditions, and systemic inequities that have contributed to transboundary patterns of
FEW production and consumption that are both inequitable and unsustainable (Allouche
et al., 2014; Foran, 2015; Leck et al., 2015).
FEWS also have significant impacts upon each other; examples include the
impact of hydraulic fracturing on water resources and food production (Ahamed et al.,
2019); the impact of fertilizer on aquatic ecosystems; and the social and environmental
impacts of hydropower (Nilsson & Berggren, 2000; Rosenberg et al., 1995). FEW nexus
research exploring the interdependent relationship between inputs and impacts across
social-ecological systems is necessary to provide an applied problem-solving lens to find
solutions that are sustainable and just. Equally important is awareness of the historical
and ongoing inequities that shape current systems. In this paper we introduce a four-part
monitoring framework for FEW/resource nexus analysis, addressing 1) Food, Energy,
Water, and Material (FEWM) inputs, 2) the social-ecological impacts of these
interdependent systems, 3) equitable access to FEWM, and 4) control over FEWS and
material extraction. We implement this framework through a case study of the contested
region of Eeyou Istchee/Jamesie (EI/J), Quebec1, which was opened by the James Bay
hydropower project in the early 1970s to industrial development, and where extractive

1

The combined extent of the overlapping boundaries of the Cree Nations of Eeyou Istchee (translated as
‘the People’s Land’) and the ‘Territory Equivalent’ (TE) of Jamésie, Quebec are used for this analysis
(Figure 3-1), hereafter referred to as Eeyou Istchee / Jamésie (EI/J). See the Cree Vision of the Plan Nord
for a summary of regional governance up to 2011 and the website of the Eeyou Istchee James Bay Regional
Government for the governance structure in place since July 24, 2012 (https://www.greibj.ca/en/),
including nine integrated Land and Resource Management Panels (https://www.greibj.ca/en/territory/tgirt)
in the forestry zone within EI/J (Figure 3-4).
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efforts have gained renewed traction in the past decade. [Departing from the resource
nexus definition, ‘materials’ will be used throughout this paper to include both the biotic
resource of timber as well as abiotic metals and minerals.] Reliant on the power supplied
by the James Bay hydropower complex and the road infrastructure needed to construct it,
logging and mining have played a central role in ongoing and de facto control of these
resource-rich areas by outside extractive interests, working alongside non-Native statebuilding and territorial expansion. At the same time, the hydropower obtained from the
region is billed as ‘clean’ energy to neighboring US markets.
We structure this analysis around the deforestation occurring in the region since
the James Bay Project began in the early 1970s, focusing on embodied inputs, impacts,
and injustices as they are manifested in boreal forest losses, as well as the overarching
issue of control over the region’s resources. Forests provide a compelling example of the
FEW/resource nexus (Tidwell, 2016): they are governed for “multiple and often
conflicting goals” including biodiversity protection, water resources, timber production,
and community livelihoods (Bleischwitz et al., 2017: 8). Hydropower projects in forest
ecosystems can also provide a guise to access lucrative resources such as timber
(Matthews & Motta, 2015). Boreal forests in particular are of global ecological
significance, containing 25% of the world’s remaining primary forests. The 270 million
hectares of boreal forest in Canada hold 306 billion tons of carbon, or 12% of the world’s
land-based carbon stock, almost twice as much as the world’s combined oil reserves
(NRDC, 2019; Swift, 2016). Large scale clearcutting, as well as ongoing overall
degradation of Canada’s boreal forest has prompted mounting concern regarding
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biodiversity, the global climate, and damages from commercial logging (NRDC, 2018;
Swift, 2019). In developing forest resources, Canadian provinces have historically
disregarded and ignored First Nations (Ross et al., 2002; Supplementary Information (SI)
Section 1). In the following section we briefly outline recent nexus critiques, providing
the theoretical context for including Embodied Injustices and Transboundary
unSustainability (ENTS) in nexus analysis. We then introduce the FEWM+ENTS
monitoring framework and outline our research objectives in implementing this
framework in EI/J.

3.1.1 FEW Nexus: Recent Critiques
The fluidity of the FEW nexus concept has been well articulated: nexus investigations
take on different manifestations depending on context, scale and geography (Matthews &
Motta, 2015). Cairns and Krzywoszynska characterize the nexus as a ‘buzzword:’ a
powerful term that combines “ambiguity of meaning and strong normative resonance,”
delineating power struggles over competing narratives (2016: 4). Several authors note
that the FEW nexus is not a new construct; rather it builds on other earlier integrative
approaches, particularly Integrated Water Resource Management (Cai et al., 2018; Cairns
& Krzywoszynska, 2016; Wichelns, 2017). The ‘integrative imaginary’ implies that
efficient integration at multiple scales is in fact achievable and can result in managerial
benefits and sustainable development, while at the same time underplaying aspects of
power. As a corollary to the integrative imaginary, the nexus is seen as a
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multidisciplinary problem requiring multidisciplinary approaches (Leck et al; Albrecht et
al 2018), which are “impossible to grasp … within the partial framings of individual
academic disciplines” (Cairns and Krzywoszynska 2016: 8).
A fundamental critique of the FEW/resource nexus is that vital linkages between
FEW access and key societal structures enabling, permitting, and denying such access are
often overlooked. Leck et al. note that “access to and utilization of water, energy and
food are closely linked with structural issues such as political processes, poverty and
entitlements” and that “identifying winners and losers in WEF nexus decision-making
and giving explicit attention to justice and equity concerns are central for nexus agendas
to be socially progressive” (Leck et al., 2015: 453; Dupar & Oates, 2012; Stringer et al.,
2012). A number of suggestions have been offered for future nexus research in response
to these critiques. Many researchers call for more critical, theoretically informed
perspectives. Allouche et al. contend that “if the nexus is to be a useful framework for
exploring alternative pathways rather than a narrative that legitimizes existing dominant
pathways, the political economy of the nexus must be more explicitly addressed” through
bottom-up rather than “top-down ways of knowing the relationship between water, food
and energy” (Allouche et al., 2014: 23). In widening the FEW nexus to include material
extraction and explicitly consider embodied injustices and transboundary unsustainability
(FEWM+ENTS), we address these challenges for the nexus concept, tracing different
factors that coexist as part of a complex argument (Leck et al., 2015; Sil & Katzenstein,
2010).

65

3.1.2 Embodied iNjustices and Transboundary unSustainability within FEWMs – A
framework
The concepts of embodied (or ‘virtual’) water and energy have been used to quantify
water and energy inputs to FEWS at the city scale (Ramaswami et al. 2017) and to
quantify water inputs to food production and the water embodied in the global food trade
(Konar et al 2011; Hoekstra and Mekonnen 2011). Drawing on ideas of embodiment as
well as environmental and energy justice, Healy et al. introduce the concept of
“embodied energy injustice,” which “integrates previously unrecognized socialenvironmental harms and injustices” and exposes the “disproportionate distribution of
such harms on vulnerable peoples situated along energy supply chains” (2019: 219,221).
As with embodied energy injustices, conceptualizing embodied food, energy,
water, and material (FEWM) injustices can help situate chains of interacting FEWM
injustices and place-based struggles within wider politics, decisions, and processes across
multiple interacting lifecycles, revealing profound inequities within and among nations
and generations. We propose the concept of embodied injustices be extended to
intertwined FEWM supply chains, and to the cumulative impacts on surrounding
ecosystems that disproportionately affect disenfranchised populations. In conceptualizing
embodied FEWM injustices on local populations along transboundary supply chains, we
propose that access ‘to’ and control ‘over’ food, water, energy, materials, and land be
understood as critical dimensions of the FEW/resource nexus. In this context, embodied
FEWM injustices at the nexus occur when: 1) environmental and health impacts of
interdependent FEWS disproportionately affect vulnerable populations; 2) access to food,
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energy, water, land and material well-being of generally local communities are
systematically hampered, jeopardized or denied to benefit generally distant consumers; 3)
control over land, water, energy resources systematically disenfranchises these groups.
Embodied FEWM injustices are also closely interlinked with teleconnected,
multiscalar supply chains spanning multiple regions and international boundaries.
Embodied injustices affect vulnerable communities along supply chains of varying
complexity, with impacts often deliberately hidden from distant consumers. Hence, we
define embodied injustices as social, environmental, and health harms stemming from
inputs, access, control, and impacts of the interdependent FEW/resource nexus landscape
and its multiscalar transboundary supply chains that disproportionately affect
disenfranchised populations.
Table 3-1. FEWM nexus interactions and embodied injustices and transboundary
unsustainability (FEWM+ENTS) framework. (See SI for extended version.)
Inputs: x ‘for’ y
Definition: The FEWM inputs to FEWS and
materials across the life cycle
Examples:
o
o
o

Water ‘for’ energy: hydropower; surface
water withdrawals for thermoelectric
power generation
Water and energy ‘for’ food: volume of
water for crop irrigation, energy used for
water pumping
Energy ‘for’ mining

Impacts: x ‘on’ y
Definition (two-fold): 1) Disproportionate
environmental and health impacts at the
FEWM nexus on disenfranchised
communities; 2) Impact of FEW/ resource
nodes on each other and the wider
ecosystem across FEWM life cycles
Examples:
o
o
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Food/Land ‘on’ Water: Impact of
fertilizer on aquatic ecosystems
Impact of Barrick Gold Corporation’s
planned Pascua–Lama project on glaciers
and water supporting indigenous
agriculture in the Huasco Valley, Chile
(Urkidi & Walter, 2011)

Access ‘to’:
Definition: Equitable access to FEWM and
to land; lack of access to x is correlated with
lack of access to y
Examples:
Lack of FEWM access at the global scale:
o
o
o
o

800 million people are hungry and 2 billion
experience moderate or severe food
insecurity (FAO et al., 2019)
1.2 billion live in water-scarce regions
(Bigas et al., 2013)
1.2 billion do not have access to electricity
More than 2.7 billion rely on traditional
biomass for cooking (WEO, 2016)

Control ‘over’
Definition: Structural issues of how FEWS
and material supply chains have been
developed, how they interact, and how
benefits and harms are distributed across
populations
Examples:
o

o

o

Institutions controlling regulatory
processes disproportionately allow
siting of toxic facilities near
communities of color in the U.S.
Provincial control of industrial
development in forests in Canada,
systematically excluding Aboriginal
Peoples from forest resource
management (encompassing food,
water, and
livelihoods)

Because transboundary sustainability and justice, like FEWM, are inextricably linked,
nexus research should illuminate and address existing, hidden injustices and
unsustainability inherent in current FEWS2 and material supply chains. Localized
sustainability initiatives often fail to account for complex, interlinked transboundary
FEWM supply chains, sometimes leading to policies that may be sustainable in one
region but have environmentally damaging and/or unjust impacts on another, such as the
procurement of raw materials required to build low-carbon energy devices and
infrastructure (Sovacool et al., 2020). The notion of sustainability that transcends

2

Following Barry (2012), we focus on “actually existing unsustainability” rather than the aspiration of
sustainability.
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administrative and political boundaries is central to the integration of such initiatives
across complex global supply chains and FEWM life cycles.

3.1.3 ‘FEWM+ENTS:’ Study design and implementation
The FEWM+ENTS framing is not only relevant to cities as centers for global demand of
food, energy, water and materials, but also to remote areas targeted for new multi-sector
extractive efforts. These regions are often characterized as ‘frontiers,’ fueling increasing
global resource consumption as more accessible supplies become exhausted (Klare,
2012). To illustrate the FEWM+ENTS approach, we consider FEWM interdependencies
as encapsulated by a historical case study of a near-Arctic ‘frontier’ region at the center
of the indigenous sovereignty movement in North America before, during, and after the
40-year construction of the James Bay Hydroelectric Complex in EI/J, Quebec. We
address embodied injustices across transboundary FEWM supply chains and the
amplification of impacts and harms among these multiple systems. FEWM nexus
interactions and embodied injustices involving food are represented through hunting,
fishing, and trapping that have sustained the Crees for millennia; these pursuits, and Cree
sovereignty, are compromised and undermined by ongoing deforestation due to multiple
drivers. Specifically, we ask: Using the FEWM+ENTS lens, how can we identify, assess,
and monitor spatio-temporal disturbances in EI/J since the James Bay Project began?
What embodied injustices and unsustainable transboundary patterns of extraction,
production, and consumption can be traced to the FEWM nexus?
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The objectives of this study are to:
•

Assess disturbances to the boreal forest in EI/J since the James Bay Hydroelectric
Project began.

•

Map ecosystem disturbances to determine both year and type of forest disturbance
using remote sensing and ground-based data.

•

Identify interdependencies among five key disturbance types (hydropower, roads,
logging, wildfire, and mining) and their cumulative social-ecological impacts and
consequences.

•

Link embodied food, energy, water, and material injustices with transboundary
resource consumption and resource control.
Using remote sensing and supplementary datasets, we document disturbances to

the boreal forest in EI/J related to hydropower, mining, logging, roads, fire,
transboundary supply chains, and their interconnected impacts. These collective
activities, and the infrastructure built to facilitate non-Native control over and settlement
of the region have cumulative impacts on indigenous efforts to maintain traditional
livelihoods and sovereignty that are greater than the sum of their parts and illustrative of
a much longer historical trajectory in North America. We consider embodied injustices
spanning these sectors in terms of impacts ‘on,’ access ‘to,’ and control ‘over’ FEWM,
drawing on transdisciplinary literature and data spanning the fields of remote sensing,
critical geography, forestry, history, policy, and ecology to identify embodied FEWM
injustices. In the following sections we review our data and methods, present the results
of our analysis, discuss forest disturbance patterns and causes, and finally we consider
implications for future development and governance in the region.
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3.2 Data and Methods
3.2.1 Study Area and Historical Context
Mapping political boundaries and natural resources raises profound questions of resource
identification, use, access, control, and governance. Highlighting the contested
boundaries and sovereignty questions at the center of this study, the combined extent of
the overlapping boundaries of the Cree Nations of Eeyou Istchee and the ‘Territory
Equivalent’ (TE) of Jamésie, Quebec are used (Figure 3-1). Two legislative Acts passed
by the Parliament of Canada in 1898 and 1912 tripled the territory of Quebec to its
current boundaries, encompassing lands inhabited by Aboriginal Cree, Innu, Naskapi, and
Inuit, and spanning more distance north to south than any other province. Hydro-Quebec
planners first inventoried the region’s rivers in the late 1950s (SI, Section II). Quebec’s
effort to develop the EI/J began in 1971 with the stated goal of promoting the
“exploitation of natural resources” (James Bay Region Development Act, 1971). The
Crees were not initially informed about the James Bay Project (JBP); once its scope
became clear, they mounted a forceful campaign against it, joined by the Inuit to the
north. The multi-pronged effort “mobilized on several fronts: the media, the international
community, public awareness, and the courts” (Moses in von Rosen, 2013) and
ultimately resulted in the historic 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement
(JBNQA), permitting the JBP to continue in exchange for Cree and Inuit selfgovernment, along with $225 Cd million from the governments of Quebec and Canada to
be distributed to 22 Indigenous communities over twenty years. The JBNQA is widely
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regarded as the first modern Aboriginal land claims treaty and “the first clear definition
of Indian rights in Canada” (Chief Diamond in von Rosen, 2012).
A crucial feature of the JBNQA was its delineation of three distinct land categories:
•

Category 1: Lands surrounding Cree settlements, set aside for exclusive use by
Cree, Inuit and Naskapi: 14,348 km2 (1.3% of the territory);

•

Category 2: Public lands; hunting, fishing and trapping exclusive to Native
people: 159,880 km2 (14.8% of the territory; 70,000 km2 in EI/J);

•

Category 3: Public lands; rights reserved to Native people for hunting, fishing and
trapping without a permit, without limit and at all times: 907,772 km2 (83.9% of
the territory; 275,000 km2 in EI/J).
While small-scale forestry and mining by non-Natives in the southern portion of

EI/J pre-dated the JBP, construction of James Bay hydropower complex would open the
floodgates of development on an industrial scale previously unseen in the region. Of the
430,000 km2 in EI/J (including waterbodies), 95,700 km2, or 24% of the region, is located
within the provincially-determined logging zone, that is, south of the northern limit for
commercial forestry (Figure 3-3). In 2012, after decades of Cree protest that Quebec
continually relegated Cree sovereignty over land management to the minimal extent of
Category 1 lands (Figure 3-1), the regional governing body Eeyou Istchee Baie James
(GREIBJ-EIJBRG) was established to jointly manage regional affairs on Category 2 and
3 lands.
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Figure 3-1 Eeyou Istchee / Jamésie (EI/J) Study Area: Ecoregions and JBNQA land categories.
Combined extent of Eeyou Istchee and Jamésie. Category 1 (gray) and Category 2 lands (gray
outline). Thumbnail: Additional JBQNA territory (dark gray); and study area (crosshatch). Left,
bottom row: Eeyou Istchee, including nine member Cree Nations (left). The Quebec Territory
Equivalent (TE) of Jamésie (right), excludes Category 1 lands but includes Categories 2 and 3
(crosshatched). Data sources: (Wiken et al., 2011) https://www.eeyouconservation.com/protectedareas-process/
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3.2.2 Forest Change Detection Using Remote Sensing
The Landsat-based Detection of Trends in Disturbance and Recovery (Landtrendr)
algorithm is a well-known method to detect forest change from moderate resolution
(30m) satellite imagery that can be performed on the Google Earth Engine platform
(Kennedy et al., 2018), utilizing the Landsat Data Archive (Woodcock et al., 2008;
Wulder et al., 2016; Zhu, 2017). Landtrendr has been used in northern forests with high
accuracy (Kennedy et al., 2010, 2012) and is designed to detect both abrupt events and
gradual trends, including ecological change and degradation from annual Landsat time
series data. Landtrendr’s segmentation method uses medium frequency and univariate
metrics, focusing on the Normalized Burn Ratio (NBR) (Zhu, 2017), derived from the
Near Infrared (NIR) and Shortwave Infrared (SWIR) Bands [NBR = (NIR -SWIR)/(NIR
+SWIR)]. The EI/J study area is comprised of 31 individual Landsat scenes, spanning
paths 13-20 and rows 20-26 (Appendix B, Figure B-1). The Landtrendr algorithm was
run using NBR on the full region for the years 1984 to 2018.
3.2.3 Disturbance Type Identification
There are a number of methods to determine the type of land cover / land use change
associated with change detection. Schroeder et al. (2011) found reflectance in the shortwave infrared wavelength (Landsat Band 5) effectively separated forest fires from
clearcut harvests. It is sometimes possible to infer the type of change by deduction from
‘before’ and ‘after’ land cover classes (Kennedy et al., 2015; Helmer et al., 2010). Here,
we identified the types of forest change using external geospatial datasets depicting
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specific types of forest disturbances (Appendix B, Figure B-14). These datasets were also
used to validate the Landtrendr results, which show year of forest disturbance for each
pixel in the study area. In the case of hydropower, fire and mining, supplementary
datasets also depict the year of disturbance, making direct comparison with the
Landtrendr results possible. Although geospatial data depicting changes over time are not
available for roads, two static datasets are presented. [Also see (Smith & Cheng, 2016)
for a time series analysis of deforestation in the Broadback River watershed of EI/J,
including roads.]
Geospatial time series data were also not available for logging disturbances in
EI/J, although Environment Canada’s 2010 Boreal Ecosystem Anthropogenic
Disturbance (BEAD) dataset offers a snapshot of disturbances as of 2010 (Pasher et al.,
2013). We constructed a time series of logging activity by overlaying Landtrendr year of
disturbance pixels falling within the forestry zone with disturbances identified as
cutblocks in the BEAD dataset and extended the time series based on non-fire pixels with
year of disturbances from 2011 to 2018 in the logging zone (Section 3.2.3 and SI, Figure
S3-20). Together, remote sensing and supplementary data provide a more complete
picture of forest disturbances and ecosystem impacts than either source alone. For
example, the Canadian National Fire Data Base (CNFDB) consists of polygons outlining
a rough extent of forest fires containing unburned forest patches and waterbodies, but
contains valuable information including ignition source, start date, and suppression
efforts. Landsat-derived estimates, by contrast, more precisely identify disturbed patches,
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but do not as accurately gauge the number of fires, which can appear to be a series of
disconnected areas (Coops et al., 2018).
3.2.3.1 Data Sources: Disturbance Type
The datasets used to provide a comprehensive picture of boreal disturbance type
occurring in EI/J after 1970 include the Canadian National Fire Data Base (CNFDB)
(Canadian Forest Service, 2019) and Environment Canada’s 2010 BEAD dataset (Pasher
et al., 2013) (SI, Table S3-3 contains the complete list of datasets used for this study).
Spatial analysis was conducted in QGIS, GRASS, and ArcGIS; statistical analysis in R.
3.2.4 Embodied Injustices
To identify embodied FEW+M injustices manifested in deforestation arising from the
James Bay Project, we undertook a meta-analysis of available sources, including Cree
Nation and Hydro-Quebec publications, provincial and federal documents, media
coverage, and the academic literature.
3.3 Results
In this section, we show forest disturbances due to hydropower, roads, logging, and
mining, and fire in EI/J as depicted in external geospatial datasets (Section 3.1). We then
present Landtrendr results for EI/J (Section 3.2) and disaggregate these results according
to deforestation type (Section 3.3) by overlaying them with the external datasets from
Section 3.1. Following this, we focus on FEWM nexus interactions among these
disturbances (Section 3.4), emphasizing their cumulative impacts. Injustices arising from

76

the impacts of energy systems and extractive activities on, control over, and resulting
access to FEWM (Section 3.5) are pervasive.
3.1 Forest Disturbances by Type
In the following subsections, hydropower, logging, mining, and fire since 1970 are
outlined. (See SI Figures xxx for map panels showing deforestation over time due to each
of these disturbances).

3.1.1 Hydropower
Reservoirs, Cumulative disturbance: Hydropower reservoirs account for ~12,600 km2 of
flooded forest in EI/J (SI, Figure S3-15). Main stem construction began on the La Grande
River, about 1000 km north of Montreal, in the early 1970s. Between 1975 and 2000,
flows of adjacent rivers were diverted into the La Grande, effectively doubling its
catchment area (Déry et al., 2018; Roy & Messier, 1989). During Phase 1 (1972-1986),
the Eastmain, Opinaca, and Caniapiscau Rivers were diverted into the La Grande,
increasing average flow from 1,700 to 3,300 m3/s. Four dams were constructed along the
La-Grande, with five reservoirs covering 11,300 km2, contributing to an installed
generating capacity of 10,800 MW, producing about 65 TWh / year. During Phase 2
(1987-1996), five secondary power plants on the La Grande and its tributaries were
constructed, adding 5200 MW, with three new reservoirs flooding 1600 km2. Phase 2
power plants generate an additional 19 TWh/year operating between 60-70% of
maximum capacity.
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High-Voltage Transmission Lines: An estimated 4400 km of powerlines run east
to west along the La Grande Complex and north to south in EI/J (Figure 3-2).
Cumulative Disturbance: The total length of roads in the region according to the
government of Canada dataset is 4065 km, while BEAD dataset (Pasher et al., 2013)
includes 21,830 km of roads (Figure 3-2), including the network of secondary and
tertiary roads built for logging occurring within the logging zone. These 17,800 km of
roads, comprising 81.5% of all roads in the region, are not included in the official roads
database.
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Figure 3-2. Roads and powerlines. The official provincial road network (black) and secondary
and tertiary roads for logging (gray; shown within study area) below the northern forestry
limit. Data Sources: Road Network File 2019 and BEAD dataset (Pasher et al., 2013).
3.1.3 Logging and Forestry Tenures
Cumulative Disturbance: The area in Eeyou Istchee that falls south of the provinciallydetermined northern limit for commercial forestry accounts for 95,700 km2 of land within
the 430,000 km2 region, including waterbodies (Figure 3-3). [Excluding waterbodies, the
total land area in the logging zone is 86,300, or 24% of the region’s total land area of
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363,000 km2.] As of 2010, 19,100 km2 were identified in the BEAD dataset (Pasher et al.,
2013) as cutblocks, or a full 20% percent of the land area in the logging zone, not
including an estimated 17,800 km of logging roads up to 2010.

Figure 3-3. The area in EI/J within the northern limit for commercial forestry
(thumbnail, grey) and deforested areas due to logging (brown). Data source: BEAD
dataset (Pasher et al., 2013).
3.1.4 Mining
Current Mining Activity: There are six active mines (3 gold, 2 zinc and one diamond),
eight more in the appraisal stage, one in exploration, and one in development (Quebec
Système d’Information Géominière (SIGEOM) 2019) according to provincial data. There
are 13 agreements between Indigenous groups and mining companies in EI/J (Natural
Resources Canada, 2020), with three in production and nine in the exploration phase
(Figure 3-4; SI, Table S3-4), according to national data.
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Figure 3-4. Agreements between Indigenous groups and Mining Companies in
EI/J(Natural Resources Canada); active mines and projects, project status, and
materials mined (SIGEOM). Histograms of mining titles and exploratory drilling by
year issued by the province of Quebec in EI/J by year (Compiled from SIGEOM data).
Mining Activity Since 1970: Expansion of mining interests and activity in the
region from 1970 is demonstrated by a steady increase in mining titles, exploratory
drilling, active large-scale mines, and prospective mining areas. Based on data from
SIGEOM (2019), 395,000 term-limited mining titles have been issued by Quebec in EI/J
since 1970, (SI, Figure S3-17). Exploratory drilling has been undertaken at 54,725 sites
(SI, Figure S3-18). Mining titles show a small increase between 1970 and 1975 during
the JBP planning phase, with a sharp takeoff in 1980 after completion of the first dam
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(Figure 3-4). Under the Plan Nord mining activity is poised to continue, with 1200
additional sites designated for exploratory drilling (Figure 3-5).

Figure 3-5. Past, present, and planned mining activity in EI/J and adjacent areas. Data source:
Quebec SIGEOM.
3.1.5 Fire
Cumulative Disturbance: Since 1973 a total of 94,700 km2 of boreal forest in EI/J have
been affected by fire, based on CNFDB data, with 81,400 km2 burned since 1984; 95%
were attributed to lightning and 5% to humans (SI, Figure S3-14). Because the CNFDB
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consists of polygons outlining the general extent of forest fires, this estimate is
significantly higher than burned area estimates obtained from satellite imagery (Section
3.3).

3.2 Boreal Forest Disturbance Over Time
Based on the Landtrendr analysis undertaken for this study, the cumulative forested area
identified as disturbed in EI/J during the 34-year period between 1984 and 2018 is 81,600
km2, totaling 22% of the 363,000 km2 region, excluding 68,000 km2 of water. There are
wide variations in the amount of area disturbed each year; peaks occur in 1989, 1990,
1996, 2002, and 2013 (Histogram, Figure 3-6). This preliminary estimate, using only
Landtrendr results, does not include the known extent of hydropower reservoirs
constructed between 1975 and 2010 (see Section 3.3).
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Figure 3-6. Top left: Study region (green) within Canada. Bottom left: Histogram
showing number of pixels disturbed each year from 1985-2018. Right: Landtrendr results
for year of forest disturbance.
3.3 Classifying Disturbance Type and Validating Landtrendr Results
Within the 81,400 km2 delineated as fire zones in the Canadian National Fire Database
(CNFDB), 50,000 km2 (58% of pixels) were identified by Landtrendr as disturbed
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(Figure 3-7). Of the 19,100 km2 identified as cutblocks in the BEAD dataset (Pasher et al
2010), 10,400 km2 (55% of pixels) were identified by Landtrendr as disturbed, and 75
km2 in the 188 km2 identified as mines (42% of pixels) in the BEAD dataset were
identified by Landtrendr as disturbed. Another 19,900 km2 of Landtrendr-identified
disturbed pixels did not fall within the boundaries of the validation datasets (SI, Table
S3-5). While only 1580 km2 out of 12600 km2 identified in the BEAD dataset as
hydropower reservoirs were identified as disturbed (Figure 3-7), most of the Phase 1
reservoirs were formed prior to 1984, the year Landtrendr detection began.
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Figure 3-7. Landtrendr disturbance, using validation datasets to identify disturbance
type. Cutblock and mining data represent a snapshot from 2010 (Pasher et al., 2013) so
successive disturbances of these types are not identified.
3.3.1 Enhanced Estimate of Forest Disturbance by Type
The results obtained from combining Landtrendr with forest disturbance type data can be
further enhanced to provide a more complete picture of disturbances since 1973 (Figure
3-8):

86

1) Landtrendr disturbances occurring between 2011 and 2018 in EI/J within the
logging zone (Figure 3-3) that were not in areas designated as fire by the CNFDB
were assumed to be cutblocks (SI, Figure S3-20a); values are consistent with
years prior to 2011 in the BEAD dataset, which shows forest disturbance circa
2010 (Pasher et al., 2013). In addition to the cutblocks identified by (Pasher et al.,
2013) up to 2010, based on Landtrendr results we estimate an additional 3000
km2 of cutblocks between 2011-2018, bringing the total disturbance from logging
to 13,500 km2.
2) Known values for years and areal extents of reservoirs formed as part of the
James Bay Project were added.
3) Annual burned area estimates from the CNFDB (minus waterbodies) going back
to 1973 were added.
In 11 of 28 years (1984-2018) disturbances due to logging were greater than those
due to fire, even though the logging zone comprises just one-quarter of the overall region.
Within the logging zone, 64% of disturbances are attributable to logging and 29% to fire.
Including 12,600 km2 of reservoirs, the cumulative forested area identified as disturbed in
the entire region since 1975 is 93,700 km2, totaling 26 % of its total land area. Further
including areal estimates of fire from 1975-1984 from the CNFDB brings the total to
106,000 km2 or 29% of the region’s forest that has been disturbed since 1975.
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Figure 3-8. Forest disturbance by type using a ‘best available’ combination of
Landtrendr estimates and validation datasets since 1973. Satellite data begins in 1984.

3.4 FEW+M nexus: Embodied energy, water, and materials
In the above section boreal forest disturbances due to hydropower, roads, logging, mining
and fire were estimated. In this section we document the interdependence of forest
disturbances, focusing on interlinked processes, impacts, and synergies. The major
interdependencies among hydropower (energy + water), roads (infrastructure), and
logging and mining (materials) are outlined here; in the next section we consider the
impacts of these systems on fish and wildlife (food + land) in the context of embodied
injustices.
Energy-Water: Hydropower generation inextricably links hydrological systems
to energy production (water ‘inputs’ to energy). In EI/J, Quebec’s energy system
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transformed the landscape and hydrology of the region. Hydropower, in turn, made
possible other forms of extraction dependent both on energy and the transportation
network needed for hydropower construction, which in turn enabled the extensive
network of logging roads south of the forestry limit.
Energy-Water-Transportation (Interdependent Infrastructures): Power and
transportation infrastructures are intricately connected. Major roads and high voltage
powerlines run in parallel east-west along the La Grande River complex and run in
parallel east-west in the logging zone. For much of the north-south corridor, they also
occur in tandem (Figure 3-9).
Energy-Water-Roads-Logging-Mining-Wildlife: Throughout the region, mines
are located near both hydropower transmission lines and roads (Figure 3-9). The one
exception is the Renard Diamond Mine, which opened in 2014 and relies on natural gas
for power: a road to the mine was built jointly by Renard Corporation and Quebec as part
of the Plan Nord. The region south of the forestry limit has 11 of the region’s 15 mines
and four sawmills (Figure 3-9), with four more just below the southern boundary of EI/J
(SI Figure S3-21). Increased human presence and infrastructure development, including
mineral exploration and extraction, has resulted in broad disturbances to woodland
caribou (Herrmann et al., 2014).
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Figure 3-9. The proximity of primary roads and high voltage powerlines throughout the
region and the siting of mines and sawmills near this dual infrastructure (left). The
occurrence of fire precludes logging; no logging roads were identified in this region
(right).
Logging-Mining-Roads: In the logging zone, roads initially built for logging are used for
exploratory drilling by the mining industry; the densest drilling sites (Figure 3-10, purple
circles) closely follow main roads running east-west. No logging roads occur in the
regions deforested by fire; the only section of the area in EI/J below Quebec’s
commercial forestry limit not interlaced with roads.
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Figure 3-10. Left: Mines, like sawmills, are adjacent to power and major road networks.
Exploratory mine drilling is also clustered along primary and logging roads. Right: Fire and
powerlines (yellow).

Hydropower-Powerlines-Fire
North of the logging limit, disturbances are attributable primarily to fire (Figure 3-7). Fire
regimes have been accelerating across Canada; the return interval for EI/J is 50-100 years,
among the shortest in the country (Coops et al., 2018); 161 fires in the region since 1977
intersect powerline corridors (Figure 3-10, right). The CNFDB attributes 95% of the fires
to lightning and 5% to humans.
3.5 Embodied Injustices at the resource nexus: Impacts, access, and control
In this section, we further explore forest loss, degradation and loss of wildlife through the
FEWM+ENTS lens, emphasizing that decisions regarding energy, water, and materials
have far-reaching and long-lasting transboundary impacts. We begin by presenting total
forest losses and deforestation type in each of the nine Cree communities comprising
Eeyou Istchee, linking this to wildlife captures in each community from 1989-2019. We
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then consider how the JBP and subsequent deforestation linked to energy and material
extraction throughout the region has contributed to embodied food, water, energy, and
material injustices with respect to FEWM access and control across these interconnected
supply chains.
3.5.1 Forest Disturbances by Community
A crucial feature of the JBNQA was its designation of three land categories in the region
(Section 2.1.1). Cree Nation boundaries are used in this section, spanning JBNQA
Category 1, 2, and 3 lands that comprise traplines (traditional family hunting and fishing
territories), rather than the minimal extent of Category 1 areas identified as Cree land on
Quebec maps of Jamésie. There is considerable variation in both overall forest losses and
most extensive forest disturbance type across the nine communities comprising the Cree
Nation of EI. Five Cree Nations have territory falling partially or completely within the
logging zone, and two have lost considerable forest area to reservoirs. Only one,
Whapmogoostui, the northernmost community, has experienced less than 10%
deforestation, while Eastmain has lost 40% of its forest, primarily to fire. The southern
communities of Waswanipi and Oujé-Bougoumou, located inside the logging zone, have
lost two and three times more forest, respectively, to logging than to fire (Appendix B,
Table B-6). A closeup of Category 1 land in Waswanipi shows the change in logging
patterns after the signing of the PDB in 2002, shifting from large swaths of clearcut land
(Figure 3-11, yellow and orange) to smaller, more extensive mosaic cuts (Figure 3-11,
red and purple) and the dense road networks needed for timber access and transport.
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Figure 3-11. Close-up of deforestation over time on the Category 1 land of Waswanipi in the
southern section of Eeyou Istchee within the logging zone. Bottom left: Active mining titles
extend to the boundary of Category 1 land; Bottom right: Earlier titles encroached on it
.
3.5.2 Declining Wildlife Captures: Food, Forests and Sovereignty
The pattern of declining wildlife captures is seen across all First Nations in EI, with
southern communities directly impacted by logging having the sharpest dropoffs (Figure
3-12; SI Section III). Migrating moose and the endangered woodland caribou,
traditionally a staple food in winter and early spring, have seen major declines. Caribou
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captures have dropped by more than 90% in five of eight communities (SI, Table S3-8).
The northernmost Cree Nation, Whapmagoostui, has experienced the least amount of
deforestation (6%), and is the only one in which there are more caribou captures than any
other species. Captures of beaver, central to fur trading for centuries, have dropped by
76% to 96% in all communities between 1989 and 2018. The decline in moose reflects
trends across the northeast in both Canada and the United States (SI, Figure S3-23). This
quote from a Cree trapper, three years prior to the 2002 Paix des Braves Agreement
(PDB), articulates the connections among roadbuilding, logging, and wildlife habitat loss:
Our land is uncut now but I know Donahue [a forestry corporation] plans to build
a road into it.... I am opposed to this road. This will seriously affect my hunting
grounds. Ours is good hunting and fishing land... The road will change all that; it
will damage the habitat and open it up to hunters and fishermen— I want all of
this considered in a full environmental assessment but they won't do it. I know the
government well… They refuse to consider all development together... We are
pushed out of our land again and again. We are told to move our hunting grounds.
I have seen this happen many times in Waswanipi. They concentrate the cutting
too heavily in one place… The companies and the government don't listen to us.
They take what is ours and push us aside. This must stop. (Affidavit of Allen
Saganash, Sr, 22 July 1999 by Feit in Blaser et al, p 96-97: 2004; italics added)
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Figure 3-12. Wildlife capture data by year and species for the Cree Nations of Eeyou
Istchee, in order of deforestation, highest to lowest. Data Source: Cree Trappers
Association wildlife capture data from 1989-2019 by community and species
(https://www.creegeoportal.ca/cta/)

The PDB adapted forestry regime strengthened the role of the Crees with respect
to forestry governance in Eeyou Istchee, creating new consultative mechanisms at
regional and local levels. The PDB set a precedent in Quebec whereby substantive
changes were made to forestry rules to accommodate Aboriginal land use, affirmed
through amendments to the provincial Forest Act, effectively creating two policy regimes
in Quebec, one applying to the Crees and another to all other First Nations. Agreements
similar to the PDB do not exist elsewhere in the province, and policies applying to other
First Nations are significantly weaker. Moreover, the effectiveness of new procedural
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arrangements in EI has yet to be investigated, and “the prescriptive nature of the PDB
itself -- based on measures agreed upon at the outset, leaves little room for meaningful
input from the different actors involved in the process” (Teitelbaum et al., forthcoming).
3.5.3 Methylmercury contamination of fish: consequences of forest flooding
Methylmercury toxicity in fish was another unanticipated consequence of hydropower
development (SI Section III). Highlighting the complex issues surrounding control over
interconnected systems, Matthew Coon Come, Grand Chief of the Grand Council of the
Crees from 1987-1999, describes the impact of the James Bay Complex on wildlife and
Cree fishing as follows:
“We have discovered that the boat access ramps are useless in areas where the
trees are left standing underwater, because the trees block boat access to the
shore. Furthermore, the fish are highly contaminated by mercury leaching out of
the rotting vegetation; if we eat the fish, one of our staples, we get methylmercury
poisoning” (Coon Come in Blaser el al. 2004: 158).
Following impoundment in the La Grande Complex, fish mercury levels rose by
factors ranging from two to eight relative to the levels found in natural environments,
according to a study commissioned by Hydro-Quebec. Mercury levels peaked 4 to 11
years after reservoir formation in non-piscivorous species (0.33 to 0.72 mg/kg) and 9 to
14 years after reservoir formation in piscivorous species (1.65 to 4.66 mg/kg). The same
study found that mercury levels generally returned to baseline values 10 to 20 years after
reservoir formation in non-piscivorous species and after 20 to 30 years in piscivorous
species (Schetagne & Therrien, 2013). Consumption of piscivorous species such as pike,
walleye and lake trout are now limited in the La Grande, Rupert and Eastmain reservoirs
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and rivers to as little as one meal per month. There is considerable variation in the extent
of toxicity in the many lakes and rivers in the region. In contrast to declining wildlife
captures, which more strongly impact southern Cree Nations, the highest levels of
methylmercury toxicity in fish species providing a key food source are concentrated in
territories in which reservoirs were formed, in the north and west of EI/J. Particularly
impacted at present are the recently-constructed Rupert and Eastmain reservoirs and
adjacent rivers (SI, Table S3-9).
3.5.4 Water
There are profound differences in perceptions of water in Indigenous and Western
cultures; Yates et al. (2017) describe the distinct, but not necessarily mutually exclusive,
ontologies of water-as-lifeblood versus water-as-a-resource. Matthew Coon Come also
addresses multiple water-related struggles in EI:
[Grandma] looked to the lake and said: 'One of these days they will come and
they will block our rivers. They will make them flow backwards.' Then she
looked to the mountains, and she said, 'I see something eating the trees.' And then
she said, 'Even the very water that you drink, someday you will have to pay for it.'
I have seen that vision come to pass. I have stood where the big dams have been
built. I have seen where the rivers have been made to flow backwards. And every
spring I am told in Mistissini that I cannot drink that water because it is
contaminated, and I have to pay so that I can drink water (Coon Come, 2004).
In addition to the appropriation of the watercourses to produce energy and the resulting
widespread, decades-long mercury contamination of fish, access to safe, reliable and
sustainable sources of drinking water and sanitation systems are among the most pressing
health issues facing First Nations communities across Canada (Basdeo & Bharadwaj,
2013; Bradford et al., 2016). In the early 1980s, failure of provincial and federal
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authorities to put adequate sewage systems in place in newly constructed settlements for
Cree communities displaced by the James Bay Project resulted in a deadly outbreak of
gastroenteritis (von Rosen, 2012).

3.5.5 Energy
In addition to the impacts of Quebec’s energy system on the land and water of EI, and
control over energy systems, there are also embodied injustices concerning access to
energy. Across Canada, 260 communities and 15 commercial sites are considered remote,
that is, not connected to either the North American electrical grid or the natural gas
pipeline network (Energy and Mines Ministers’ Conference, 2018). Of these, 77% rely on
diesel fuel for power generation, 14% on hydropower, and 10% on local grids. Remote
indigenous communities rely more on expensive, environmentally damaging, and aging
diesel power generators than their non-indigenous counterparts, and this situation is even
more pronounced in Quebec. In the rest of Canada, 83% of the 147 remote indigenous
communities rely on diesel, and 15% on the grid, while 66% of the 87 remote nonindigenous communities rely on diesel, and 38% on hydro or a local grid. In Quebec,
82% of 22 indigenous communities rely on diesel and 14% on hydro; by contrast just
29% of 17 the province’s non-indigenous remote communities rely on either diesel or
heavy fuel oil and a full 71% have access to hydropower (Analysis of data from
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada & Natural Resources Canada, 2016).
In EI/J, eight of the nine Cree communities are connected to the Hydro-Quebec
grid, in part because of stipulations in the 1975 JBQNA and the 2002 Paix des Braves
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Agreement (PDB) and in part because of the proximity of Eeyou Istchee to hydropower
sources (National Aboriginal Economic Board 2014: 28). In 2002 the PDB contained a
specific provision guaranteeing that Waskaganish in the southwest of the region would be
connected to the HydroQuébec network within five years and Whapmagoostui in the
north would be connected “as soon as possible” (Paix des Braves 2002: 25);
Whapmagoostui remains unconnected 18 years later. Directly north of Eeyou Istchee is
the Innuit region of Nunavik, which was also a party to the JBNQA; all 14 Innuit
communities in Nunavik rely on diesel generators and none have an integrated grid
(National Aboriginal Economic Board 2014).

3.4. Discussion
The disturbances presented above – hydropower, timber extraction, mining, roads, and
fire – affecting the boreal forest in EI/J since the 1975 JBNQA are part of a wider history
of colonial development across North America. The FEWM+ENTS approach, integrating
embodied food, energy, water, and material injustices over time in the context of
transboundary unsustainability, offers a powerful lens to highlight past and current
injustices on which wide-ranging FEWS have been built and continue to depend. As
implemented in this study, FEWM+ENTS also provides a monitoring framework to
digitally document historical landscape change that can be used to improve stewardship
of the working landscape and address ongoing embodied injustices at the nexus of FEWS
and material extraction. We group FEWM+ENTS observations resulting from the EI/J
case study as follows: 1) spatio-temporal patterns of boreal deforestation; 2)
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‘anthropogenic’ verses ‘natural’ proximate drivers of deforestation 3) hydropower and
transboundary sustainability 4) embodied injustices and multi-sectoral impacts; and 5)
ongoing northern development and the critical importance of continued monitoring that is
fundamentally interlinked with equity, justice and sustainability initiatives.
3.4.1 Boreal Forest Disturbances: Spatiotemporal patterns of extraction and
deforestation
Quebec’s construction of a major hydropower complex in EI/J catalyzed more intensive
private-sector development throughout the region. With this base established in the
northern section of EI/J, successive waves of multi-sector resource extraction extended
increasingly northward toward the La Grande River Complex beyond the logging zone,
similar to events in neighboring regions (Massell, 2011). Development can be seen to
intensify in fractal patterns, building on existing infrastructures, and repeating at multiple
spatial scales across sectors. These patterns are evidenced by:
•

The initial primary road network developed in tandem with and supported
hydropower construction running north-south to the La Grande River and eastwest along it.

•

Major hydropower and road infrastructure fostered the construction of a dense
logging road network below the northern limit for commercial forestry.

•

Utilizing the same roads, logging was followed by intensive exploratory drilling
by the mining industry in Ouje-Bougoumou and Waswanipi, the most southern
Cree Nations in the region.

•

Power-intensive mining operations and sawmills were co-sited with high-voltage
transmission lines and primary roads.

•

Mining operations expanded northward steadily since 1970: evidenced first by
titles, then exploratory drilling, stretching further north above the limit for
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commercial forestry. South of the forestry limit, exploratory drilling increased in
density, closely following primary roads (SI, Figures S3-17 and S3-18).
•

Hydro-Quebec planned to dam the Great and Little Whale Rivers north of the
LaGrande, and the Nottaway, Broadback, and Rupert Rivers to the south. The
Crees successfully blocked the Great/Little Whale plans, but the Rupert was
developed in exchange for permanently dropping plans to develop the Nottaway
and Broadback Rivers.

3.4.2 Deforestation by Type
Logging outweighs fire in forestry zone: Fire, by area, is the main cause of deforestation
north of the forestry limit, but we find that 64% of disturbances within the logging zone
are cutblocks and just 29% are due to fire. (Figure 3-7). Linear disturbances from roads in
the logging zone, which comprises just 24% of the land in EI/J, amount to another 17,765
km. When the edge effects of logging and logging infrastructure are taken into account,
forest degradation and loss are likely to be much more extensive than cutblock area alone
indicates (Chaplin-Kramer et al., 2015; Smith & Cheng, 2016). In EI/J logging
infrastructure becomes a permanent feature on the landscape, leading to further
extraction, particularly mining, and facilitating non-native access and settlement. As in
Ontario (Wildlands League, 2019), deforestation due to logging plus logging
infrastructure in EI/J and in Quebec as a whole is likely much larger than the official
forestry records indicate (2020 km2 for Quebec in 2016 (Natural Resources Canada,
2018)). These additional impacts should be clearly understood amid proposals (Jobidon et
al., 2015) to extend Quebec’s limit for commercial forestry allocation further north.
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Fire cannot be viewed as solely a ‘natural’ disturbance: Leveraging nexus-based insights
that FEWS and material extraction are interconnected with, encompassed by, and have a
profound impact upon the wider ecosystems which surround them, it would be
misleading to conclude that fire as a ‘natural’ disturbance is the main cause of
deforestation in EI/J. Reservoir formation accounted for a spike in forest disturbance as
large as fire in the early years of the James Bay Project (Histogram 2). There are also
several reasons why it is important to consider that at least some proportion of fires are
not only anthropogenic but also, from a justice perspective, non-Native in origin:
1) The James Bay Hydropower Complex has significantly altered flow patterns and
water discharge in EI/J. The Cree Vision for the Plan Nord calls for public discussion
on the type of information needed on regional climate change and the hydrological
consequences of northern hydroelectric development and a “thorough review of the
adequacy of the basic framework for the collection of and access to hydro
meteorological data in Northern Québec” (2011: 44).
2) The fire return interval of 50-100 years in the region surrounding the La Grande
River complex is the most rapid (i.e. more frequent fires) in Eastern Canada and
among the most rapid anywhere in the country. From 1985 to 2015, a total 6% of
Canada's forested ecozones burned, with a significant national increasing trend in
burned area of 11% per year over the past decade (Coops et al., 2018).
3) Our results suggest powerlines may be an unexamined cause of fire ignitions in the
region. 161 fires in the region since 1977 intersect high voltage powerline corridors.
Currently 5% of the fires in EI/J are attributed to human causes in the Canadian
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National Fire Database. The remaining 95% are attributed to lightning, although
eastern Canada has lower rates of fire due to fewer lightning strikes and wetter
conditions than western Canada (Coops et al., 2018: 13). Powerlines are a significant
and increasing cause of wildfire in many regions (Keeley & Syphard, 2018; Collins
et al., 2016; Faivre et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2017). The combined effect of drier
forests and atmospheric turbulence at fragmented edges (e.g. breaks at powerlines or
roads) may exacerbate fire ignition, intensity, and spread in EI/J.
4) Climate change is increasing boreal forest wildfires (Amiro et al., 2001), with further
increases expected this century due to more frequent and severe droughts (Terrier et
al., 2013). Increasing fire incidence in combination with current rates of clear-cutting
and mosaic harvesting are of major concern to the health of boreal forests across
Canada (Bergeron et al., 2011).
5) The commercially valuable black spruce harvested from the boreal forest by timber
companies in EI/J is often replanted with the much more combustible jack pine
(Barlow, 2008; Henneb et al., 2020), which also is also predicted to push black
spruce out of forest succession over time as fire frequency increases due to climate
change (Boiffin & Munson, 2013; Sirois, 1993)
6) Changing this narrative around fire may undercut the federal and provincial
justification for logging implicit in the contention that fire -- viewed as a purely
‘natural’ disturbance -- is the “dominant stand-replacing disturbance impacting
forested ecosystems” across Canada (Coops et al., 2018: 2).
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3.4.3 FEWM + Transboundary Unsustainability
FEWM+ENTS provides a critical lens that can inform ongoing efforts to transition to
more just and sustainable FEWS and material supply chains across regional and
international boundaries. The energy and materials extracted from EI/J have met demands
of consumers in southern Quebec, neighboring provinces, and the U.S. since the 1970s:
Hydro-Quebec (HQ) currently has an estimated surplus of about 40 TWh per year
(Hydro-Québec, 2019); in 2019 the utility sold 208.3 TWh of energy, including 33.7
TWh (16%) exported to New England, New York State, Ontario and New Brunswick
(Hydro-Quebec, 2020); Vermont, for example, relies on Quebec for about one third of its
electricity supply (Vermont Department of Public Service, 2016). The U.S. is also a
major consumer of the province’s lumber and pulpwood. In the 1990s and early 2000s
the Crees were successful in leveraging the electricity supply chain to gain support in the
United States to block Hydro-Quebec’s planned expansion of the James Bay complex
into the Great Whale, Broadback and Nottaway Rivers (von Rosen, 2013; McRae, 2004).
The Cree campaign involved extensive efforts to raise awareness of its impacts to HydroQuebec’s intended markets in New York, Vermont, and Maine (von Rosen, 2013) and the
promotion of energy conservation as a crucial way to meet increasing energy demand in
the U.S.
The argument that conservation is a vital way to meet demand also holds for
Quebec. Currently the James Bay complex operates at about 70% of its generating
capacity of 17,200 MW and comprises half the total installed capacity in Quebec. The
power oversupply in Quebec has led to inefficient electric baseboards as the most
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common form of home heating throughout the province, while northern indigenous
communities still rely on diesel generators for power. In 2017, annual electricity
consumption per capita in Quebec (population 8.5 million) was 21 MWh, compared to
9.5 MWh in neighboring Ontario (population 14.6 million). Quebec’s per capita
electricity consumption is 44% more than the national average; its higher consumption is
driven by the presence of high-electricity consuming industries such as aluminum
smelting, and reliance in the residential and commercial sectors on electric baseboard
heating (SI, Section Vb).
There is intense debate about whether large hydropower should be considered
renewable as more governments across North America adopt higher renewable energy
targets. In 2018 Hydro-Quebec secured a 20-year contract to supply Massachusetts with
9.45 TWh of energy per year, and is now building a 1200 MW interconnection, the New
England Clean Energy Connect (NECEC), to deliver electricity to the New England grid
via Maine, after a similar initiative to deliver hydropower via New Hampshire was
defeated in that state. A strong clean energy rhetoric surrounds these initiatives (HydroQuebec, 2020). In addition to the carbon footprint of newly created hydropower
reservoirs (Deemer et al., 2016; Teodoru et al., 2012), the cumulative boreal deforestation
in EI/J beginning with, and dependent on power from, the James Bay hydroelectric
complex, indicate that the assertation of the region’s hydropower as ‘clean’ should be
carefully examined.
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3.4.4 FEWM+ Embodied Injustices: “They refuse to consider all development
together”
An important takeaway from this case study is that multi-sectoral impacts leading to
forest degradation and loss are ultimately more damaging than the sum of their parts,
affecting interdependent social-ecological systems at multiple spatial scales. While siloed
and atemporal metrics can obscure cumulative losses and combined impacts in tandem,
the FEWM+ENTS framework supports collection of multi-sectoral data over time that
permits causal and correlative patterns to be detected.
In EI/J several forest disturbance types related to the region’s development–
hydropower, mining, logging, roads, and fire – interact in multiple reinforcing ways.
Broadly speaking, hydropower dramatically reshaped the landscape, requiring the
construction of an arterial road network, running in tandem with high voltage powerlines.
Hydrological reengineering and powerlines have likely boosted ignition risk, a
phenomenon which merits further study, and can partially account for accelerating burn
cycles in the region. Sawmills and mines require electricity and transportation
infrastructure and roads; exploratory mining closely follows major roads in areas opened
by logging. In the same way that the combined impacts of hydropower, roads, logging,
mining, and fire have led to forest loss and land and water degradation throughout Eeyou
Istchee that are ultimately more damaging than the sum of their parts, so too are the
interlinked embodied FEW+M injustices resulting from these activities.
These mutually reinforcing injustices are intertwined with non-Native
extractivism, permanently altering the landscape and damaging the boreal ecosystem, and
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facilitating non-Native settlement. These embodied injustices take on several dimensions:
Quebec and Canada were able to wrest control over land and water in EI/J from Native
Peoples in order to generate energy and extract timber and minerals for the benefit of
distant populations, resulting in significant boreal forest loss and destruction of fish and
wildlife habitat. This in turn deprived the Crees of access to traditional foods and safe
drinking water, upending traditional ways of life, and largely excluding the Crees from
economic development of the region. Even after the passing of the JBNQA, it was a
decades-long process for the Crees to push the provincial and federal governments to
honor the commitments made in the Agreement: “It took until 1987 to get the Cree
School Board fully funded. It took until 2002 to get the Health Board fully funded. In the
meantime the social and health problems of the communities were encountering were
growing” (Craik in von Rosen, 2012).
3.4.5 Future considerations
The 2011 Plan Nord, Quebec’s 25-year, $80 Cd billion plan to intensify resource
extraction in the 1.2 million km2 territory in Quebec north of the 49th parallel, applies to
72% of Quebec’s total area, including all JBNQA lands. Its aims are to enable resource
development by 2035, setting aside 50% for “non-industrial purposes, environmental
protection, and safeguarding of biodiversity” (Gouvernement du Québec, 2015: 13). The
Plan Nord has generated considerable concern among Aboriginal, environmental, and
scientific communities. The 2011 Cree Government response, the Cree Vision of Plan
Nord (CVPN), states that the Plan Nord must respect Cree rights as articulated in
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Constitution of Canada, the JBNQA, and the Paix des Braves (PDB), including the nation
to nation relationship between the Crees and Quebec outlined in the PBD.
The FEWM+ENTS approach to the nexus illustrated in this paper, focusing on
impacts on, access to, and control over the FEW/ resource nexus, implicitly supports the
perspective articulated in the CVPN: that development activities are interconnected, with
impacts reverberating across the land and the people inhabiting it. The CVPN further
states that past industrial development must be taken into account in the Plan Nord’s goal
to protect 50% of the territory. In particular, timber harvesting both north and south of the
northern limit of allocation “should be considered as ‘industrial’ under the Plan Nord
50% protection scheme” (CVPN, 2011: 103). Given the extensive nature of logging
operations within the current forestry zone in EI/J, this provision would likely
significantly curtail the area open to development.
The Need for Monitoring: Uncertainties relating to “50% Protected Area”
illustrate that monitoring is needed to document the nature, scope and impacts in all
sectors of industrial activity, including energy, forestry, and mining, which will be
affected by the Plan Nord (CVPN, 2011). The FEWM+ENTS lens, building on FEW
/resource nexus insights and the concept of embodied energy injustice, offers an
important framing for the ongoing monitoring needed to document the nature, scope and
impacts of hydropower, logging and mining across their interlinked supply chains.
Specifically, the CVPN asks: “What industrial activity has taken place in the past?
Where, by whom, with what environmental, social and health impacts in the Territory?”
noting:
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It is impossible to answer these questions with any assurance of accuracy. A
rational development strategy, such as the Plan Nord purports to be, requires the
establishment of baseline information to determine the “before” and the “after” of
existing industrial activity and of future industrial activity associated with the
Plan Nord (CVPN, 2011: 106).
The CVPN also calls for a thorough review of the technical aspects of monitoring,
stating this is essential for development of future policy recommendations concerning the
Plan Nord. The CVPN asserts that Quebec’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Wildlife
(MNRW) has not shown willingness to prioritize the health of the forest ecosystem over
timber extraction, calling for Quebec to suspend tree cutting in areas with woodland
caribou and to consult all parties to create a recovery plan. With respect to Cree rights
more broadly, “the Government of Quebec must make a definitive statement rejecting
suggestions to amend the exclusivity of the Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Regime …in
the JBNQA” (CVPN, 2011: 56). The Cree Government also calls for rigorous attention to
environmental evaluation, restoration and monitoring of the past mistakes with respect to
mining and emphasizes the need to inspire public trust, noting that “outstanding
environmental impacts of past mining activities in the region have …created a climate of
mistrust” (CVPN, 2011: 100). With respect to embodied injustices stemming from
development as whole, the CVPN asks, “Who will bear the human costs of economic
development in the North?” and concludes:
Northern populations are already at a disadvantage due to their remote location
and suffer considerable health and social inequities compared to the rest of
Quebec. Profiting from the natural resources and tourism potential in the North at
their expense would be unjust, further increasing inequities rather than helping
those who need it most (CVPN, 2011: 113).
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3.5. Conclusion
This study extends the FEW/resource nexus to include Materials, Embodied iNjustices,
and Transboundary unSustainability (FEWM+ENTS), using a historical perspective to
examine proximate causes of deforestation in a contested landscape that is now the site of
the largest hydropower complex in the Western Hemisphere and poised for a new wave
of northern development, initiated by the province of Quebec and reflective of trends
throughout Canada. We address several recent critiques of the nexus approach,
particularly its failure to consider the political production of the nexus, that is, “the
contested relationships, processes and technologies through which [food], energy and
water become enrolled in nexus interactions” (Williams et al., 2014: 4). Through
FEWM+ENTS framing and analysis, we trace and map ecosystem disturbances to the
region, identifying the year and type of forest disturbance. Rather than focusing primarily
on the inputs of water to energy, we focus on the reverberating social-ecological impacts
of the energy system on the region as whole, as hydropower, logging, mining, and fire
have cumulatively deforested at least 26% of the boreal forest in EI/J since the early
1970s, excluding the edge effects of nearly 20,000 km of roads initially built for timber
extraction in southern EI/J. Moreover, the large burned area in EI/J cannot be attributed
solely to natural causes, and ignition of fire from powerlines may be an unexamined
cause of fires in the region.
We further identify interdependencies among forest disturbance types and link
embodied FEWM injustices to transboundary resource consumption and control,
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emphasizing that the extensive ecological degradation documented here undermines the
‘clean’ and ‘sustainable’ narratives surrounding electricity and material exports from the
region. Logging is not only the main cause of deforestation in the southern quarter of
EI/J, it also serves as a gateway to further extraction, territorial control, and permanent
non-Native settlement. The boreal forest is of global ecological significance, playing a
pivotal role in carbon cycling and biodiversity, and providing crucial habitat for fish and
wildlife that have supported Aboriginal People for millennia. The boreal forest of Canada
may be as consequential for global climate change mitigation as the rainforests of the
Amazon, and is further threatened by intensive development north of the 49th parallel,
which can be seen to mirror at northern latitudes the trajectories of tropical deforestation
and development.
In extending the concept of embodied energy injustice to include nexus
interactions among FEWS and material supply chains, we focus not only on inputs to and
impacts of these systems, but also on access to and control over FEWM. Precisely
because it is still an emerging concept, the nexus offers an opportunity, particularly at the
resource frontier, to re-examine approaches to the social-ecological impacts of complex
interacting systems rather than specific projects, such as a mine, power plant, or timber
allocation, as isolated activities with narrowly-defined environmental impacts.
FEWM+ENTS can provide a powerful lens for monitoring nexus interactions through
which the interconnected nature of ongoing territorial expansion, entangled socialecological changes, and embodied injustices come into sharper focus. This lens opens up
the possibility of seeing more clearly a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts, and
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thus facilitates awareness of the emergent properties of these rapidly developing systems
in both place-based and technological ‘frontiers’, in which emerging technologies are
rapidly accelerating extractive capabilities.
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CHAPTER 4: CARBON AUTOCRACY: THE GLOBAL OIL AND GAS
EXTRACTION NETWORK, STATE-FIRM RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERFIRM DEPENDENCIES, 2014-2018
Abstract
Publicly available sources for global energy data generally depict national-level fossil
fuel extraction and related processes. These sources do not systematically track the
transnational activities of the world’s major oil and gas producers, confounding efforts to
trace environmental, social, and climate impacts of the fossil energy system to specific
actors, policies, and the dynamic relations between sovereign nations and extractive
corporations. Here we examined the a new, spatially-explicit dataset using publicly
available annual reports and operating statements of the top 26 global oil and gas
companies based on annual production. Using this dataset, we conducted multilayer and
multiplex network analyses of the global production network from 2014 to 2018. During
this key period, international climate mitigation efforts coalesced in the Paris Agreement,
large scale renewable energy alternatives became increasingly viable, and pro-fossil fuel
interests gained increasing traction in politically conservative “populist” movements in
key oil and gas producing countries around the world. We represented countries, stateowned oil companies, hybrid state-investor companies, and investor-owned corporations
as network nodes, with weighted network edges indicating the flows of oil and gas
among resource-holding countries and oil and gas companies. This system-wide
perspective of the global oil and production network offers insights into the structure of
complex and rapidly-shifting global energy geopolitics. The prevalence of joint ventures
and equity holdings across investor-owned and hybrid companies emphasizes the tight
interdependence among transnational oil and gas interests and cooperation (‘collusion’)
in the face of existential threats to the industry that crystallized around the decisive US
election of 2016. At a system level, the interconnectedness, global reach, and combined
power of the major private, hybrid, and state oil and gas producers point to the necessity
for a supply-side approach to the reduction of global carbon emissions.
4.1.

Introduction

The global transition to low-carbon energy systems, while increasingly urgent, is also
intensely contested, as evidenced by several rapid and seemingly contradictory shifts.
The past decade has seen the incorporation of large-scale renewable energy into the
electric grid, binding commitments to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions in the
landmark 2015 Paris Agreement, and the increasing electrification of the transportation
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system, as well as surging production of shale oil and gas through “fracking” (i.e. High
Volume Hydraulic Fracturing (HVHF) in combination with horizontal drilling). Fracking
propelled the United States to become the top producer of petroleum and natural gas in
the world, surpassing Russia in natural gas in 2009 and Saudi Arabia in petroleum in
20131. Commercial-scale fracking also occurs in Canada, China, and Argentina, amid
vocal efforts in other regions to halt the process. The tensions between entrenched fossil
fuel interests and the growing movement to transition away from them are reflected in
ongoing political struggles in countries crucial to the global oil and gas production
network and attempts by transnational fossil fuel interests to influence political processes
in these countries. In order to effectively govern the global transition away from fossil
energy, it is necessary to clearly outline and characterize the rapidly-changing oil and gas
production network and its complex interdependencies at the system level. This effort is
especially urgent given the industry’s motivation and ability to obstruct, stymie, and
derail meaningful efforts at a large-scale energy transition across national borders.
Publicly available data are essential tools for fostering public oversight of the
global fossil fuel industry, and as such have been the target of high-level obstruction.
Regularly scheduled meetings in the USA of the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, an international effort involving stakeholders from government, energy
companies, trade organizations, and civil society groups seeking to track all payments to
governments were unilaterally cancelled by the Trump administration in early 20172.
Weeks after Trump’s inauguration in 2017, the Republican-controlled House passed a
resolution nullifying a provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform law
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requiring all oil and gas companies listed on the US stock exchange to publicly report all
taxes, royalties, fees, dividends and bonuses paid to foreign governments or officials
(2019: 352)2.
While there are several major publicly-available datasets constructed by public
agencies and industry groups that include detailed information on fossil fuel production,
consumption, and trade patterns3–5, they generally provide data at the national level, with
additional sources providing data for some countries at the subnational level6. Third party
groups addressing firm activities tend to focus on one section of the whole system or on
the activities of one company7.However, none of these sources consistently track or
integrate the activities of all of the major firms engaged in fossil fuel extraction,
obscuring the central role of transitional private and hybrid state-private interests in a
complex global regulatory and political landscape. This constitutes a major shortcoming
in the effort to effectively reduce carbon emissions at the global scale.
To undertake this analysis of oil and gas extraction across countries at the firm
level, we developed a new spatially-explicit dataset of global oil and gas production using
publicly available data, including annual reports, operating statements, and SEC filings of
the top 26 oil and gas companies based on millions of barrels of oil equivalent per day
(mboed) produced in 2016 (Table 4-1). This dataset consists of more than 7600 records
for exploration, reserves, production, and refining by the 26 largest companies between
2014 and 2018. Each record includes the name of the company, the country in which the
operation occurred, the quantity (if available), unit, exact location if given, whether the
operation is a joint venture and venture partners if listed, year, source, and if the original
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record was not in table form, the text from which the record was constructed (Table 4-5).
There are over 5300 records for production, including 3000 at the national level, with
separate entries for liquids, gas, and total hydrocarbons. Another 2100 records describe
extraction at the subnational level and 400 are aggregated to the regional or continental
level. Also included are about 500 records for major development projects in the preproduction phase as well as acreage held as part of active concessions.
Using this dataset we present a high-level description of current global oil and gas
extraction, and construct a directed, weighted network of global oil and gas production
from 2014 to 2018. We analyze this network according to established methods, including
the application of machine learning for community detection within the network and
highlight key trends and hotspots in the network.
4.1.1 The Global Oil and Gas Production Network
We depict oil and gas extracting companies, or firms, (whether exclusively private, statecontrolled, or some combination thereof) and sovereign nation-states as network nodes,
drawing on a notable illustration of the global production network (GPN) applied to oil8.
That study from 2008 identified two defining tensions in the GPN for oil influencing its
organizational structure and geographies: 1) the tension between resource-holding states
and resource-seeking firms and 2) the distribution of value between producers (both
states and firms) and consumers. Although that work also relied on national-level
production and consumption data3 and did not capture more recent social, political and
environmental dynamics and risks of various state relationships to the fossil fuel industry,
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it was notable in prioritizing inter-firm and firm-state relationships. This
conceptualization was offered as an alternative to the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis, which
posits that states rich in natural resources tend to have less democratic governance.
Bridge8 also identified three structural imperatives that distinguish it from other sectors:
1) the resource (access) imperative to replace constantly depleting reserves, with
resource-seeking firms negotiating with resource-holding states over the terms of access
and firms competing for access to and control over reserves; 2) the technological
imperative to reduce costs to gain competitive advantage, which manifests itself in the
aggressive pursuit of economies of scale in production and refining, and in transportation;
and 3) the ecological imperative to reduce carbon emissions worldwide as the energy
needed to extract oil from increasingly hard to reach areas, including subsurface shale
and deepwater deposits is increasing, such that firms “nominally in the business of
producing oil (rather than consuming it) top the ranks of carbon dioxide emitters”
(2008:18)8.
The GPN approach insists “on a relational understanding of production and the
ways in which inter-firm competition structures the organization and geographies of the
production network” (2008: 406)8. The approach also highlights more recent challenges
to effective governance of the global transition to a low-carbon energy system,
particularly the vital role of national regulation of the fossil fuel extractive industry and
the many instances in which such regulations fail in their mandates of adequate
environmental, health, social and labor protection. Mitchell outlines four features of the
political economy of oil in the 20th century: 1) the extraordinary rents that could be
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earned from controlling the production and distribution of oil, 2) the difficulty in securing
those rents due to the overabundance of supply, 3) the pivotal role of Saudi Arabia in
maintaining oil scarcity, and 4) the collapse of older colonial methods of imposing antimarket corporate control of Saudi oilfields, such that oil profits depended on working
with those forces that could guarantee the political control of Arabia…the multinational
oil corporations sought to secure and enlarge these rents, in a rivalrous collaboration with
the governments that controlled the oilfields” (2013: 229)9.
The crucial role of the US, Russia Saudi Arabia in the global production of oil is
not new: Saudi Arabia developed into one of the three very large producers in the 1970s,
and by the 1990s these countries each produced two or three times as much oils as any of
the other producers among the top dozen9. Mitchell, in the book Carbon Democracy,
highlights Saudi Arabia’s importance not just in its abundance of supply, but in its pivotal
role in the system of scarcity:
With a population about one-tenth the size of Russia’s and 1/16th the size of the
US, Saudi Arabia could afford to keep part of its production capacity switched
off. By the 1990s, this unused capacity (then estimated at 3 million barrels per
day) was close to or exceeded the total production of any other country except
Russia and the US. The excess allowed Saudi Arabia the ability to play the role of
‘swing’ producer, threatening to switch its surplus on and off to discipline other
producers who tried to exceed their production quotas. It did so in collaboration
with the United States, on whom it depended for military protection. As a result of
these three factors – inelastic demand, overabundance, and the Saudi surplus – the
possibility of large oil rents anywhere in the world in the second half of the
twentieth century depended on the political control of Arabia (2013: 207).
De Graff 10 also utilizes a network approach, focusing on the underlying relations
between different companies, observing a shift toward “a more multipolar and hybrid
global energy order in which the rise of statist actors from outside the Western core …is
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generating more hybrid forms of cooperation, new alliances and dynamics and a blurring
of categories.” This relational approach is offered as an alternative to the ‘National Oil
Companies (NOCs) vs Investor Owned Companies (IOCs)’ view, or ‘net-exporters vs net
importers”, in which power dynamics are seen to shift based on the price of oil and forces
of demand and supply. Using social network analysis to map the joint ventures, whollyowned subsidiaries abroad, equity interest, and operating/service contracts of state-owned
companies3 in 1997 and again in 2007, De Graaff found that NOC expansion took place
at least in part through increasing integration with IOCs. Although NOCs might seem to
have ‘gained’ power –partly driven by high oil prices – and IOCs might be seen to have
‘lost’ power, they were also seen to increasingly join forces, with the further implication
that during this period they became increasingly interdependent10.
To guide our dataset conceptualization and network modeling, the processes of
exploration, production, transportation, refining, processing, and consumption from the
GPN model were transformed into network layers (Figure 2). Additional layers for
reserves and development were added to the dataset and ‘consumption’ was recast as
sales. The current analysis focuses on upstream operations, with data on mid and downstream operations to form the basis of a follow-on study. The multiplex network model
used to develop this dataset (Figure 2) encompasses states, firms, processes and products.
GPN state and firm functions8 are listed for reference. They are largely based on the
functions of IOCs, with state-owned firms having the potential to play a different role in

3

Saudi Aramco, Gazprom, National Iranian Oil Company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), and
China National Petroleum Corporation (PetroChina)

130

countries with national oil companies and hybrid firms, in which the corporation itself
can be seen to be held accountable to the public.

GPN State Functions
“Resource holder: Exp,
licenses; Taxation, health &
safety and env regulations”
1800 records
“Resource holder: production
concession; Taxation, health &
safety and env regulations”
5300 records

Multilayer approach to Global Production
Network for oil and gas

GPN Firm Functions
Seismic data; drilling tech;
demand forecasting; Project
management, Political Risk

Taxation, health & safety and
env regulations

Construction; Project
Management; equity
partners (other oil firms);
Debt (banks); Staff, crew,
camp services
Shipping, pipelines, terminal
operators, risk management

Taxation, health & safety and
env regulations
500 records
Taxation, health & safety and
env regulations

Wholesalers, retailers;
individuals, institutional and
corporate consumers
Wholesalers, retailers;
individuals, corp. consumers

Taxation, health & safety and
env regulations

Carbon offset brokers;
sequestration projects

Figure 4-1. Multiplex representation of the generalized global production network used
in this study, focusing on upstream and midstream activities.

4.2.

Results

We provide a quantitative summary of the global hydrocarbon production system and
present key results of our analysis of network properties by company and year (Layer 2 in
Figure 4-1). We model global oil and gas production as: 1) a multiplex network in which
different company types (NOCs, Hybrids, and IOCs) are represented as separate layers,
with each layer having different companies, and 2) a multilayer network in which each
year is represented a separate layer and the same companies appear in all layers. Well-
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known methods are used to determine network centrality, correlation, and
clustering/community detection.
4.2.1 System-Wide Overview
The top 26 global oil and gas companies accounted for approximately 67% of annual
output during the period from 2014 to 2018 (55700 of 81900 kboed), and fall into three
general categories corresponding to 1) their level of international activity in the arena of
upstream operations and 2) the extent to which they are privately-owned. Apart from
fully state-owned companies (NOCs) and fully private companies (IOCs), a third
category can be distinguished10: ‘Hybrid’ companies, which are partly state owned and
partly owned by private investors; in some cases banks and other oil companies have
significant holdings. Four of the seven Big Oil companies are headquartered in European
countries (Britain’s BP, Holland’s Royal Dutch Shell, France’s TotalSA, and Italy’s
EniSpa) and other three (ExxonMobil, Chevron and ConocoPhillips) have headquarters
in the USA (Table 1-1). All Big Oil companies are headquartered in countries that do not
have nationalized or hybrid firms. Moreover, Germany, Denmark and other European
countries without Big Oil firms and fewer conventional oil and gas reserves are
structurally better positioned to advocate for renewable energy, without having to
contend with vested private in-country opposition from the multi-national oil and gas
sector. With the exception of Petronas, NOC countries are also members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
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National Oil Companies (NOCs): The NOCs in this group are, in descending
order of net hydrocarbon production in 2018 (where 2018 data is available): Saudi
Aramco (#1), Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (#4), National Iranian Oil Company
(#5), Iraq’s Basra Oil Company (#10), Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (#); Petroleos de
Venezuela (#15), Petronas in Malaysia (#18), Sonatrach in Algeria (#19), Qatar
Petroleum (#21), and Nigerian National Petroleum Company (#26).
Hybrid NOC/Investor Owned Companies include the Russian majority stateowned companies Gazprom (#2) and Rosneft (#3) as well as PetroChina (#6), CNOOC
(#23), and Sinopec (#25), all majority owned by the Chinese government. Brazil’s
Petrobras (#14), Mexico’s Pemex (#16), and Norway’s Equinor (#20) round out this
group.
Investor-Owned Companies (IOCs, including ‘Big Oil’) ‘Big Oil’ refers to seven
of the world’s largest privately-owned IOCs, also known as the ‘supermajors,’ including:
ExxonMobil (#7), BP (#8), Shell (#9), Chevron (#12), TotalSA (#13), EniSpa (#22), and
ConocoPhillips (#24). Moscow-based Lukoil (#17), with extensive retail operations in the
US, is the only IOC in the top 26 that is headquartered in a country that also has one or
more NOCs.
Hybrid companies have an international presence in oil and gas production that is
generally less than Big Oil and more than fully state-owned NOCs. Pemex and Petronas
are outliers in this framework: Pemex is 75% state-owned but operates solely within
Mexico and Petronas is 100% owned by the Malaysian government but engages in
exploration and extraction in 23 countries on six continents and markets petrochemicals
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and lubricants worldwide. Among the NOCs, there are steep variations in how much
extraction by outside firms is permitted: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait
allow very little direct outsider production (roughly about 5%), although Saudi Aramco
partners with ExxonMobil, Shell, Sinopec, TotalSA, and Chevron in refineries in Saudi
Arabia and partners with Shell in refining operations in Toyko, with Sinopec and
ExxonMobil in refining in China and with Petronas in petrochemical processing in
Malaysia, among others. By contrast, Qatar Petroleum and Nigerian National Petroleum
Company only account for about 40% of in-country production, and have a large Big Oil
presence, while 2017 estimates (the most recent available) have Iraq-owned production at
70%.

Figure 4-2. Multiplex network showing total hydrocarbon extraction extracted from
countries by companies, with NOCs, Hybrid companies, and BigOil/IOCs as separate
layers in 2017 (the most recent year with data for all 26 companies). Nodes are colored
by communities within each layer and sized according to the weights of their edges.
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Together these 26 companies directly employed more than 3 million people in
2018 (Table 1-1). The reach of the industry is much more extensive than direct
employment figures indicate: the oil and gas drilling sector, comprising companies that
explore for, develop, and operate oil and gas fields, alone makes up around 3.8% of the
global economy, or 3.3 trillion of the estimated global GDP of 86 trillion in 201911. In the
United States it has been estimated that the oil and gas industry accounted for up to 5.6%
of total employment in 2015, combining operational and capital investment impacts, and
amounted to 10.3 million full-time and part-time jobs, according to a study commissioned
by the industry12.

Table 4-1. Key figures describing the top 25 global oil and gas producers as measured by
millions of barrels of oil equivalent produced per day in 2018. NOCs are shown in pink,
Hybrids in gray, and IOCs in orange.
Company
1. Saudi Aramco
2. Gazprom
3. Rosneft
4. ADNOC
5. National Iranian
Oil Company
6. Petrochina
7. Exxon Mobil
8. BP
9. Royal Dutch Shell
10. Iraqi Oil
Ministry

Country HQ

Year
Founded

Type

Hydrocarbon
Prod. In 2018
(mboed)

Employees
in 2018

Dhahran, SA

1933

NOC/OPEC

13.60

70762

10.19+

466100

5.82

302100

Moscow,
Russia
Moscow,
Russia
Abu Dhabi,
UAE

Hybrid: 50%
state owned
Hybrid: X%
state owned

1989
1993
1971

NOC/OPEC

4.67*

55000

Tehran, Iran

1951

NOC/OPEC

4.50*

104000

Beijing, China

1999

Hybrid: X%
State-owned

4.09

506000

Irving, TX

1911

Big Oil

3.83

69600

1909

Big Oil

3.68

74000

1907

Big Oil

3.67

18000

1966
1987

NOC/OPEC

3.59*

London,
England
The Hague,
Netherlands
Bagdad, Iraq
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2018
11. Kuwait

Kuwait City,
Kuwait
San Ramon,
CA, USA
Courbevoie,
France
Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil
Caracas,
Venezuela
Mexico City,
Mexico
Moscow,
Russia
Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia

1980

NOC/OPEC

3.19

10984

1879

Big Oil

2.93

48596

1924

Big Oil

2.78

104000

1953

Hybrid: 64%
state-owned

2.77

62700

1976

NOC/OPEC

2.73*

1938

Hybrid: 75%
state-owned

2.58

124660

1991

IOC

2.35

103600

1974

NOC

2.32

49911

Algiers, Algeria

1963

NOC/OPEC

2.27

120000

Stavanger,
Norway

1972

Hybrid: 67%
state owned

2.11

20525

21. Qatar Petroleum

Doha, Qatar

1974

NOC/OPEC

1.92

14000

22. EniSpa

Rome, Italy

1953

Big Oil

1.85

33000

1.30

99000

12. Chevron
13. TotalSA
14. Petrobras
15. Petroleos de
Venezuela
16. Pemex
17. Lukoil
18. Petronas
19. Sonatrach
20. Equinor

23. CNOOC

Beijing, China

1982

Hybrid:
CNOOC state/
CNOOC Ltd
investorowned

24. ConocoPhillips

Houston, TX,
USA

1875

Big Oil

1.28

10800

1.24

249000

1.19

25. Sinopec

Beijing, China

2000

Hybrid:
Sinopec
Group state
owned/
Sinopec Ltd
investorowned

26. Nigerian National
Petroleum Company

Abuja, Nigeria

1977

NOC/OPEC

*2018 production figures not available; 2017 used. **Total national production for Iran
from BP Statistical Review used in lieu of company publications. +plus equity affiliates
4.2.2 Network Properties
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In its simplest form, a network is comprised of entities, or ‘nodes,’ and the interactions,
or ‘edges,’ between them. Networks having multiple types of interactions can be
modelled using a layered, or “multiplex” network, in which the nodes are constant across
layers and each layer represents a different type of interaction, or network edge (Baggio
et al 2016: 1). Moreover, interdependencies between layers can have profound effects on
the entire system, including behavior which cannot be predicted by studying each layer in
isolation. The complexity of the global production network for oil and gas lends itself to
multiple types of network modeling. Here we construct networks focusing on:
1. Company type, using a multiplex network with separate layers representing
NOCs, Hybrid companies, and IOCs, repeated for multiple years as separate
multiplex networks that can be compared.
2. Temporal changes, using a time series network (including all companies in top
26) for each fuel type for total hydrocarbons, repeated for oil and gas separately,
with each year from 2014 to 2018 representing a separate layer.
We analyze these networks using the following metrics: 1) network centrality, in terms of
the strength of each node (how much oil and gas flows from each country to each
company), as well as the degree of each node in the network (the number of countries in
which companies extract oil), 2) correlation among multiplex networks, treating years
and company types as network layers, and 3) community detection using the Louvain
method.
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We also construct a weighted network illustrating joint ventures and equity holdings in
other firm operations at the field level in 2014 and 2018 for the hybrid Norwegian stateinvestor owned company Equinor, which was one of only two companies whose annual
reports: a) consistently listed the percentage of its equity holdings in all partner-operated
fields (Conoco-Phillips was the other), b) named the partner company acting as operator
for that field, and c) provided the amount extracted from that location. Although only two
companies in the top 26 consistently supplied this information for 2914-2018, it
nonetheless provides a window into the joint operations among the major producers.
4.2.2.1 Network Centrality Metrices: Flows Among Nation-States and Companies
There are notable differences in the degree centrality and node strength of total
hydrocarbon production in aggregate, as well as patterns that emerge when considering
oil and the more regionally-bounded natural gas networks separately (Table 1-2). The
total hydrocarbon category is more comprehensive than liquids or natural gas, because
there are some firms for which country and field-level production is not disaggregated
into oil and gas. (This is notably the case with Equinor, which reported total
hydrocarbons only and therefore is not represented in gas and oil networks.)

Table 4-2. Each node and fuel type as single layer networks, aggregated across all years.
Metric

Big Oil Hybrid NOC Big Oil Hybrid NOC Big Oil Hybrid
THC
THC THC Liquids Liquids Liquids Gas
Gas

NOC
Gas

Nodes N
(Company;
Country)

7
63

9
63

10
14

7
63

6
20

10
12

7
59

6
18

10
10

Edges m

768

412

52

624

107

51

667

89

46
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Average degree

11.0

5.72

2.16

8.91

4.1

2.3

10.1

3.7

2.3

Node strength
(weighted degree)
Sum of weights/N
/5=kboed per year

260

400

1709

144

484

1322

118

491

612

Pearson
Correlation
Assortativity

-0.85

-0.72

-0.59

-0.87

-0.61

0.34

-0.78

-.62

1

Community
Detection:
Modularity

0.07

0.05

0.07

0.06

0.07

0.07

0.08

0.07

0.07

4.2.2.1.1 Total Hydrocarbons
Node strength
The special role of Saudi Arabia in the oil production network is evident in the quantity
of total hydrocarbons going to Saudi Aramco, compared even to the next largest
hydrocarbon producer, Gazprom (Figure 4-3a; StrengthIn). The National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC), Rosneft, and PetroChina round out the most extractivist five
companies over the past years. Notably, Big Oil is absent from this group, with
ExxonMobil and BP occupying the sixth and seventh places respectively, although in
2018 ExxonMobil outproduced PetroChina to be the fifth largest extractor that year
(Figure 4-3a, red segments).
A different narrative emerges from the country perspective (StrengthOut); in this
case the largest volume of total hydrocarbons flows from Russia to the world’s largest oil
and gas companies (Figure 4-3b), primarily to its hybrid state-private companies
Gazprom and Rosneft (in the second and fourth spots respectively for total hydrocarbon
extraction), as well as the IOC Lukoil. While the USA is the top extractor of
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hydrocarbons overall (BP Stats 2019), it occupies fifth place in terms of oil and gas
extracted by the top 26 global producers, behind Saudi Arabia, Iran and China as well as
Russia.
a) Total Hydrocarbon Production: Strength In – To Companies (kboed)

b) Total Hydrocarbon Production: Strength Out - From Countries (kboed)
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Figure 4-3. Total Hydrocarbon Production, Network Node Strength: 2014-2018. a)
Strength in: total flow of total hydrocarbons to all companies by country by year. b)
Strength out: total flows from all countries to the Top 26 companies.
Node Degree
While the volume of inputs and outputs highlights the importance of Russia, Saudi
Arabia, China, and their respective NOC and hybrid companies, an examination of node
degree highlights the central role of Big Oil in the global network. This metric represents
the number of countries in which each company is actively extracting oil and gas (indegree). Six of the seven big oil companies occupy the first six spots, in descending
order: Total, Chevron, EniSpa, Shell, ExxonMobil and BP ranking first through sixth
respectively (Figure 4-4a). Conversely, the number of companies extracting oil and gas
from each country is represented by the node out-degree. A different picture emerges
here: Canada has the largest number of Top 26 companies extracting oil and gas within
its boundaries, followed by the USA and the UK, and then Russia, China, Venezuela,
Norway, Nigeria and Iraq (Figure 4-4b).
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Total HC Production: Degree Out - From Countries (kboed)

Total HC Production: Degree In - From Countries (kboed)

Figure 4-4. Total Hydrocarbons, Network Degree: 2014-2018: a) Degree in: number of
countries in which each firm is extracting oil and gas; b) Degree out: number of firms
extracting oil and gas from each country.
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4.2.2.1.2 Crude Oil and Other Liquids
The crucial Saudi role in oil production is further illustrated by the amount of crude oil
and other liquids originating from Saudi Arabia (Figure 4-5b) going to its national oil
company, Saudi Aramco (Figure 4-5a); this quantity is more than double that of the next
largest oil producer, NIOC in Iran. Rosneft sits just behind NIOC, with Kuwait Petroleum
Company and PetroChina nearly tied for fourth and fifth, with Big Oil appearing in the
form of ExxonMobil in sixth place, followed by Iraq’s Basra Oil Company and BP. From
the country perspective, Russia is in second place behind Saudi Arabia for oil extraction,
followed by Iran, Iraq*, China, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, highlighting the
pivotal role of the Middle East in global oil production and the prominence of Russia and
China in the network. This group is followed by the Western Hemisphere producers, with
the USA ranking eighth, followed by Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico.
a) Liquids Production: Strength In - To Companies (kboed)

*

2018 data not available.
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Liquids Production: Strength Out - From Countries (kboed)

Figure 4-5. Liquids, Node Strength: 2014-2018. a) Strength in: total flow of crude oil
and other liquids to each company from all countries listed in the dataset by year. b)
Strength out: total flows from each country to the Top 26 companies.
The seven Big Oil companies occupy the first seven places in the ranking of in-degree for
liquids, followed by the hybrid state-investor companies Gazprom, PetroChina and
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CNOOC, again illustrating the expanding role in worldwide extraction of Russia and
China (Figure 4-6a). In terms of node out-degree, the USA ranks first with respect to the
number of companies in the top 26 extracting oil within its boundaries. Much of the
activity in the USA occurs in the Gulf of Mexico (also shown separately to indicate how
many companies are present in this region alone). The USA is followed by the UK and
Canada, which also do not have national oil companies (Figure 4-6b). This group is
followed by Norway, Nigeria, Russia, China, Iraq, and Venezuela, all of which do have
either NOCs or Hybrids, and some degree of foreign involvement in oil extraction, in the
latter two instances marked by recent violence.
Liquids Production: Degree Out- From Countries (kbd)

Liquids Production: Degree In - To Companies (kbd)
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Figure 4-6. Liquids, Node Degree: 2014-2018. a) Degree in: number of countries in
which each firm is extracting crude oil and other liquids; b) Degree out: number of firms
extracting crude oil and other liquids from each country.

4.2.2.1.3 Natural Gas
Gas production among the top 26 companies is dominated by Gazprom, followed by
NIOC, Saudi Aramco, Algeria’s Sonatrach, and PetroChina, nearly tied with
ExxonMobil, and Shell, BP, TotalSA and Rosneft rounding out the top ten (Figure 4-7a).
The difficulty in accessing accurate data is illustrated by Qatar Petroleum’s position,
however, which would also be in the top group if accurate data were available for 20142016. In 2018 Gazprom accounted for 12% of the world’s natural gas production (falling
to 11% in 2016 from 12% in 2014) and holds 16% of the world’s reserves and 71% of the
reserves in Russia13.
Russia dominates natural gas production by country, more than double that of Iran
(second), while the USA ranks sixth (Figure 4-7b), even though the Russian Federation
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produced 64.74 bcf and the USA produced 89.1 bcf in 2018 (BP Stats 2019). This
discrepancy can be explained in terms of how much of each country’s gas is going to the
major producers: whereas ExxonMobil produced 2.78 bcf in the USA per day in 2018, in
the same year Gazprom produced 48.24 bcf per day in Russia. An examination of the
unweighted node out-degree shows a different picture than node strength: here the USA
and UK are tied for the top spot, followed by China, Australia, Canada, Norway, Nigeria,
Indonesia, and then Russia (Figure 4-8b).
Natural Gas Production: Strength In - From Countries (kboed)

Natural Gas Production: Strength Out - From Countries (kboed)
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Figure 4-7. Natural Gas, Network Strength: 2014-2018 a) Strength in: total flow of
crude oil and other liquids to each company from all countries listed in dataset by year.
b) Strength out: total flows from each country to the 26 companies included in this
dataset.
Natural Gas Production: Degree In - To Companies (kbd)

Natural Gas Production: Degree Out - From Countries (kbd)
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Figure 4-8. Natural Gas, Node Degree: 2014-2018. a) Degree in: number of countries in
which each firm is extracting crude oil and other liquids; b) Degree out: number of firms
extracting crude oil and other liquids from each country.
4.2.2.2 Correlation
This section examines interlayer correlation for two separate networks: a multiplex
network, with each company type represented by a separate layer, and a multilayer
network in which each year from 2014-2018 is a separate layer.
4.2.2.2.1 Correlation by Company Type
The interlayer Spearman correlation measures the assortativity of multiplex networks:
while positive correlations indicate that nodes that are highly active in one layer are also
highly active in a corresponding layer, negative correlations indicate that nodes that are
highly active in one layer have lower activity in another layer. Because companies are
exclusive to particular layers (ExxonMobil, for example, only appears in the IOC/BigOil
layer), this metric indicates the likelihood of countries in which either IOCs, NOCs, or
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Hybrids are active for companies from another category to be active in those countries as
well. Countries in which NOCs are extracting oil are slightly disassortative with Hybrid
companies, and more disassortative with IOCs; by contrast hybrid and IOCs tend to be
active in the same countries. Moreover, both these trends have become more pronounced
since 2014: NOCs are becoming slightly more disassortative (indicated by increasingly
negative correlations) with Hybrid and IOCs, Hybrids and IOCS are becoming more
assortative (indicated by increasingly positive correlations; Table 4-3).

Table 4-3. Interlayer Spearman correlation.
Metric
Spearman
Correlation
Spearman
Correlation
Spearman
Correlation

Network
Tot HC: 2018
Tot HC: 2014
Liquids: 2018
Liquids: 2014
Natural Gas: 2018
Natural Gas: 2014

NOC-Hybrid
-0.226
-0.177
-0.195
-0.145
-0.188
-0.186
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NOC-BigOil
-0.237
-0.228
-0.15
-0.166
-0.208
-0.220

Hybrid-IOC
0.290
0.176
0.148
0.123
0.092
0.049

Figure 4-9. Total hydrocarbon extraction represented as a multiplex network, shown in
2014 (top) and 2018 (bottom).

4.2.2.2.2 Correlation by year
The year 2016 was pivotal, as most of the top 26 oil and gas companies reported major
financial losses following a drop in oil prices beginning in 2015 and pro-fossil fuel
Republican candidate Donald Trump emerged as the US president-elect. The inter-layer
Pearson correlation (Figure 1-10) measures the extent to which layers having the same
nodes are similar to each other and can be applied to the multi-layer network in which
each year from 2014 to 2018 is represented as a separate layer (Figure 1-11). Here 2016
stands out as different from the other years, with the years 2017 and 2018 looking more
like 2014, signifying a roll-back or return to the level of activity and relationships prior to
2015 and 2016.
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Figure 4-10. Interlayer Pearson correlation for time series multi-layer network for total
hydrocarbons.
a) Total Hydrocarbons

b) Natural Gas
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c) Liquids

Figure 4-11. The multi-layer networks for total hydrocarbons, natural gas, and liquids,
depicting each year as a separate layer.
4.2.2.3 Clusters/Community Detection
Community detection using the Louvain method to determine modularity shows clusters
(groups of producers operating in the same countries/groups of countries with the same
companies) within networks for oil, gas, and total hydrocarbons As expected, the level of
modularity is lowest for total hydrocarbons (0.066) because it aggregates oil and gas
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extraction, which are concentrated in different regions. This contrasts with the somewhat
higher modularity of oil (0.104) and much higher modularity of gas (0.269) networks. In
2017, BP, Rosneft, Gazprom, Lukoil, Venezuela’s PDVSA, and Basra Oil Company can
be seen to form a cluster, as do Chevron, Sinopec and PetroChina, as well as Shell,
Exxon, and Nigeria’s NNPC (Figure 1-13). In the gas network (with all years
represented), other clusters emerge, including ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Petrobras
and Qatar Petroleum, as well as another including Gazprom, TotalSA, ADNOC and
Basra Oil Company (Figure 1-14a). The latter group, joined by PDVSA, also forms a
cluster in the oil network, as do Shell, ExxonMobil, Petrobras and NNPC (Figure 1-14b).
Further structure is evident in the clusters within NOC, Hybrid and BigOil taken
as separate networks. Each NOC (Figure 1-15a) constitutes its own community,
reinforcing the picture of NOCs acting independently with respect to extraction. Since all
the NOCs are also OPEC members (except Petronas, which is depicted in the Hybrid
group), their seeming isolation is countered by the community formed by OPEC to
address production targets, benchmarks and oil price influencing in international markets.
In the hybrid network, three clusters of two companies each emerge (Figure 1-15b): 1)
Lukoil and Gazprom, 2) PetroChina and Sinopec, and 3) Petrobras and Equinor. While
the first two can be seen to reflect ownership by their respective states Russia and China,
the third indicates similarities between Petrobras and Equinor, both having major
offshore and deepwater resources in their respective home countries (Brazil and Norway),
as well as a presence in the Gulf of Mexico and offshore Nigeria, but while Equinor is
present in Brazil, Brazil is not in Norway.

154

While Big Oil companies are active in many of the same countries, they can also
be seen to specialize in specific regions. In the gas network there are two clusters: 1)
ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips form a cluster (both operating in Canada, Norway,
Indonesia, Russia, UK, USA, Qatar, Libya, Malaysia, and Timor-Leste) and 2) TotalSA
and BP (both operating in Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Oman,
Trinidad and Tobago, Gabon, Yemen, Italy and France). In the oil network TotalSA and
Shell (both operating in Norway, Oman, Brazil, Denmark, Gabon, and Brunei) form the
only cluster. [Note: all these companies operate in other regions, but these are identified
as clusters with more links among them than to nodes outside their cluster.]
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Figure 4-12. Communities in the total hydrocarbons network in 2017 for all 26
companies. BP’s 20% equity holding in Rosneft is represented separately, with Rosneft
appearing in the country category to signify this relationship.
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Figure 4-13. Gas (a-left) and liquids (b-right) for all companies across 2014-2018. The
gas network displays more modularity (0.269) than the liquids network (0.104).

Figure 4-14. Communities for NOCs (excluding Petronas, a-left) and Hybrids +
Petronas (b-right) production for total hydrocarbons.
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Figure 4-15. Communities for gas (a-left) and liquids b-(right) production of Big Oil.
4.2.3 Equity Holdings and Joint Ventures
Joint ventures and equity holdings are widespread throughout the industry, but
inconsistently documented in annual reporting and other publicly available data sources.
Even with reporting gaps, however, 1180 of some 2050 records at the subnational level in
this dataset indicate some type of joint ownership with other companies, most commonly
in the form of joint ventures through equity holdings. Equinor and ConocoPhillips were
the only companies not only to consistently list their equity holdings subnationally at the
oilfield level, but also to specify which companies operated them, making it possible to
partially map the joint ventures using an ego network (the view of the network from the
perspective of single node).

4.2.3.1 Norway / Equinor
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In 2014, Equinor’s equity holdings in 32 partner-operated locations (primarily abroad)
ranged from 0 to 60%, with an average of 22%. Equinor’s 19-odd partners who were
oilfield operators in 2014 include all seven Big Oil companies, NOCs PDVSA and
Sonatrach, as well as major US companies Anadarko and Chesapeake Energy (Figure 117a). The company’s equity holdings in the 41 locations in which it was the operator (39
in the North and Norwegian Seas, one in Canada and one in Brazil) ranged from 0 to
85%, with an average of 44%; its non-operating partners holding the rest of the equity in
these ventures were not listed in the company’s annual reports.
In 2018 the number of Equinor’s partner-operated locations increased by 25%
from 32 to 40, including two wholly-owned subsidiaries, one in Brazil and one the USA;
equity shares ranged from 0 to 100%, with an average of 27%, illustrating that oil and
gas-field operators are often minority shareholders in specific ventures. Equinor’s 25-odd
partners who were operators in 2018 included five of the seven Big Oil companies,
Sonatrach and Anadarko; new to the list were Sinopec and Petrobras, with Venezuela’s
PDVSA and Chesapeake Energy no longer appearing (Figure 1-17b). Equinor’s equity
holding in the 36 locations in which it was the operator ranged from 13.04% to 70%, with
an average of 45%. Notably absent from these lists however, are the other non-operating
equity holders in which either Equinor or another company was the operator, making it
very difficult to map the complete ownership network among oil and gas companies.

159

160

Figure 4-16. Equinor’s equity holdings in partner-operated fields in 2014 (top) and 2018
(bottom). Nodes sized by volume, edges weighted by percent equity, ranging from 0 to
60% in 2014 and 0 to 100% in 2018. Multiple edges between Equinor and a specific node
indicates multiple locations in that country with that operating partner.
4.2.3.2 Nigeria / NNPC
Nigeria’s distribution of concessions by lease contract types offers another instructive
example of state-firm relationships in the global network: 42% of concessions are
Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs), with about forty companies holding production
contracts/leases. Between 2014 and 2018 the production capacity of PSCs has steadily
increased, averaging 3% growth, to account for about 35% of total production (NNPC
2018 AR, p 12-15). Another 34% of concessions were Joint Ventures (JV), 23% sole risk,
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and 1% service contracts (this breakdown remained roughly the same between 20142018). The top extractors of total hydrocarbons (measured in kboed) in 2018 in Nigeria
were NNPC (1205), TotalSA (284), Shell (259), Chevron (241), ExxonMobil (221),
EniSpa (100), CNOOC (59), and Equinor (43). The total amount (1256) going to these
predominantly Big Oil companies was larger than the Nigerian state-owned NNPC share.
In 2018 JV arrangements accounted for about 55% of aggregate production, while
indigenous oil companies’ production capacity accounted for 12.5% of aggregate
production14.
The top destinations for Nigerian crude oil (in million barrels per year) in 2018
were India (92), Spain (86), Netherlands (65), South Africa (50), France (47), USA (44),
Philippines (34), UK (31), Sweden (26), Indonesia (23), Canada (22), Brazil (15). At the
same time, over 80% of the petroleum products consumed in Nigeria is imported, while
Nigeria’s four state-owned refineries operate well below their capacity of 445,000 barrels
per day. The pump prices of gasoline products (excluding diesel) are subsidized by the
government, monies that “could have been used to provide infrastructure or provide
better quality education or health facilities” (2019: 12)14. Nigeria’s Dept of Petroleum
resources notes a deficit of 2.6 million barrels per day between demand and supply of
petroleum products in Africa in 2018 and that more could be done to realize the
government’s aspiration of making Nigeria a refining hub in Africa14.

4.3.

Discussion
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These results illustrate the scope and complexity of current global oil and gas operations,
providing a window into their historical roots and the continuing influence of this history
on the network’s organization, interdependence, and disparity, even as the entire
production system continues to experience rapid changes. In this section we supplement
the findings above with further evidence of the degree to which IOCs, NOCs, and Hybrid
companies have variously joined forces in the face of existential threats to the industry,
before highlighting key elements of the above analysis as they relate to ongoing efforts to
achieve effective international oversight of the oil and gas industry.
4.3.1 Rivalrous collaboration and strategic cooperation
Several ownership structures indicate not only the increasing interdependence among
these companies but also active joining of forces through ‘rivalrous collaborations’ and
shifting alliances, which can be difficult to discern solely through an analysis of the
countries in which they operate. Another defining characteristic of the current system is a
lack of transparency and accountability: In 2013 BP was identified to have 1180 affiliated
companies and subsidiaries, with up to 12 levels of ownership15. Types of ownership
structures include not only joint ventures through various subsidiaries and equity
holdings (as were mapped for Equinor in the preceding section) but also operating and
service contracts and strategic cooperation agreements10. BP’s 2014 Annual Report
outlines this multi-pronged approach to applied to exploration: “The group explores for
oil and natural gas under a wide range of licensing, joint arrangement and other
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contractual agreements. We may do this alone or, more frequently, with partners” (2015:
26)16.
In 2015 BP announced the formation of “a new ownership and operating model”
with Chevron and ConocoPhillips designed to move two significant BP deepwater
discoveries in the Gulf of Mexico closer to development and provide expanded
exploration access. The plans, which also involve Petrobras, shed light on the degree to
which the oil majors have merged operations:
BP sold approximately half of its current equity interests in the Gila field to
Chevron in December and sold approximately half of its equity interest in the
Tiber field in January 2015. BP, Chevron and ConocoPhillips also have agreed to
joint ownership interests in exploration blocks east of Gila known as Gibson,
where they plan to drill in 2015. As a result of the agreements, BP, Chevron and
ConocoPhillips will have the same working interests across Gila and Gibson and
any future centralized production facility. Chevron will hold equity interest of
36%, BP 34% and ConocoPhillips 30%. In Tiber, BP and Chevron will each hold
equity interest of 31%, Petrobras 20% and ConocoPhillips 18%. Chevron will
operate Tiber, Gila and Gibson. Operatorship is expected to be transferred after
BP finishes drilling appraisal wells at Gila and Tiber. BP believes combining the
technical strengths and financial resources of these three companies will provide
greater efficiency through scale, reduce subsurface risk and increase the
likelihood of achieving a future commercial development (2015:213)16.
The relationship between Big Oil companies BP and ExxonMobil and Russia’s
Rosneft within the rapidly-shifting wider geopolitical context has been welldocumented2. BP owns 20% of Rosneft17, which until 2020 was majority-owned by the
Russian government, whose stake dropped at that point from just over 50% to 40%, as
part of a deal by which Russia acquired Rosneft’s Venezuelan assets (including the U.S
based Citgo chain). Analysts speculated the move was to limit potential US sanctions on
Rosneft at a time when the US and Saudi Arabia were considering cutting production and
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did not want Russia to increase output18. ExxonMobil and Rosneft signed a Strategic
Cooperation Agreement in 2011 for joint exploration and production in the Kara Sea,
Black Sea, and West Siberia, with additional joint venture agreements in 2014 for
additional blocks in the Russian Arctic across the Kara; Laptev; and Chukchi Seas
(ExxonMobil interest: 33 percent), covering an area of more than 150 million gross acres.
In its 2014 annual report ExxonMobil noted that “currently, certain exploration activities
in Russia are precluded under applicable U.S. and European sanctions” (2015: 44)19.
ExxonMobil and Rosneft also have a joint cooperative agreement for exploration
offshore of Mozambique.
In addition to production sharing agreements (PSAs) with countries in which
IOCs operate, cooperative agreements are a primary example of the merging of interests
among various IOC, and Hybrid companies extracting oil and gas abroad. China’s Belt
and Road Initiative has driven efforts by PetroChina to deepen and broaden its ongoing
international oil and gas cooperation through a variety of cooperation agreements and
memorandums with the governments of Russia, Venezuela, Peru, Mozambique, Algeria,
etc. and their energy companies. CNPC and Gazprom signed an MOU to promote
cooperation in underground gas storage and gas power generation projects in China and
seek a wider range of joint venture and cooperation opportunities” (2016: 30-31)20. In
Qatar, the Qatargas consortium includes Qatar Petroleum, TotalSA, ExxonMobil,
ConocoPhillips, Shell and other partners. RasGas is 70% owned by QP and 30% owned
by ExxonMobil21.
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Many other joint ownership arrangements exist among the major global
producers: in 2018 it was announced that the oil producing country of Qatar (a British
protectorate from the early1900s until 1971, with a current population of 2.8 million)
acquired a 19% stake in Rosneft, although details were murky, and ConocoPhillips
owned 20% share of Russian IOC Lukoil until 2010. In 2016 Rosneft acquired a 49%
stake in Essar Oil, the second largest private oil company in India, while Netherlandsbased Trafigura Group Pte and Russian investment fund United Capital split another 49%
equally22.
4.3.2 Implications for Governance
The well-known resource curse theory holds that countries depending upon petroleum
resources for a large part of their earnings from exports tend to be less democratic, and
the less oil a country produces, and the faster its production is declining, “the more
readily the struggles for democracy unfold” (2013:1)9. In response to this simple
formulation, “which largely assumes land and resource access rights have been settled
and which focuses on political conflicts arising from the allocation of revenues rather
than the wresting of land and resources,” the GPN approach focuses on inter-firm and
firm-state relationships and addresses “the ways in which inter-firm competition
structures the organization and geographies of the production network,” creating space to
address how the structure of the global oil production network affects the ability of
resource-holding states to (re)negotiate ground rent” (2008: 406)8.
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At this point in time, given the interconnectedness, global reach, and combined
power of the major private, hybrid, and state oil and gas producers, effective international
governance is essential to achieve a just transition. Within this context, the following
observations can be made with respect to the network metrics of centrality, correlation,
and community detection presented in Section 4.3:
Centrality: Saudi Arabia, by virtue of its sheer supply (node strength) and modest
domestic demand, has the ability to dominate global supply. Although output of the Big
Oil/ IOCs is smaller than the top six state-owned and hybrid companies, the IOCs extract
hydrocarbons from more countries than any other type of producer (node degree), an
arrangement that may be seen as a direct legacy of centuries of colonial rule that in some
parts of the world did not end until the 1970s.
Correlation: By and large hybrid and IOCs are increasingly extracting oil and gas from
the same countries (Spearman correlation), which are not countries in which NOCs are
active (with the exception of Iraq, which has seen multiple Big Oil and Hybrid companies
step in since the Iraq War). This statistic can be explained not only by partnerships
among IOCs and Hybrid companies but also by ongoing US efforts to drive Iranian oil
and gas exports to zero and recent unrest in Venezuela.
Community Detection: There is a modest degree of modularity in the oil and gas
production networks, illustrating the inter-group alliances among IOC, Hybrid and NOC
companies that indicates focused activities in particular regions and shows some
movement from year to year: In 2017 BP, Rosneft, Gazprom, Lukoil, Venezuela’s
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PDVSA, and Basra Oil Company formed a cluster, as did Chevron, Sinopec and
PetroChina, as well as Shell, Exxon, and Nigeria’s NNPC.
Moreover, an intricate global network of joint ventures, equity holdings and
cooperative agreements effectively ‘sits under’ the more straightforward network of
companies extracting oil and gas from specific locations within specific countries, about
which there is very little comprehensive publicly available information. These
relationships illustrate the increasing risks of extracting oil and gas from ever more
remote locations, the merging of operations, and the combined motive for ensuring
nation-states around the world allow their investments and operations to continue
unimpeded.
Together these findings indicate:
•

The Hidden Cost of Obtaining ‘Access to Rent’: The ongoing presence of Big Oil
in resource-rich regions around the world, now predicated on “the negotiation of
ground rent with resource-holding states,” is both unsustainable and unjust,
benefiting both from corrupt autocratic rulers willing to ‘negotiate’ and wars
when resource-holding states do not wish to take part in such negotiations.

•

The Role of Big Oil: Although the three Big Oil companies in the USA and four
in Europe (UK, Holland, France, and Italy) are private entities, they play critical
roles as producers and suppliers in their home countries, acting vehicles of state
power and exerting hidden influence on political processes to maintain their
position, particularly as efforts to transition away from them intensify. As has
been shown they also have deep ties to other fossil producers around the world,
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effectively forming a subterranean coalition with formidable influence in virtually
every country in the world.
•

Centralized Control and Price Fixing: Although the US and Russia produce more
total hydrocarbons than Saudi Arabia, there is a stark difference in the
contribution these countries make to the top 26 global producers of oil and gas.
This has led to a complex interplay between OPEC and Russia (termed OPEC+),
and US that is rapidly changing. It has been further noted that “despite Trump’s
longstanding disdain for OPEC, he has managed to make the United States its
‘shadow member.’ Washington’s influence is a reversal from a decades-long
vulnerability to OPEC’s decisions” 23.

•

Information spreading: Big Oil companies and companies with many extractors
can also be seen as ‘information spreaders’ on network through which new
extractive processes and technologies are circulated; the prevalence of coventures also serves this function.
A necessary precursor for effective governance of global carbon emission

reductions is open, transparent data spanning the entire global production network for the
entire life cycle of fossil fuels, from exploration to emissions, documenting not only incountry production and consumption, but crucially also the activities of the global oil and
gas companies responsible for extracting these resources and influencing global prices.
Although there have been many grassroots efforts to develop this kind of information,
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there are structural reasons why it does not already exist in usable form for the general
public and is hard to develop.
4.3.2.1 Supply-side approach to carbon emissions
This network approach points to not only to the potential efficacy of globally coordinated
supply-side management of carbon emissions, but arguably to its necessity, given the
ability of the industry to derail transition efforts that do not directly address their fate in
ways they either buy into or cannot effectively undermine. System-wide fossil fuel
oversight could be linked to implementation of the Paris Agreement, and relatedly
supply-side accountability for carbon emissions. Mirroring the taxonomy of policy
instruments in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment
Report24 for demand-side reduction, similar supply-side policies have been proposed,
including taxes, removal of producer subsidies, trade allowances and credits, as well as
regulatory approaches, government provision of goods and services25. Key questions
remain, however, concerning international equity and fairness in the adoption of supplyside policies, as well as the conditions under which governments “might forgo extraction
and associated economic rents, and how jurisdictions implementing supply-side policies
might take ‘credit’ for their supply-side ‘contributions’, given that emission reductions
may occur largely beyond their borders” (2015:16)25. Nationalization has been proposed
as another option to manage the transition away from fossil fuels: the case has been
recently made that, “as global oil demand craters and crude oil floods an already
oversupplied market” during the COVID-19 crisis, the U.S. government “should assert
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long-term ownership and control over its fossil fuel companies” (2020: 1,6)26.
Implications for the international context are uncertain, however, and it is unclear how a
transition to public ownership in the U.S. would affect international production,
international climate and trade agreements, and carbon leakage and accounting, as well as
escape by multinationals abroad. It is also important to consider which countries’ oil and
gas companies currently do have a mandate to act in the public interest (or have had one
and were undermined or ousted by private interests). As we have seen, global
multinationals effectively wield and manipulate what can be seen as de facto state power
across national boundaries.
4.4.

Conclusion

Network analysis offers a useful set of tools to illuminate the interdependencies and
strategic alliances among global oil and gas firms and nation-states around the world
dependent on the extraction of these resources, and insights from such analysis can be
used to inform effective global governance of the transition away from fossil fuels. As
this study has shown, the oil and gas industry is driven by competition for access to
resources and markets; cooperation in the form of joint ventures, equity holdings,
production control, and price influencing; and, at this point in the unfolding energy
transition, what may be characterized as transnational industry-state collusion to
obstruct, stymie and delay this transition for as long as possible. We contend that systemwide analysis is necessary to support system-wide oversight and this oversight is an
essential component of global transitions governance. The Global Production Network
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for Oil and Gas Dataset developed for this analysis represents one step in the ongoing
effort to shed light on the activities of the global fossil fuel industry and the opaque
relationships among oil and gas companies and nation-states around the world. In
conjunction with traditional national-level energy data, ecoregions, agriculture, water
scarcity and other spatial layers, this dataset can be used to assess transboundary socialecological harms and embodied energy injustices traceable to complex multi-scalar and
multi-system fossil fuel production processes.

4.5.

Methods

4.5.1 Constructing the Global Oil and Gas Production Network Dataset
The dataset used in this analysis was constructed from publicly available sources,
emphasizing the paucity of data concerning firm-level activities compared to nationallevel data on fossil fuel extraction. Annual reports and SEC filings provided the bulk of
the data sources for hybrid and investor-owned companies and the NRGI dataset
provided data for the majority of NOCs; gaps in the NRGI dataset were supplemented by
other sources where available, such as the 2018 Pemex Statistical Yearbook. Given the
much higher accuracy of proprietorial industry data sources than public sources, figures
were validated where possible using data from Ryder Energy (U-Cube data) and Carbon
Underground. Data was compiled using R, JMP and Python, with sources noted and links
provided R in the ‘CreateRepository’ script. Network modeling was done in R using the
igraph package. Multilayer network visualization and analysis was also undertaken in
MuxViz, which runs on R and Octave.
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Table 4-4. Data model for the Global Oil and Gas Production Network Dataset.
Process

Company Country Year

Location Weight

Joint
Unit Source Notes Venture
Status

Exploration
Reserves
Development
Production
Refining
Sales
Emissions

4.5.2 Data limitations and uncertainties
Compilation of non-standardized data from widely disparate sources posed a number of
challenges. Among these are:
•

There is no single format for US SEC Form 20-F filings for foreign companies;
they were sometimes collapsed into the same document as the annual report.
Where they were separate, SEC filings and annual reports occasionally listed
different amounts for production (such as EniSpa); in this case data from the more
recent publication was used.

•

Subnational location data was often scattered throughout ‘operational highlights’
narratives rather than in table form. Varying amounts of detail were provided for
specific projects, countries or locations; actual volumes extracted were not always
given and when they were, they were inconsistently separated into oil and gas or
amalgamated. Similarly data for geographic locations variously reported details
and quantities at the project, formation, play, state, regional, or basin level.
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•

Virtual all companies report only net, rather than gross, production totals, thereby
not providing a clear picture of how much energy is consumed in the production
process.

•

There are numerous data gaps: many companies do not provide readily accessible
data on the location of their operations within counties, and/or do not report
quantities. Petronas, the state-owned Malaysian oil and gas company which
conducts major exploration and production operations abroad, for example lists
the countries in which it extracts oil and gas in its annual reports but does not
provide quantities. PetroChina and CNOOC aggregate volumes extracted abroad
under the category “Overseas.”

•

Data gaps in some cases are due to deliberate lack of transparency: in Europe,
Asia, Africa, and South America, Shell lists an “Other” category comprised of
“countries where 2018 production was lower than 7,300 thousand barrels or
where specific disclosures are prohibited” (2018: 49) in Asia the total for Shell
falling into this category in 2018 was 28,769 barrels27.

•

Geographic regions are aggregated and referred to differently (i.e. Australia and
Oceania, Oceania, Middle East, Middle East and North Africa).

•

Production from equity-accounted entities/subsidiaries is not handled
consistently: some include equity holdings as part of total production, others list it
separately (in a few cases it was not clear which was the case). Non-operating
partners in co-ventures are generally not listed. BPs 20% equity holding of
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Rosneft: In the Annual Report BP reports production by country for equity
holdings of Rosneft as “Rosneft (Russia, Canada, Venezuela, Vietnam)”
•

National Iranian Oil Company figures rely on the BP Statistical Review for the
country of Iran, although Shell and CNOOC/PetroChina, Rosneft have listed
operations and/or exploration of opportunities there, so these totals should be
considered an approximation.

4.5.3

Network Metrics

The following well-known network properties were used to analyze these networks28–30:
a. Average degree: <k> the average number of links per node in the network,
obtained by dividing the total number of links (m) in the network by the number
of nodes N.
b. Node strength, s: The sum of weights attached to ties belonging to an individual
node.
c. Transitivity / clustering coefficient: of the degree to which nodes in a graph tend
to cluster together: Local clustering coefficient 𝐶! for directed graphs,

𝐶! =

|%𝑒"# : 𝑣" , 𝑣# ∈ 𝑁! , 𝑒"# ∈ 𝐸-|
𝑘! (𝑘! − 1)

where 𝑒"# is the edge between vertices 𝑣" and 𝑣# for immediately connected
vertices in neighborhood 𝑁! with set of edges E in the full graph G with set of
vertices V.
The global clustering coefficient for networks is:
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𝐶=

3 × 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠

d. Interlayer Assortativity coefficient, r: (Pearson correlation coefficient): the extent
to which network nodes are linked to nodes with similar properties (often
measured in terms of degree). In directed graphs, in-assortativity and outassortativity measure the likelihood of nodes to link to others with similar in- and
out- degrees as they have. Assortitativity, r, ranges between -1 (fully
disassortative), 0 (non assortative), and 1 (fully assortative)

𝑟=

∑"# 𝑗𝑘(𝑒"# − 𝑞" 𝑞# )
𝜎$%

where 𝑞# is the distribution of the remaining degree (that is, the number of edges
leaving the node, excluding the edge that connects the current pair), 𝑒"# is the
joint probability distribution of the remaining degrees of the two vertices, and 𝜎 is
a scaling term.
e. Spearman Correlation, 𝜌&' : the strength 𝑠& of countries in one layer compared to
their strength 𝑠' in other layers

𝜌&' (𝑝𝑞) = 1 −

(!)
(!)
6 ∑*
!+,[𝑟& (𝑝) − 𝑟' (𝑞)]

𝑁(𝑁 % − 1)

(!)
where p; q = ingoing, outgoing, or total strength, and 𝑟& (𝑝) is the rank of node i

in layer a. Strong positive correlations indicate countries that are very active in
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one layer are also very active in another layer and, conversely, strong negative
correlations indicate countries active in one layer are much less active in another
layer 31.
f. Multiplexity, g(v): is the shortest path among nodes in a connected graph such that
the number of edges or the number of weights (for weighted graphs) is minimized
for every pair of nodes. Betweenness centrality for each node is the number of
shortest paths that pass through that node.

𝑔(𝑣) = K
-/0/.

𝜎-. (𝑣)
𝜎-.

where 𝜎-. is the total number of shortest paths from vertex s to vertex t and 𝜎-. (𝑣)
is the number of such paths that intersect v.
g. Modularity, Q: is defined as a scalar value between -1 and 1 measuring the
density of links inside communities compared to links between communities28,32.
In the case of weighted networks it is defined as

𝑄 =

𝑘! 𝑘"
1
K N𝐴!"1
P 𝛿(𝑐! , 𝑐" )
2𝑚
2𝑚
!"

Implemented in igraph and muxviz using the Louvain method for finding
community structure by multi-level optimization of modularity33.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The Food-Energy-Water (FEW) nexus framing of interdependencies among systems
offers the promise of integrated, holistic thinking to guide transitions to just and
sustainable FEW systems. At the same time, however, the nexus has been characterized
as a ‘buzzword’ that merely recycles prior work, notably in integrated water resources
management, and furthermore does little to address the historical roots and structural
underpinnings of current global inequities in FEW systems. This dissertation has
addressed such critiques through two case studies in which the nexus analysis has been
used to focus on what might be termed the ‘collateral damage’ of current energy systems,
focusing on extractive impacts of fossil fuels and hydropower on the regions in which the
energy is sourced. Also undertaken in this dissertation was a focused look at the structure
of the hydrocarbon underpinnings of this rapidly-shifting energy system at the global
scale, using network analysis to focus on intra-industry and carbon-state relationships and
explore its recent dynamics.
Chapter 2 illustrated the potential of the nexus approach to identify interconnections between demand and supply networks through an integrated assessment of
the FEW nexus in the Denver region, addressing embodied FEW as well as ecosystem
impacts and risks at the municipal, country, and regional scales. The widening of the
nexus to encompass impacts as well as inputs to FEW systems in the Denver region
placed hydraulic fracturing firmly within the FEW nexus scope. Chapter 3 used the
Landtrendr algorithm to quantify deforestation by type in Eeyou Ischee/Jamésie after the
James Bay Project began in the 1970s, further extending the nexus to include materials
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and address the critical, often overlooked issues of embodied FEW injustices and
transboundary sustainability (FEWM+ENTS) as essential to nexus analysis. This
approach, with its attention not just to FEW inputs and impacts but also access to and
control over FEW systems, provides a framework for monitoring these interconnected
components.
Chapter 4 employed a network analysis to identify patterns in global oil and gas
production from 2014-2018, delving into inter-firm and firm-state relationships as
pressure to transition away from fossil fuels has intensified. It also considered the
‘collateral damage’ of an energy system predicated on the ability of American and
European Big Oil firms to leverage the structural advantages of a colonial past and their
continuing support of repressive regimes in oil rich regions around the world. This
chapter quantified material extraction in terms of the net volumes of oil and natural gas
reported by the top 26 companies within a system predicated on the extraction of large
rents from oil, accomplished by controlling what had been an abundant supply in the
Middle East for much of the twentieth century and thus creating artificial scarcity. And
from this manufactured scarcity, of course, came the ability to control oil prices, and the
price of oil, it turned out, was closely tied to the price of food. The effect of the four-fold
rise in oil prices between 2005-2008 caused the global price of food staples to double, an
increase caused by extreme weather events, “rising production costs due to the heavy use
of petroleum products in industrial farming and synthetic fertilizers, and the widespread
conversion of corn from a food crop to an industrial energy crop” (Mitchell 2013: 257).
A number of key conclusions that firmly link food, energy, and water systems to
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transboundary sustainability and embodied injustice can be drawn from the three interrelated studies that comprise the main chapters in this dissertation. First, these
investigations all address the tensions arising from fossil energy and large-scale
hydropower extraction at their sources: from the Niobrara Shale in the Denver Region,
USA; from the La Grande, Eastmain, Rupert and Caniapisau Rivers in Eeyou Istchee/
Jamésie, Quebec, Canada; and from crude oil and natural gas extractive sites worldwide.
The immediate negative environmental and health impacts and harms of large-scale
energy systems are generally experienced most intensely by local inhabitants of a region
for the benefit of generally distant consumers, from whom these social and ecological
harms are either rendered opaque or kept entirely hidden. As this dissertation has
illustrated, these local-distant tensions between energy production and consumption occur
on multiple spatial scales, ranging from urban-regional, to provincial-national, to global.
Second, and following from this, in order for embodied injustices arising from
interlinked food-energy-water-material systems to be adequately addressed, the complex
FEWM supply chains across the life cycles must be rendered transparent. These essential
systems variously involve the extraction, production, flow, processing, distribution,
consumption, treatment, disposal, and related emissions and have inequitably distributed
impacts and consequences at each step, building on locked-in infrastructures and
historical conditions that are rife with structural racism and inequity. In the case of Eeyou
Istchee/Jamésie, the comparatively straightforward hydropower supply chain was a key
factor in the Cree public relations strategy to appeal directly to consumers in Vermont
and New York State to halt efforts by Quebec to dam the Great Whale River in 1990s. At
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the same time, however, as the EI/J case illustrates, supply-chain transparency alone is
not enough to dismantle systemic forces that privilege FEWM access and control by
specific groups.
Third, FEWM supply chain transparency is closely linked to data availability, and
significant data gaps characterize each of these three studies, either because nexus
relationships have not yet been conceptualized to permit systematic data capture (i.e.
energy used for water distribution or food warehousing), or ecological impacts are not
monitored (i.e. water withdrawals from the Denver Basin Aquifer; ongoing water
contamination and mercury levels in fish species throughout EI/J), or are not made
available to the public (i.e. the amounts of money paid by oil and gas companies to
governments or state officials worldwide). The national non-profit Frac Focus Chemical
Disclosure Registry (used in Chapter 2 to identify the amount of water used for fracking
annually in the Denver Region), is managed by the Ground Water Protection Council and
the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission and lists the chemicals used for each
frack job by company, and includes data about water quantity, but all states do not
require companies to publicly disclose this information. Additionally, the use of
subsidiaries and affiliates often make it difficult to trace local oil and gas activities back
to the major oil companies that have vested interests in them.
While Chapter 3 relied on remote sensing data, this stream of information can also
present barriers to access by grassroots advocacy groups. The EI/J case also illustrated
the urgent need for the accurate monitoring of extractive activities, as well as the
development of a suitable monitoring framework capable of assessing the interlinked
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social and ecological impacts of increasing provincial investment in northern resource
extraction.
Chapter 4 initially began with the effort quantification of embodied water in the
global extraction, trade, transport and consumption of coal, oil and natural gas using the
UN Comtrade database. This exercise illustrated that most data is collected and
disseminated at the national level, notably overlooking the key role of integrated
multinational firms in extracting, transporting, and selling fossil fuels around the world.
As such Chapter 4 is intended to serve as a starting point for a wider analysis of global
food, energy, and water systems that can also integrate corporate actors into supply chain
networks.
Fourth, these three studies all provide examples in which recent technological
developments have accelerated resource extraction in ‘frontier’ areas, from the far north
to the deep subsurface: hydraulic fracturing of shale deposits, while not new per se, only
became commercially viable in the 2000s and enabled the US to once again surpass Saudi
Arabia and Russia as the world’s largest oil and gas producer in 2013. Automated tree
harvesting processes have vastly increased the amount of timber that can be extracted
from remote northern locations, and state-of-the-art sawmills using automated scanning
and cutting machinery can process this timber more quickly than was previously possible,
allowing each log to be cut into the most profitable dimensions at current market prices.
These four observations – concerning local extraction versus distant consumption,
the need for transparent supply chains, the lack of data availability, and the acceleration
of resource extraction due to technological change – are all illustrative of the larger issue
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that collective oversight and broad public engagement are needed within complex sociotechnical systems to foster the transition to FEWM systems that are both just and
sustainable at multiple spatial scales.
5.1 Directions for Future Research
Several areas for future research have emerged from each of the main chapters. The work
undertaken in Chapter 2 sets the stage for FEW nexus analysis to articulate the need for
more and better data on system and trans-boundary interconnections that are vital to
assessing the impact of fracking on regional water quality and soil fertility that so far
have not been systematically undertaken.
The examination in Chapter 3 of embodied FEW injustices in EI/J stemming from
the James Bay Hydroelectric project through the region’s deforestation since 1975 points
to several areas for further study. Although that chapter did not focus on quantifying the
inputs from one system required for another, this more conventional approach to the
nexus (e.g. how much water is required to generate each megawatt of electricity) in EI/J
is also of interest, with the caveat that it needs to be considered alongside the other
crucial nexus components identified in that chapter. On the topic of boreal deforestation
using Landtrendr, areas for further study include: a) supplementing Landtrendr results
with automated random forest approaches to detect disturbance type rather than relying
exclusively on external datasets; b) using Landsat Band 5 to distinguish between fire and
clearcutting; and c) using NDVI to distinguish mining disturbances from clearcutting and
fire. Propensity score matching could be used to determine the link between mining and
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deforestation (e.g. Sonter et al., 2017) as well as the impact of protected areas on
neighboring parcels.
Areas for future inquiry from Chapter 3 also include a closer examination of the
links between hydropower and fire frequency in the Eeyou Istchee/Jamésie, particularly
the origin of fires, severity, and proximity to electrical power infrastructure. In addition to
quantifying the full extent and impact of logging infrastructure left in post-logging areas
in Quebec, similar to the Ontario (Wildlands League, 2019), the links between logging
infrastructure and other extractive and settlement activities warrant closer examination. It
would also be instructive to apply the FEWM+ENTS monitoring lens to other regions
and ecosystems, focusing on nexus inputs, impacts, control, and access along integrated
food, energy, water, and extractive supply chains. This could form the basis for a more
rigorous assessment of the social-ecological impacts of complex interacting systems over
time that transcend local and regional boundaries.
The analysis of the global oil and gas production network undertaken in Chapter 4
likewise points to several areas for further study. The outsized impact of the fossil fuel
industry on global geopolitics highlights the need for data sources that provide a clear
picture of the scale and scope of its activities in the face of intensifying efforts to
transition away from fossil fuels, as opposed to focusing primarily on country level
analysis of production and consumption. In particular energy transitions research should
more thoroughly explore the powerful pushback from a complex set of transnational
actors against deep decarbonization and their corresponding ability to control national
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political agendas, as has notably happened in the USA, UK, Brazil, and India in recent
election cycles, aligned with divisive right-wing political movements. Although this
dataset and analysis is concerned primarily with the flows of oil and gas between
companies and countries, these flows are fundamentally tied to the price of oil and the
gains to be made by companies (particularly those in the private sector and state-owned
companies focused on oil and gas exports). A similar analysis could be taken to map the
corresponding flows of money. Automated text data mining could also be employed to
analyze the annual reports of the top oil and gas companies and to perform a sentiment
analysis; text mining of company publications would also enable temporal patterns and
geographic and operational clusters to be detected. The use of automated techniques
would also facilitate the analysis of more companies, permitting the assessment of a
broader swath of the oil and gas industry.
5.2 Connection to Ongoing Events
As I write this conclusion, less than one week before the 2020 presidential
election, the United States is in the midst of another surge in COVID-19 cases ahead of
what promises to be a difficult winter. Among other massive disruptions to societies
worldwide, the ongoing pandemic has had a profound impact on oil and gas
consumption, causing prices to fall sharply and destabilizing the industry, prompting
many questions about its ultimate impact on the pace and trajectory of the energy
transition. We stand at a number of crossroads at this particular moment, and the
convergence of right-wing political movements based on racism and xenophobia with the
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interests of the global fossil fuel industry to stave off the renewable energy transition is
both alarming and familiar. In this context the notion of transnational “collusion”
involving the Trump administration and Russia should be extended to encompass
political activities at the nexus of Big Oil, hybrid state-private, and national oil
companies worldwide. The degree to which these activities are permitted is precisely the
degree to which the world’s largest oil and gas companies have integrated their
operations and financing with state entities and global capital, structurally positioning
themselves to stave off and control the parameters surrounding the transition for as long
as possible by whatever means are at their disposal.
5.2.3 Global Climate Justice, Revisited
Global climate justice considerations generally focus on the fact that countries that have
emitted the least carbon are now in the position of 1) facing significant climate
consequences in the form of aridification, flooding, drought, extreme weather that they
did not cause and 2) being unable to use fossil fuels as a pathway to development as rich
countries have. But there is a significant climate justice argument on the supply side as
well: the Global South has endured authoritarian regimes, repressive governments and
ongoing wars meant to de-stabilize oil-producing regions even as its oil and gas is sent to
wealthy nations. From this vantage point, not only are developing countries not
responsible for carbon emissions, but their communities and ecosystems continue to bear
the social, ecological and political costs.
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APPENDIX A. CHAPTER 2 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS (SM)
THE FOOD-ENERGY-WATER NEXUS, REGIONAL SUSTAINABILITY, AND
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: AN INTEGRATED ASSESSEMENT OF THE
DENVER REGION
This paper implements a regional systems framework for the trans-boundary FEW in the
Denver region, USA. Additional details about our methods, data sources, calculations,
and results are provided below.
Methods
Our characterization of multi-level regional FEW systems relied on an initial ‘desktop’
review of FEW indicators as well as ongoing stakeholder engagement. An inventory of
publicly available datasets quantifying municipal and regional FEW production,
consumption, and embodied FEW was conducted. For assistance in identifying relevant
datasets and to gain additional perspectives on regionally important FEW nexus topics, we
met with analysts from regional utilities including Xcel Energy and Denver Water, data
providers at the Denver Council Region of Governments, infrastructure consultants, and
city sustainability coordinators.
Data sources
Many of the key data sources for energy, transport, demographic, and crop at the county
level are federally administered (including USDA, USGS, EIA, FAF4). Data on the
monitoring of oil and gas wells is available at the state level, while municipal boundary
data is available from regional planning organizations.
Where data was not already available in GIS format, we created geo-referenced maps based
on state, county, and regional boundary files. We also co-identified publicly available data
sources for FEW supply and demand metrics with regional FEW experts.
We used county and municipal level data within Denver region over a ten-year period.
This allowed not only for consideration of sub-regional inequities but also changing
consumption patterns over time.
We quantify the following framework components at the municipal, county and regionwide level:
1. Intra-regional energy and water demand + food imports
2. Intra-regional energy and water supply + food exports and agricultural production
3. Trans-boundary flows of food, energy, and water
4. Food, energy, and water system interdependencies
5. Ecosystem impacts and health risks of regional food, energy, and water systems
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Demand for energy was derived from Xcel Energy’s Community Energy Reports for
2015 at the municipal and county level and mapped using ArcGIS. County-level demand
for water relied on United States Geological Survey (USGS) Water Use Data for the
Nation for the years 2000 and 2010. Electricity and natural gas usage at the municipal
and county level was obtained from Xcel Community Energy reports for 2015. Imports
of food-related products were derived from the Freight Analysis Framework (FAF4).
Supply of food was derived from exports of food-related products in FAF4 for 20122015. Maps of farmland used the United States Department of Agriculture’s Cropland
Data Layer for 2015. The map of regional electricity generation capacity and primary fuel
used data from the Energy Information Administration (SM Figure 2). County level
energy production data were obtained from the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission. Exports of food-related products were derived from the Freight Analysis
Framework (FAF4).
Trans-boundary flows of food and energy were derived from the Freight Analysis
Framework, Version 4 developed by the Center for Transportation Analysis. Transboundary water flows were obtained from Colorado’s Water Plan (2015) and the South
Platte Basin Implementation Plan (2015).
Embodied water and energy (Wquantity → F; Wquantity → E; Einput → W; Einput → F;
Finput → E) utilized USGS Water Use Data for irrigation and thermoelectric power,
Denver’s Water Withdrawal Footprint for Energy Supply (Cohen and Ramaswami, 2014)
and estimates of varying water and energy intensities of crops grown in different counties
(Fisher 2014). The quantity of water used in hydraulic fracturing at the well level was
obtained from fracfocus.org.
Ecosystem impacts from FEW systems (Eimpact → W; Eimpact → F; Fimpact → W;
Wquality → F; Wquality → E;) used socioeconomic data from the Denver Region Council
of Governments, the American Community Survey, and the Energy Information
Administration. Data on oil and gas spills, violations, and public complaints were
obtained from the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission’s Daily Activity
Dashboard; data on Class II injection wells came from fractracker.org.
Results
A-1. Food, energy, and water demand
City-wide and per capita FEW consumption within the region varies widely. Aggregate
energy demand is greater in more densely populated cities and towns, but per household
demand in these areas tends to be lower. Denver and Boulder, for example, consume the
most electricity and natural gas in aggregate but have the lowest energy consumption per
household (Figure 5a). Reflecting the water intensity of Weld County’s food and energy
production, Weld County (2010 population 254,000) consumed three times more water
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than the city of Denver (2010 population 603,000). Major crops include winter wheat,
corn, alfalfa and camelina (Figure 7).
Food: The demand for food can be quantified from the food consumption data from
USDA or FAO’s food balance sheet. Given the focus of this paper on impacts of energy
extraction on food and water systems, we do not offer this calculation here. We do
however note that imports of food to the Denver region (based on the FAF4 dataset) in
2015 totaled 16745 ktons (including imports from Denver to itself). We also note that
imported goods can be further processed and re-exported, so these numbers should be
interpreted with caution.
Water: The Denver region sits atop a series of four interconnected and largely nonrenewable groundwater reserves, collectively known as the Denver Basin Aquifer, which
have been extensively drilled to support the region’s water needs (Figure 1). Water wells
are concentrated in Boulder, Broomfield and Weld Counties. Aquifer pumping has
increased steadily from an estimated 40 ft3/s in 1953 to 170 ft3/s in 2003; actual pumping
is not monitored (Paschke et al. 2011). The state is facing an anticipated 163 billion
gallon (500,000 acre-feet) water shortfall by 2050, twice the amount currently used by
Denver Water’s 1.3 million residents (Colorado Water Conservation Board 2015; Finley
2014). The projected gap includes the loss of up to 424,000 acres of farmland statewide
(Finley 2014).
In 2000, a total of 12,622 Mgal/day were withdrawn in the state of Colorado for irrigation
(90.5%), industry (1.3%), public supply (7.1%), and thermoelectric power (1.1%). In
2010, withdrawals had declined to 10,778 Mgal/day, reflecting competing demand from
growing municipalities, while water use by sector statewide was roughly the same for
irrigation (90.1%), industry (1.3%), public supply (8%), and thermoelectric power
(0.7%). This trend of decreasing overall use is evident in the Denver Region, where total
water withdrawals fell from 1870 Mgal/day (2000) to 1403 Mgal/day (2010). [Put in
2015 #s] Unlike the rest of Colorado, however, water use by sector shifted in the Denver
Region, reflecting its growing population: public supply rose from 29% of total water
withdrawals in 2000 to 39% in 2010, while irrigation fell from 65% of withdrawals in
2000 to 54% in 2010.
Using figures from the USGS Water Use for the Nation dataset, a total of 12,622
Mgal/day were withdrawn in 2000 in the state of Colorado for irrigation (11420/12,622),
industry (164/12,622), public supply (899/12,622), and thermoelectric power
(138/12,622). In 2010, a decade later, the state withdrew a total of 10,778 Mgal/day for
irrigation (9715/10778), industry (139/10778), public supply (848/10778), and
thermoelectric power (77/10778). Regional and within region comparisons:
Calculations:
2000
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Irrigation (11420/12,622)=90.5%
Industry (164/12,622), =1.3%
public supply (899/12,622), 7.1%
thermoelectric power (138/12,622). 1.1%
2010
Irrigation (9715/10778)=90.1%
Industry (139/10778)=1.3%
public supply (848/10778)=8%
thermoelectric power (77/10778). =0.7%
Final
A total of 12,622 Mgal/day were withdrawn in 2000 in the state of Colorado for the
following uses: irrigation (90.5%) industry (1.3%), public supply (7.1%), and
thermoelectric power (1.1%). In 2010, a decade later, the state withdrew a total of 10,778
Mgal/day for irrigation (90.1%), industry (1.3%), public supply (8%), and thermoelectric
power (0.7%).
[Energy data excludes Clear Creek and Gilpin Counties.]
Data Gaps: Xcel reports were not available for prior years (and have since been removed
from the utility’s website).
A-2. Regional food, energy, and water supply
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Figure A-1. The locations, capacity, and primary fuel of the fleet of the region’s power plants in
2015. Data Source: EIA, 2015.

Food: The supply for food is equal to the sum of production within the region, imported
quantity, and change in stock (supply = production + import + change in stock). Supply
for local utilization = Production + imports - exports + changes in stocks (FAO nd;
Okrent and Alston 2012). Given the focus of this paper on impacts of energy extraction
on food and water systems, we do not offer this calculation here. We do, however, note
that exports from the Denver region (based on the FAF4 dataset) in 2015 totaled 14106
ktons (including exports from Denver to itself). We also note that imported goods can be
further processed and re-exported, so this number should be interpreted with caution.
A-3. Transboundary flows of food, energy, and water
National maps of energy and food imports to Denver at the city-region level were created
using the Freight Analysis Framework, Version 4 Regional Database.
Agricultural / Food imports were mapped using all the entries for live animals/fish, cereal
grains, other agricultural products, animal feed, meat/seafood, milled grain products,
other foodstuffs, and alcoholic beverages for which Denver was the destination in 2015.
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Agricultural / Food exports were mapped using all the entries for live animals/fish, cereal
grains, other agricultural products, animal feed, meat/seafood, milled grain products,
other foodstuffs, and alcoholic beverages for which Denver was the source in 2015.
The region is a net food importer: The total volume of food-related commodities
imported into the region was 16745 ktons in 2015, compared to 14106 k tons of foodrelated commodities exported from the region in the same year.
Up to 39% of the food-related commodities produced in the region may be consumed in
the region: (Food related imports from Denver to Denver) / (Food related imports from
anywhere to Denver, including imports from Denver to itself) = (6.5 megatons)/(16.7
megatons) = 0.39. It should be noted, however that imported goods can be further
processed and re-exported.
Energy imports were mapped using all the entries for coal, crude petroleum, gasoline,
aviation turbine fuel, and ethanol (includes kerosene, and fuel alcohols), fuel oils
(includes diesel, bunker c, and biodiesel), other coal and petroleum products, not
elsewhere classified for which Denver was the destination in 2015. Energy exports were
mapped using all the entries for coal, crude petroleum, gasoline, aviation turbine fuel, and
ethanol (includes kerosene, and fuel alcohols), fuel oils (includes diesel, bunker C, and
biodiesel), other coal and petroleum products, not elsewhere classified for which Denver
was the source in 2015.
The region is a net energy exporter: The total volume of energy-related commodities
imported into the region was 37,000 ktons in 2015, compared to 63,000 ktons of energyrelated commodities exported from the region in the same year.
Table A-1. Summary of import export stats of energy and food for the Denver region
derived from the FAF4 database.
D to
D. to/from D. to/from
Total
Denver to
itself:
elsewhere elsewhere
Total
Million
itself (ktons) Millon $
(ktons)
Million $
(ktons)
$
Ag Exports
6540
6417
7567
7371
14106
13774
Ag Imports
6540
6417
10206
11143
16746
17560
Energy
Exports
4657
2704
62703
16948
67360
19652
Energy
Imports
4657
2704
37039
6968
41696
9672
Water: Local food production and municipal water supplies rely on large-scale, trans-boundary
water diversion projects. The Colorado Big Thompson Project (C-BT), originally constructed in
the 1930s for irrigation, diverts about 220,000 acre-feet of water per year from the Western slope
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of the headwaters of the Colorado River. The water is delivered 13 miles to the eastern Front Range.
More than 33 cities and towns in northeastern Colorado, including Fort Collins and Boulder, are
served by the project, which provides a secondary water source for approximately 830,000 people.

A-4. Food, energy and water system interdependencies
WinputsàE: Total water use on the Niobrara Shale annually from 2013-2107 was
calculated using the full FracFocus Chemical Disclosure Registry downloaded from
http://fracfocus.org/data-download. Annual totals were obtained by summing the
TotalBaseWaterVolume column for all jobs with a value in the ‘JobStartDate’ field in
that year for all the counties in the Denver region, as well as the neighboring counties of
Larimer, Elbert and Morgan (also on the Niobrara Shale). The amount of water per well
was obtained by dividing this total by the number of wells (obtained from number of
unique entries in WellName field) registered that year in the relevant counties.
FinputàE: The town of LaSalle in Weld County is also home to Heartland Biogas, of the
largest biogas facilities in the country, which began operating in 2015. The facility uses
cattle manure and food waste to produce up to 4,700 MMBtu of biogas daily, and is
under contract to provide the renewable fuel to the Sacramento Municipal Utility District
in California. The facility was shut down in early 2017 due to complaints by residents
about the overpowering odors, and has yet to reopen (Runyon 2016; Marmaduke, 2017).
EinputàW: Public drinking water systems in the U.S. consume approximately 39.2 billion
kWh per year; this corresponds to roughly 1% of total electricity use nationwide.
Municipal wastewater treatment systems consume about 30.2 billion kWh annually, or
about 0.8% of total electricity use nationwide (Pabi et al. 2013).
EinputàF: The energy intensity of food production varies across the region. The estimated energy
intensity for small-scale potato, onion, carrot, and tomato growing in the city of Denver, where
potable tap water is used for irrigation, is 119 kWh/AF (365 per Mgal). In Alamosa County, by
contrast, where pumped irrigation is used, the site-specific energy intensity for potato crops was
recorded to be 12.8 kWh/AF (Fisher 2014).
WinputàElectricity Thermoelectric power generation also relies heavily on surface water supply
for power system cooling. Nationally, water withdrawals for this purpose are the single largest
consumer of water, comprising 45 percent of total withdrawals in 2010 (Maupin et al., 2014). In
2010, regional electricity generation required roughly 18 million gallons per day (USGS 2014).
Cohen and Ramaswami (2014) estimate the total mean water withdrawal footprint of Denver’s
energy supply in 2005 to be 22,070 million gallons (83,545 million liters) per year, including
building energy use and transportation fuels.
Table A-2. Industry-reported water use for hydraulic fracturing on the Niobrara Shale.
Data derived from the FracFocusRegistry database (fracfocus.org).
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Year

Total Base Water Volume
(Million Gallons)

#Wells

2012

739.12

1797

Average per well
(Million Gallons)
0.41

2013

3160.43

1302

2.43

2014

5750.71

1449

3.97

2015

5452.77

1117

4.88

2016

4915.53

721

6.82

2017

9774.93

1111

8.80

A-5. Ecosystem impacts and health risks of regional food, energy, and water systems
Proportion of energy from renewables in the residential sector in the Denver region in
2015 was mapped using municipal level data from Xcel Energy’s Community Energy
Reports. The number of residential customers participating in wind source and solar
garden programs was divided by the total number of customers, yielding a percentage.
The results were then mapped according to standard deviation.
A-6. Proximity to Energy Extraction and Thermoelectric Power Generation
Although energy production and electricity generation are significant regional activities, the
associated health risks of living adjacent to these facilities are not distributed evenly across the
population. Wealthier communities are more readily able to participate in renewable energy
programs like Solar Gardens and Renewable Energy Credits (Figure 11). Low-income, nonminority communities are dispersed throughout the region while minority and minority plus lowincome communities are concentrated within Denver (Figure 12).
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Figure A-2. Proportion energy from renewables in the residential sector in the Denver
region in 2015.
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Figure A-3. The spatial distribution of minority, low-middle income communities in the
region. The surface locations of the regions 44,000+ oil and gas wells are depicted in
orange. Also shown is the electricity-generating capacity of hydro (left) and wind (upper
right). Data Sources: Denver Region Council of Governments 2015, Energy Information
Administration 2015.
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Figure A-4 Spills and releases, public complaints, and alleged violations in Weld County
from 2011 to 2017. Data obtained from the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission Daily Activity Dashboard (http://cogcc.state.co.us/DAD.html) and the
Colorado Oil and Gas Information System (http://cogcc.state.co.us/cogis/).
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Weld County Gas Production (2006-2016)
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Weld County Produced Water (Wastewater)
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Figure A-5a-c. Weld County oil and gas production from 2006 to 2016, as well as produced
water. Hydraulic fracturing accounts for the sharp increase beginning in about 2012.
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APPENDIX B: CHAPTER 3 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION (SI)
THE FOOD-ENERGY-WATER-MATERIAL NEXUS AND EMBODIED
INJUSTICES: THE ROLE OF HYDROPOWER IN DEFORESTATION IN EEYOU
ISTCHEE/NORTHERN QUEBEC
B-I Introduction
Linkages between mining and the FEW/resource nexus
Mining requires land for exploitation of ores and for waste disposal: an estimated 60
billion tons of material are moved each year (Humphreys, 2017). Mining also depends on
large water inputs: an average of 172 tons (thousand liters) is needed to produce one ton
of copper, and 600–700 tons to produce 1 kilogram of gold. Large quantities of energy
are also needed for mineral processing, representing one quarter of metal production
costs. As pressure on FEWS increases, linkages to mining have become more important,
and may constrain mining development more than physical availability of mineral ores
(Humphreys, 2017).
Forest Management in Canada
Canadian provinces, which are primarily responsible for forest management, have
historically disregarded and ignored First Nations in resource development (Ross et al.,
2002):
Aboriginal Peoples are still largely excluded from forest allocation and
management… provincial governments have allowed industrial developments to
radically alter the lands and resources used by Aboriginal Peoples... Aboriginal
and treaty rights, notably land and resource-related rights such as the rights to
hunt, trap, fish and gather, and to use forest resources for their own benefit, are
directly and often negatively affected by industrial forestry activities. Lack of
recognition and protection of the rights of Aboriginal Peoples on traditional lands
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allocated to forest companies has resulted in the implementation of policies and
management systems that do not meet the needs of Aboriginal Peoples, are
foreign to their values and management systems and endanger their very existence
(Ross et al., 2002: 4).
As articulated by Matthew Coon Come, former Grand Chief of the Grand Council of the
Crees, the appropriation of land and water in Eeyou Istchee to supply energy to distant
populations deprived the Crees of their means of subsistence, constituting the most basic
of injustices:
There is something fundamentally wrong that needs to be identified here. At the
same time that these negotiations concerning the JBNQA were taking place,
Canada was participating in the development of the International Covenant on
Social, Economic and Cultural Rights at the United Nations. Article 1 provides
that: 'Under no circumstances shall a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence.' Yet this is precisely what had just been done to us, as the waters of
the La Grande hydroelectric mega-project rose around us and flooded our
ancestors' graves. I believe that the governments knew then what they were doing:
depriving the Cree people of our own means of subsistence in violation of our
fundamental human rights (Coon Come, 2004: 157).
Impact of Logging Infrastructure on the Boreal Forest in Canada
In a recent study, the annual deforestation rate of the Canadian province of Ontario
jumped to seven times the official forestry rate for the entire country when commercial
logging infrastructure (including roads to access and remove timber, landings for log
storage, road pull-offs, staging areas, localized digging and wayside pits for road-building
material, tree waste processing areas, and waste log piles) was taken into account,
although the Ontario officially accounts for just 17% of Canada’s logging (Wildlands
League, 2019).
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Using “analytical eclecticism” in extending the FEW nexus
Alongside nexus critiques, many have called for more critical, theoretically informed
perspectives (Allouche et al., 2014; Foran, 2015). Leck et al. (2015) propose the use of
analytical eclecticism, defined by Sil and Katzenstein as an intellectual stance utilizing
“theoretical constructs embedded in contending research traditions to build complex
arguments that bear on substantive problems” (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010: 411). This
approach can guide nexus research in navigating disciplinary boundaries, specifying how
“different causal factors might coexist as part of a more complex argument” relevant for
research, practice, and facilitating dialogue among disciplines and stakeholders (Leck et
al., 2015: 451-452). In widening the FEW / resource nexus to include embodied injustices
and transboundary sustainability (FEWM+ENTS), we employ this approach.
Embodied Injustices
Healy et al observe that conceptualizations of embodied energy injustices can: 1) help
situate chains of energy injustices and place-based energy struggles within wider national
and regional energy politics and 2) address regulatory gaps in energy governance by
expanding the scope of energy decisions and processes, thus providing a framework to
situate and understand place-based injustices as part of an unjust global order (Healy et
al., 2019).
Table B-1. FEWM nexus interactions and embodied injustices and transboundary
unsustainability (FEWM+ENTS) framework.
Inputs: x ‘for’ y

Impacts: x ‘on’ y
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Definition: The FEWM inputs to food, water,
energy systems and materials across the life cycle
Examples:
o Water ‘for’ energy: hydropower; surface
water withdrawals for thermoelectric power
generation
o Water and energy ‘for’ food: volume of water
for crop irrigation, energy used for water
pumping
o Energy ‘for’ mining
Note: Nexus studies often focus here, particularly
quantifying inputs/flows from one system to
another

Definition (two-fold): 1) Impact of FEWM systems
on each other and the wider ecosystem across
FEWM life cycles; 2) Disproportionate
environmental and health impacts at the FEWM
nexus on vulnerable and disenfranchised
communities
Examples:
o Food/Land ‘on’ Water: Impact of fertilizer on
aquatic ecosystems
o Impact of Barrick Gold Corporation’s planned
Pascua–Lama project using open pits and
cyanide leaching for ore recovery on glaciers
and water supporting indigenous agriculture in
the Huasco Valley, Chile (Urkidi & Walter,
2011)

Access ‘to’:
Definition: Equitable access to food, energy,
water, materials and land; lack of access to x is
correlated with lack of access to y

Note: Mandated environmental impact assessments
and the environmental justice movement address this
Control ‘over’
Definition: Structural issues of how FEWM systems
have been developed, how they interact, and how
benefits and harms are distributed across populations

Examples:
Lack of access to FEW at the global scale:
o 800 million people are hungry and 2 billion
experience moderate or severe food insecurity
(FAO et al., 2019)
o 1.2 billion live in water-scarce regions (Bigas
et al., 2013)
o 1.2 billion do not have access to electricity
o More than 2.7 billion rely on traditional
biomass for cooking (WEO, 2016)

Examples:
o Institutions that control regulatory processes
disproportionately allow siting of toxic
facilities near communities of color in the
U.S.
o Provincial control of industrial development
in forests in Canada, systematically excluding
Aboriginal Peoples from forest resource
management (encompassing food, water, and
livelihoods)

Note: Development projects sometimes address
this

Note: Environmental justice/reform/transition efforts
address this

These four interrelated dimensions – inputs, impacts, access, and control – at the
FEWM nexus are essential to providing a more complete picture for research and policy
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addressing nexus topics. The spatial component to each of these dimensions can be
mapped and monitored over time and across large distances. These capacities are
especially salient for just and sustainable transitions, as FEW systems, governance
structures, policies, and transboundary supply chains receive increasing scrutiny.
Transboundary Unsustainability: Linking Production and Consumption Through
Infrastructure: ‘Nexus infrastructures’ are highly interdependent: transportation, for
example, enables the building of energy and water distribution networks and is necessary
for resource extraction, while transport/rail vehicles are in turn dependent on fossil fuels
and/or electricity for power.

B-II. Data and Methods
Table B-2. Datasets used in this analysis.
Data Type
Satellite imagery
Fire

Boreal Forest
Disturbances
(Pasher et al., 2013):
o Logging
o Mining
o Reservoirs
o Roads
o Powerlines

Source
The Landsat Data Archive was accessed via the Google Earth Engine
platform.
The Canadian National Fire Data Base (CNFDB) (Canadian Forest
Service, 2019) was used as an accurate reference map depicting the
year and cause of historical disturbances due to fire, following a
number of studies that have taken this approach (Coops et al., 2018;
Schroeder et al., 2011).
Environment Canada’s 2010 Boreal Ecosystem Anthropogenic
Disturbances Dataset (BEADD) (Pasher et al., 2013) contains
digitized polygonal and linear disturbances for the entire boreal forest
in Canada manually at 1:50000 scale (500 m) using Landsat imagery
from 2008-2010, providing a snapshot of disturbances circa 2010.
The polygonal disturbances layer helped identify cutblocks,
reservoirs, and mines; the linear disturbances layer was used to
identify roads and power lines.
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Water Bodies
Hydropower

Roads
Mining

Energy

Mercury Levels in
Fish
Wildlife Capture
Data

The EC/JRC’s Global Surface Water dataset ‘occurrence’ layer was
used to mask known waterbodies from the Landtrendr results
showing forest disturbances (Pekel et al., 2016)
The Global Reservoir and Dam (GRanD) Database Version 1.3
(Lehner et al., 2011) contains the spatial extent of James Bay
Complex hydropower reservoirs, dam locations, and year of
construction.
The Statistics Canada Road Network File (2019) contains digital road
line coverage of Canada, including linear extent, type, rank, and
class, but not the date of construction.
Quebec’s Système d’Information Géominière (SIGÉOM à La Carte,
n.d.) contains georeferenced, temporal data on expired and active
mining titles, exploratory drilling, current mining operations, and
prospective mining areas. Natural Resources Canada’s interactive
map of indigenous mining agreements listing specific mining
companies was also used (Natural Resources Canada, n.d.)
The Atlas of Canada – Remote Communities Energy Database
contains information about 276 remote communities in Canada
including name, province, main power source, annual fossil fuel
generation, and community classification (Indigenous and Northern
Affairs Canada & Natural Resources Canada, 2016).
Healthy Fish Eating in Eeyou Istchee (Cree Health Board) and the
Northern Fish Nutrition Guide (Blanchet, n.d.)
Cree Trappers Association Big Game Survey Data and Trapline
Capture Reports contain data on caribou, moose, black bear, and 15
small game species from 1989 to 2018 in eight Cree communities
within Eeyou Istchee (CTA - GeoPortal for Eeyou Istchee, n.d.).

B-IIa. Study Area
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Figure B-1. The Eeyou Istchee / Jamésie study area is comprised of 31 individual
Landsat scenes, spanning paths 13-20 and rows 20-26.
Overlapping boundaries
The southwestern portion of Jamésie that does not overlap with Eeyou Istchee is part of
the traditional territory of the Wahgoshig First Nation (formerly known as the Abitibi
Band of Abitibi Indians).
Additional Context
The Quebec Boundary Extension Act, 1898 and the Quebec Boundaries Extension Act,
1912 passed by the Parliament of Canada together tripled the territory of Quebec to its
current boundaries, encompassing lands inhabited by Aboriginal Cree, Innu, Naskapi, and
Inuit, and spanning more distance north to south than any other province. Hydro-Quebec
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planners first inventoried the region’s rivers in the late 1950s, although Hydro-Quebec
was not initially supportive of launching the James Bay Project (JBP). Quebec’s
development efforts began in 1971 with the stated goal of promoting “economic
development and the development and exploitation of natural resources, other than
hydro-electric resources falling within Hydro-Québec’s mandate” (James Bay Region
Development Act, 1971). Supporters of the JBP, which was dubbed “The Project of the
Century,” rallied around the political slogan Maître Chez Nous (“Masters of Our Own
House”), originally derived from the Liberal Party’s 1962 provincial election campaign.
Anticipating growing energy demands of Quebec’s growing population, the JBP was an
attempt by Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa’s Liberal Party in the early 1970s to create
100,000 jobs and redirect Quebec separatist sentiment toward 1960s-era economic
nationalism at a time when the newly-launched Parti Québécois was on the rise. The JBP
was the Liberal alternative to the Parti Québécois independence project: in Bourassa’s
words, the JBP was the “key to the political stability of Quebec,” functioning as “a
symbolic gesture stimulating hope and collective pride” (McCutcheon, 1998: 33).
Jean Chrétien, Minister for Indian Affairs and Northern Development for Canada
(who would later become Prime Minister of Canada), at the time called the region “the
last frontier to open in North America,” stating the federal position that “we cannot afford
to make too many mistakes” as Quebec sought to develop the region (von Rosen, 2010).
The Grand Council of the Crees (2011) describe the external development of
Eeyou Istchee as occurring in four waves 2015: beginning in the 1950s and 60s with
Canadian military-operated radar defense lines, continuing with the 1971 James Bay

221

Region Development Act in Quebec, leading to the 1975 James Bay and Northern
Quebec Agreement, and culminating in the Plan Nord, a 25-year, C$80 billion effort to
engage in continued resource extraction applying to all of Quebec north of the 49th
parallel, launched by Quebec in 2011 and reaffirmed in 2015 (Québec (Province) et al.,
2011; Gouvernement du Québec, 2015). The Plan Nord, including lands covered by the
JBNQA, is seen by Quebec as one of its most ambitious projects (Québec (Province) et
al., 2011: IX).
Ecoregions
The boreal forest ecoregions comprising the study area (Figure 1) include the Taiga
Shield, Hudson Plain, Northern Forest Softwood Shield, and Northern Forest Mixed
Hardwoods Shield according to the North American Terrestrial Ecoregions Classification
System (Wiken et al., 2011). Most of the commercial forestry licensed by the province of
Quebec within EI/J occurs in this ecoregion (Map 1a) and in the Northern Forest Mixed
Hardwoods Shield to the southeast, containing maple, birch, aspen, spruce, balsam fir,
hemlock, and pine. Commercial timber extraction is concentrated in the southern region,
where there are processing mills, road infrastructures, and heavily forested environments,
all of which decrease to the north, along with increasing operational constraints (e.g.
steep terrain, bogs, lakes, and rivers) (Jobidon et al., 2015) and declining commercial
values (Beaudoin et al., 2014).
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B-IIb. Methods
Landtrendr relies on relative radiometric normalization and cloud screening rules to
create on-the-fly mosaics of multiple images per year; for each pixel temporal trajectories
of spectral data are extracted. Temporal segmentation strategies use straight line
segments to model important trajectory features and eliminate noise; control parameters
and threshold-based filtering are used to reduce the role of false positive detections
(Kennedy et al., 2010, 2012).
The Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) and Landsat Band 5 were
also tested. In order to determine if reservoir formation between 1984 and 2018 could be
detected (Section 3.3), water was not masked in the initial Landtrendr analysis. To more
accurately estimate deforested land throughout the study area, the Global Surface Water
occurrence data layer (Pekel et al., 2016) was applied to the Landtrendr result; pixels with
values from 10-100 were classified as water and masked from the final map of disturbed
area. The Landtrendr algorithm was run using NBR for all scenes from 1984 (the earliest
year with sufficient data to enable this technique) to 2018.
B-III. Forest Disturbances by Type
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Figure B-2. Validation datasets depicting boreal forest disturbances in EI/J. Mining is
shown separately in Section 3.2.4 and Figures S3-1x and S3-1x. Data sources:
(Canadian Forest Service, 2019; Pasher et al., 2013).
B-IIIa. Hydropower
The full complex consists of a series of ten hydropower dams on the eastern rivers
flowing into James Bay, owned and operated by Hydro-Quebec, the province’s public
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electric utility (Déry et al., 2018). The James Bay complex is the largest in the Western
Hemisphere; in 2019, its installed generating capacity totaled 17,268 MW (Hydro-Quebec
2019 Annual Report, 2020).
In 1992 Quebec suspended the Great Whale Complex after prolonged Cree
opposition, culminating in New York State canceling its contract with Hydro-Quebec. In
2002, as part of the Paix des Braves Agreement setting out a Nation-to-Nation
relationship between the Grand Council of the Crees and Quebec, the Nottaway,
Broadback and Rupert (NBR) Complex, which would have resulted in the flooding of
over 8000 km2 of land, was also abandoned. In return, the Crees agreed to the
construction of the Eastmain and Rupert projects, involving the partial diversion of the
Rupert River and the construction of a series of dikes and dams along the Eastmain and
Rupert Rivers, causing the Eastmain to partially dry up and 975 km2 to be flooded. The
Paix des Braves also provided for joint Cree and Quebec management of mining, forestry
and hydropower resources.
Pre-1975

1975-1980
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1980s

1990s

2000s

2010

Figure B-3. Dam and reservoir construction in Eeyou Istchee / Jamésie by decade from 1970 to 2010.
Data sources: 2019 GranDam Database (Lehner et al., 2011) and the National Hydrographic Database
Rivers dataset (Secretariat, 2019).
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Year

River

Reservoir

km2

1977

La Grande

La Grande 2

2759

1978

La Grande

La Grande 1

78

1980

Eastmain

Opinaca

1981

La Grande

La Grande 3

2401

1981

Caniapiscau

Caniapiscau

3543

1981

La Grande

La Grande 4

806

1982

Laforge

Laforge 2

293

1994

Laforge

Laforge 1

1048

2005

Eastmain

Eastmain-1

591

2010

Rupert

Rupert

172

Generating
Cap (MW)

929

5616
1436
768
2417
469
2779
319
878
480

Figure B-4. James Bay Complex dams, reservoirs, power station capacity, and major drainage
basins modified by the project. From north to south: Great and Little Whale, La Grande, Rupert
and Broadback, and Nottaway drainage basins. Data Sources: GrandDam Database and HydroQuebec, 2019: http://www.Hydro-Quebec.com/generation/centrale-hydroelectrique.html National
Hydrographic Network; GranDam Database and Lakes and Rivers.
B-IIIb. Mining
Of the approximately 395,000 term-limited mining titles issued by the province of
Quebec in EI/J since 1970 approximately 78,100 are active; 285,000 have expired; and
3600 were revoked, suspended or refused (SIGÉOM | Système d’information Géominière
| SIGÉOM à La Carte, 2019).
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Table B-3. Active Agreements between Indigenous groups and Mining Companies in EI/J. Data source:
Atlas Canada Indigenous Mining Agreements (https://atlas.gc.ca/imaema/en/) (Natural Resources Canada
& Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, n.d.)
Project
name

Mining company

Bachelor
Lake

Metanor
Resources Inc.

BlackRock
Mining
Project
Croteau Est
and
Waconichi
Douay

Éléonore
Hopes
Advance
Project

BlackRock Metals
Northern Superior
Resources Inc.
Aurvista Gold
Corporation

Goldcorp Inc.

Lac Rocher

Oceanic Iron Ore
Corp.
Victory Nickel
Inc.

Moblan
West

Perilya Limited

Montviel
Project

Geomega
Resources Inc.

Renard
Diamond
Project

Stornoway
Diamond Corp.

Rose
TantalumLithium

Critical Elements
Corp.

Whabouchi
Property
Windfall
Lake

Nemaska Lithium
Inc.
Osisko Mining
Corp.

Signatories
Waswanipi (Cree Nation of),
Grand Council of the Crees
(Eeyou Istchee) / Cree
regional Authority
Grand Council of the Crees
(Eeyou Istchee) / Cree
regional Authority, OujéBougoumou Cree Nation
Grand Council of the Crees
(Eeyou Istchee) / Cree
regional Authority, OujéBougoumou Cree Nation
Conseil de la Première Nation
Abitibiwinni
Cree Nation of Wemindji,
Grand Council of the Crees
(Eeyou Istchee) / Cree
regional Authority
Makivik Corporation,
Nunavik Landholding
Corporation of Aupaluk
Waswanipi (Cree Nation of)
Cree Nation of Mistissini,
Grand Council of the Crees
(Eeyou Istchee) / Cree
regional Authority
Grand Council of the Crees
(Eeyou Istchee) / Cree
regional Authority,
Waswanipi (Cree Nation of)
Grand Council of the Crees
(Eeyou Istchee) / Cree
regional Authority, Cree
Nation of Mistissini
Grand Council of the Crees
(Eeyou Istchee) / Cree
regional Authority, Eastmain
(Cree Nation of)
Grand Council of the Crees
(Eeyou Istchee) / Cree
regional Authority
Waswanipi (Cree Nation of),
Grand Council of the Crees
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Agreement
type

Project
status

SocioEconomic
Agreement

Producing

Year
signed

Commodities

2012

Gold

Impact and
Benefits
Agreement

Exploration

2013

Iron,
Vanadium,
Titanium

Other

Exploration

2013

Gold

Other

Exploration

2014

Gold

Cooperation
Agreement

Producing

2011

Gold

Letter of
Intent

Exploration

2011

Iron

MOU

Development

2007

Nickel

Other

Exploration

2013

Lithium,
Tantalum

Other

Exploration

2011

Rare Earth
Elements

Impact and
Benefits
Agreement

Producing

2012

Other

Exploration

2012

Diamonds
Tantalum,
Rare Earth
Elements,
Lithium

Other
Exploration
Agreement

Exploration

2014

Lithium

Exploration

2012

Gold

(Eeyou Istchee) / Cree
regional Authority

.
1970-1979

1970-1994

1970-2009

1970-1984

1970-1989

1970-1999

1970-2004

1970-2014
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1970-2019

Figure B-5. Start date of mining titles (leases) from 1970-2019. Data Source: (SIGÉOM |
Système d’information Géominière | SIGÉOM à La Carte, 2019)

1990-1994

1990-1999

1990-2004

1990-2009

1990-2014

1990-2019
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Figure B-6. Exploratory drilling maps overlaid with titles in EI/J.

B-IIIc. Fire
1973-1978

1973-1993

1973-1983

1973-1988

1973-1998

1973-2003
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1973-2008

1973-2013

1973-2018

Figure B-7. Time series of forest disturbances due to fire in EI/J. Data source: Canadian
National Fire Data Base (Canadian Forest Service, 2019).
B-IIId. Logging
a)

1984-1988

b) 1984-1993

232

c) 1984-1998

d) 1984-2003

e) 1984-2008

f) 1984-2013
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g) 1984-2018

Figure B-8. Time series reconstruction of cutblocks and fire in the commercial forestry
zone in Eeyou Istchee / Jamésie.
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Figure B-9. System interdependencies: Sawmills are located along both power and major road
networks.
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Figure B-10. Commercial Forestry Tenures in EI/J. Data source: (Global Forest Watch,
2019)
Linear disturbances due to roads and transmission lines were not reliably identified by
Landtrendr, although some roads linking cutblocks are visible at finer scales (Main Text,
Figure 12).
Comparing Landtrendr and Disturbance Type Datasets
Table B-4. Percent of areas in validation data layers identified as disturbed by Landtrendr NBR.
Disturbance Type
Validation Dataset
Fire / NFDB
Cutblock / EC
BEAD
Mining / EC BEAD
Reservoir / EC
BEAD

Landtrendr-identified
Disturbed Area in
Validation Dataset (km2)
47400

Validation Dataset:
Total Area (km2)
81400

% of disturbance area
identified as disturbed
by Landtrendr
58%

10400
75

19100 (to 2010)
188 (to 2010)

55%
40%

1584

12600

13%
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Unclassified

--

19900

--

B-IV. Embodied Injustices
B-IVa. Disturbance Type and Wildlife Capture by Community
Table B-5. Cree Nation forest losses by type. Data sources: https://www.cngov.ca/communityculture/communities/ and
https://www.decrochezcommejamais.com/fichiersUpload/fichiers/20190401094139-web-eng-bj-gto2019.pdf
Cree Nation
(North to south)
Whapmagoostui
Chisasibi
Mistissini
Wemindji
Eastmain
Waskaganish
Nemaska
Oujé-Bougoumou
Waswanipi

Population
1550
5000
4550
1540
830
2620
850
2010

Area
(km2)

Reservoir
(km2)

Powerline (km)

67300
82200
126000
28800
15200
29700
14900
10600
37100

7500
2000
850
1100
120
-

0
780
550
780
460
180
500
400
500

Total
Forest
Loss
(km2)
4140
11500
28600
8060
6080
4120
4500
1960
8920

Fire
(%)
2
11
11
26
38
9
24
4
7

Cutblock
(%)

Forest
Loss
(%)

3
1
1
12
16

6
14
23
28
40
14
30
16
24

Table B-6. Mining activity and roads in each Cree Nation. Data sources: Quebec SIGEOM;
Statistics Canada 2019 Road Network File (https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/catalogue/92-500X); BEADD, (Pasher et al., 2013).
Cree Nation
(North to south)
Whapmagoostui
Chisasibi
Mistissini
Wemindji
Eastmain
Nemaska
Waskaganish
Oujé-Bougoumou
Waswanipi

Mines
1
1
2
1
2
3

Mining
Agreements
3
1
1
1
5

Exp.
Drilling
190
1700
6600
1500
1900
960
1700
11600
11400
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Mining
Titles
5970
27200
101000
31300
19200
9000
23500
29800
79100

Official
Roads (km)
30
710
510
440
240
360
210
380
440

Logging Roads
(km)
3000
350
550
1300
6000

Matthew Coon Come, Grand Chief of the Grand Council of the Crees from 1987-1999,
describes the impact of the James Bay Complex on wildlife and Cree hunting and fishing
as follows, highlighting issues surrounding control over interconnected systems:
“We have realized that programs to build hunters' campsites beside the reservoirs
are not worthwhile, because the animals do not live there. One hunter discovered
a beaver lodge twenty feet high on the edge of a reservoir. The beavers had kept
building higher to keep ahead of the rising water all summer. When the winter
came, the water was drawn down and the beavers froze. We have discovered that
the boat access ramps are useless in areas where the trees are left standing
underwater, because the trees block boat access to the shore. Furthermore, the fish
are highly contaminated by mercury leaching out of the rotting vegetation; if we
eat the fish, one of our staples, we get methylmercury poisoning. We have
discovered that beaver and lynx relocated by helicopter from the areas to be
flooded very often die from the shock of the move. We have discovered that the
engineers' promises that they could manage the flows appropriately were untrue,
when 10,000 caribou drowned trying to follow their traditional migration paths”
(Coon Come, 2004: 158).
Table B-7. Wildlife capture trends in Eeyou Istchee from July 1, 1989 to June 30, 2019. The threeyear average from 1989-1991 is the ‘beginning’ value and the three-year average from 2017-2019
is the ‘end’ value, shown along with percent change. (Three-year averages are rounded, except
when the rounded value further explains percent change.) Data source: (Cree Trappers Association
- GeoPortal for Eeyou Istchee, n.d.)
Cree Nation
(North to south)

1000
km2

Forest
Loss (%)

Whapmagoostui
Chisasibi
Mistissini
Wemindji
Eastmain
Waskaganish
Nemaska
Waswanipi

67
82
126
28
15
30
15
37

6
14
23
28
40
14
30
24

Cree Nation
(North to south)

Km2

Forest
Loss (%)

Whapmagoostui

67,300

6

Caribou
% Change
(Beg | End)
-54% (154 | 70)
-71% (196 | 56)
-93% (297 | 21)
-99% (48 | .3)
-100% (4 | 0)
-97% (59 | 1.6)
-92% (12 | 1)
-- (0 | 2)

Moose
% Change
(Beg | End)
-1% (.6 | 0)
10% (27 | 30)
-47% (206 | 109)
-77% (48 | 11)
-38% (41 | 26)
-39% (49 | 30)
-7% (41 | 38)
-57% (237 | 102)

Black Bear
Beg/End/
%change
-59% (16 | 7)

Linx
Beg/End/
change
-89% (6 | 1)
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Beaver
% Change
(Beg | End)
-96% (93 | 3)
-90% (447 | 46)
-92% (967 | 77)
-76% (483 | 114)
-80% (246 | 50)
-84% (591 | 96)
-90% (178 | 17)
-85% (372 | 55)

Marten
% Change
(Beg | End)
-86% (358 | 47)
106% (84 | 220)
-72% (968 | 268)
940% (21 | 224)
-19%(50 | 40.3)
-40% (277 | 167)
-61% (85 | 33)
-87% (272 | 35)

Mink
Beg/End/
change
-100% (98| 0)

Otter
Beg/End/
change
-100% (31 | 0)

Chisasibi
Mistissini
Wemindji
Eastmain
Waskaganish
Nemaska
Waswanipi

82,200
126,000
28,800
15,200
29,700
14,900
37,100

14
23
28
40
14
30
24

107% (14| 30)
-9% (30 | 28)
-71% (18 | 5)
13% (17 | 20)
14% (2 | 3)
-84% (6 | 1)
557% (5 | 30)

-84% (100| 16)
-89% (25 | 3)
-77% (109 | 25)
-87% (39 | 5)
-88% (11 | 1)
-53% (6 | 3)
-60% (10 | 4)

-98% (104 | 2)
-96% (334 | 5)
-90% (45 | 5)
-100% (15 | 0)
-100% (37 | 0)
-100% (22 | 0)
-91% (30 | 3)

-90% (61 | 6)
-91% (136 | 12)
-65% (47 | 16)
-80% (15 | 3)
-89% (28 | 3)
-96% (8 | 0)
-82% (11 | 2)

Cree Nation
(North to south)

Km2

Forest
Loss (%)

Whapmagoostui
Chisasibi
Mistissini
Wemindji
Eastmain
Waskaganish
Nemaska
Waswanipi

67,300
82,200
126,000
28,800
15,200
29,700
14,900
37,100

6
14
23
28
40
14
30
24

Wolf
Beg/End/
change
-93% (5 | .3)
-97% (22 | 1)
-98% (16 | .3)
-36% (4 | 2)
-100% (1 | 0)
--% (0 | 0)
-100% (3 | 0)
-100% (1 | 0)

Red Fox
Beg/End/
change
-93% (19 | 1)
-75% (88 | 21)
-94% (37 | 2)
-38% (37 | 23)
-97% (10 | 0)
-72% (32 | 9)
-62% (4 | 2)
-93% (9 | 1)

Silver Fox
Beg/End/
change
-50% (1 | .3)
-76% (8 | 2)
-100% (1 | 0)
-83% (2 | .3)---% (0 | 1)
-100% (.3 | 0)
--% (0 | 0)
--% (0 | 0)

White Fox
Beg/End/
change
-100% (1 |0 )
200% (1 | 3)
--% (0 | 0)
--% ( 0| 1)
100% (.3 | 0)
--% (0 | .3)
--% (0 | 0)
--% (0| 0)

Cree Nation
(North to south)

Km2

Forest
Loss (%)

Whapmagoostui
Chisasibi
Mistissini
Wemindji
Eastmain
Waskaganish
Nemaska
Waswanipi

67,300
82,200
126,000
28,800
15,200
29,700
14,900
37,100

6
14
23
28
40
14
30
24

Muskrat
Beg/End/
change
-100% (256 | 1)
-92% (461 | 39)
-97% (293 | 7)
-91% (142 | 13)
-74% (13 | 3)
-92% (182 | 15)
-87% (13 | 2)
-94% (41 | 2)

Weasel
Beg/End/
change
-100% (135 | 0)
-91% (93 | 8)
-94% (71 | 4)
-45% (35 | 19)
-100% (11 | 0)
-100% (8 | 0)
-100% (7 | 0)
-44% (5 | 3)

Skunk
Beg/End/
change
-100% (0.3| 0)
--% (0 | 0)
--% (0 | 0)
--% (0 | 0)
--% (0 | 0)
--% (0 | 0)
--% (0 | 0)
--% (0 | 0)

CFX
Beg/End/
change
-100% (2 | 0)
-80% (16 | 3)
-83% (2 | .3)
-43% (8 | 4.3)
0% (1 | 1)
-100% (1 |0 )
-100% (1 | 0)
100% (.3 |.6)
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Figure B-11. Caribou and moose captures in EI.
B-IVb. Logging
Until 2013, private forestry companies in Quebec were responsible not only for timber
extraction, but also for forest planning and management. In 2013 Quebec introduced a
new forest policy regime, under the Sustainable Forest Development Act, which
introduced government-led planning in Quebec’s forested regions, which are largely the
unceded territories of eleven First Nations in Quebec, including 55 communities
(Teitelbaum et al., 2019; SI Section IVa). Teitelbaum et al (forthcoming) note the PDB’s
adapted forestry regime strengthened the role of the Crees with respect to forestry
governance in Eeyou Istchee, creating new consultative mechanisms at the regional and
local levels. The Cree-Quebec Forestry Board, comprised of five representatives from the
Cree Regional Authority and five from Quebec was given responsibility for PDB
implementation. At the community level, Joint Working Groups were formed, including
two appointees from each Cree community and two provincial appointees, with the
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responsibility for implementation of specific PDB provisions and addressing forestryrelated conflicts.
As the governance landscape has become more varied, Crees have adopted new
strategies, including engagement with the Forest Stewardship Council, an international
non-state, market-driven forest certification regime requiring ‘free and informed consent’
in order to provide certification of forest products (Teitelbaum et al., 2019). The new
provincial regime included a commitment to undertake specific consultations with
Indigenous communities (a policy known as “consultation and accommodation”) but
specifically does not go as far as the “free and informed consent” required for FCS
certification, leading the province reverse its decision to become FSC certificate holder,
instead collaborating “with the forest industry to allow private companies to remain the
parties responsible for certification. The government would play a backseat role, setting
up advisory committees for each forest management unit to ensure communication
between industry and government on issues related to FSC certification and forest
management planning” (Teitelbaum et al., 2019: 17).
B-IVc. Water
In the 2009 study Nituuchischaayihtitaau aschii (“Let us know our land”), commissioned
by the Cree Board of Health, total coliforms, E. coli, and enterococci were detected at
least once in all tested drinking water sources used by the Cree community of Mistissini
apart from tap water. Although existing water harvesting and storage practices were
found to decrease microbial counts, the study recommended that raw water be boiled
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before consumption (Bernier et al., 2009). A study by the Public Health Department of
the Cree Board of Health and Social Services of James Bay and local First Nation
Councils in 2005 found that drinking water from some springs and streams and water
used in camps were contaminated (Cree Board of Health and Social Services of James
Bay, 2018). Closed or abandoned mining sites around the Chibougamau region are also
of major concern due to water contamination affecting the watershed (Cree Vision of
Plan Nord, 2011: 99).
Elevated mercury levels in fish as a result of reservoir formation were first
detected in South Carolina in the mid 1970s and have been recorded in a variety of
tropical, temperate and boreal areas around the world (Rosenberg et al., 1995).
Table B-8. Restrictions on Fish Consumption due to mercury contamination in Eeyou
Istchee / Jamésie. Data Source: Northern Fish Nutrition Guide: James Bay Region.
(https://www.creehealth.org/sites/default/files/Guide_BaieJames_Ang_BasseR.pdf)
(Blanchet, n.d.).

Fish Species
Lake Whitefish
Speckled Trout
Walleye
Pike
Lake Trout

LaGrande - Western Sector

LaGrande - Eastern Sector

Eastmain 1
Sector

Reservoirs

Natural Lakes

Reservoirs

Natural Lakes

Reservoirs

Rupert Sector
Rupert Division
Bays & Upper
Nemiscau R.

Natural Lakes
& Rupert R.

Lemare & L.
Nemiscau
Rivers

Eastmain 1
Sector
Fish Species

Natural Lakes

Lake Whitefish
Speckled Trout
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Walleye
Pike
Lake Trout

Table B-9. Restrictions on Fish Consumption due to mercury contamination in Eeyou
Istchee / Jamésie. Source: Healthy Fish Eating in Eeyou Istchee
(https://www.creehealth.org/library/online/healthy-fish-eating-eeyou-istchee-map) (Cree
Board of Health and Social Services of James Bay (CBHSSJB), 2015).
Drainage Basin

Fish Species
Lake Whitefish

La Grande
Natural
Lakes and
Rivers

La Grande Rupert
forebay and tailbay

Little and Great
Whale

LaGrande Reservoirs
and rivers downstream
from powerhouse

La Grande Eastmain
1 Reservoir and
Rivers downstream
from powerhouse

Rupert

Nottaway

Broadback

Sucker
Lake Sturgeon
Cisco
Speckled Trout
Pike
Walleye
Lake Trout

Fish Species
Lake Whitefish
Sucker
Lake Sturgeon
Cisco
Speckled Trout
Pike
Walleye
Lake Trout

0-0.29
0.30-0.49

Unrestricted
8 meals per month

0.5-0.99

4 meals per month
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1.0-1.99
2.0-3.75

2 meals per month
1 meal per month

B-V. Discussion
B-Va. Fire
Wildfires in California show an overall decline in ignition sources in recent decades, yet
powerline ignitions have increased (Keeley & Syphard, 2018) and tend to burn larger
areas than fires ignited by other causes (Collins et al., 2016). Powerline-ignited fires tend
to be much more dangerous and capable of rapid spread because they generally occur
during high winds, which have three effects: tree contact, line arcing, and metal fatigue
resulting in downed lines (Mitchell, 2009). In southern Australia a disproportionate
number of electricity-caused wildfires occurred when fire danger was high (Miller et al.,
2017). Powerline distribution along roads may contribute to burning patterns that are
closely correlated with road distribution in southern California (Faivre et al., 2014;
Keeley & Syphard, 2018).
B-Vb. Transboundary Sustainability
An emphatic clean energy rhetoric surrounds Hydro-Quebec’s initiatives to export
hydropower to neighboring states and provinces, including the New England Clean
Energy Connect (NECEC), a new 1200 MW interconnection deliver electricity to the
New England grid from Quebec via Maine:
The contract will meet 17% of Massachusetts’ electricity needs while cutting its
GHG emissions by more than 36 million tons of CO2 equivalent—roughly
comparable to taking 413,000 cars off the road. The deliveries will help reduce
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dependency on costly and emissions-generating fuels like oil and natural gas.
Overall, the contract will benefit not just Quebec and Massachusetts, but Maine
and all of New England as well (Hydro-Quebec 2019 Annual Report, 2020: 27).
As power demands in neighboring provinces and in nearby U.S. states increase,
Hydro-Quebec is increasingly able to market the huge storage capacity of its reservoir
generating stations as ‘clean’ energy that can meet baseload demand, complementing
solar and wind initiatives. The utility is committed to “stepping up initiatives to increase
electricity exports to all markets in northeastern North America.” In 2019, hydropower
exports from Quebec permitted their neighbors to obtain, “at competitive prices, a large
quantity of green energy that they could use to offset the intermittent nature of their
renewables, such as solar and wind power” (Hydro-Quebec 2019 Annual Report, 2020:
27).
Quebec’s industrial sector consumed 84.1 TWh of electricity in 2017 while its
residential and commercial sectors consumed 66.6 TWh and 23 TWh, respectively
(Government of Canada, 2020a). In neighboring Ontario, by contrast, electricity
consumption is split roughly equally between the three sectors: in 2017 the commercial
sector consumed 47.0 TWh and the residential and industrial sectors consumed 44.2 TWh
and 42.1 TWh, respectively (Government of Canada, 2020b).
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APPENDIX C: CHAPTER 4 Supplementary Information (SI)
Table C-1. Major datasets for each process in the generalized global production network for
oil at the national level.
National-Level Global Datasets

• Global Resources / Proved Reserves
1980-2017: USGS, EIA, BP STATS,
OPEC]
• Production
1965-2017 (EIA, BP STATS, OPEC)
• Transportation & Trade
2000-2017 (BP STATS,
UNCOMTRADE, EIA)
• Refining and Processing
1965-2017 (BP Stats, OPEC, US
EIA)
• Consumption,
1965-2017 (BP STATS, EIA)
• Carbon Dioxide Emissions,
1965-2017 (BP STATS);

Company-level datasets

• Global Resources / Proved Reserves
ResourceContracts.org: Online
repository of petroleum and mining
contracts
• Production
Chevron ‘Alternative Annual Report’
(2009-2011)
NRGI: National Oil Company dataset
• Transportation & Trade
EIA Energy Imports to US by
Company
•
•
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Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Carbon Underground; Carbon Majors
Database
Env Impacts: World Resources
Institute: BP Operations in
Ecologically Sensitive Areas
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Table C-2. Network metrics across multiplex production network time series at the
national level: Big Oil, Hybrid Companies and NOCS as separate networks (in R).
Big Oil

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Nodes N
(Company; Country)

7
58

7
60

7
59

7
60

7
58

Edges m

383

378

435

439

469

Assortativity

-0.117

-0.081

-0.125

-0.113

-0.157
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Figure C-1. Larger versions of adjacency matrices appearing in main text. Gas (top) and
liquids (bottom) for all companies across 2014-2018. The gas network displays more
modularity (0.269) than the liquids network (0.104).

253

254

Figure C-2. Larger versions of adjacency matrices appearing in main text.
Communities for gas (top) and liquids (bottom) production of Big Oil.
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